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ABSTRACT

Australia is one of the countries that have been active in criminalising money
laundering (ML) activities, particularly when it passed the Anti-Money Laundering and
Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (AML/CTF Act), and when it established
AUSTRAC (the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre) as the financial
intelligence unit (FIU) and the regulator of the Australian AML system in 1989. The
Financial Action Task Force (FATF) evaluated the Australian AML system in October
2005 (before passage of the AML Act in 2006) and found a considerable number of
shortcomings, one of those being that Australia was partially compliant (PC) with a
number of important aspects in regard to its AML regime. This includes AUSTRAC’s
inability to enforce compliance. It noted that even where AUSTRAC had limited
powers to enforce compliance these have been utilised very infrequently. This thesis
assesses the operational capacity of AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism in regard to
non-compliance with reporting obligations.
This thesis contextualises the review process of activities that have been undertaken in
Australia (after issuing the AML/CTF Act of 2006) to enhance the ability of AUSTRAC
to apply the most effective enforcement powers regarding compliance with reporting
obligations. These activities failed to address a number of major shortcomings that
have, nevertheless, been explored by FATF in its mutual evaluation reports. This thesis
further notes that, while the Australian AML system has shortcomings, there exist a
number of factors (some more amenable to change than others) that will make it more
difficult for Australia to comply with existing and future FATF Recommendations if the
scenario remains largely the same. These factors include: the struggle of various entities
to understand and apply the risk based approach (RBA), the limitations of the AML
xv

training programs for reporting entities, and the disconnection in the relationship
between AUSTRAC and its partner agencies.
This thesis will consider the benefits that AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism could
gain — in terms of increasing its level of effectiveness — from examining the
enforcement mechanisms of other countries’ FIUs as well as the enforcement
mechanisms of other Australian regulatory agencies in regard to non-compliance
behaviour.
Finally, this thesis suggests that while a number of recommendations and practical
solutions for AUSTRAC, its partner agencies and reporting entities can be reliable
options to achieve increased effectiveness for the Australian AML system, any such
initiative is more likely to deliver sustainable positive outcomes when it contributes to
enhancing this system in general and the AUSTRAC enforcement mechanism in
particular.
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1 INTRODUCTION
1. 1 Preface
1.1.1 Background
Several features of financial institutions make them particularly attractive to money
launderers. First, organised crime generates proceeds generally in the form of cash;
second, the sheer volume of cash handled by financial institutions makes it possible to
channel huge amounts of money through financial institutions without arousing their
suspicions; third, the financial system is highly internationalised, making it very easy to
transfer proceeds from one jurisdiction to another; and, fourth, financial institutions are
often surrounded by a cloak of secrecy. 1 Due to these vulnerabilities financial
institutions are often subject to regular surveillance by a government’s financial
intelligence unit (FIU).
The global anti money laundering (AML) regime has, through the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF), established a number of obligations for financial institutions so that
they can prevent themselves from being used for the purpose of money laundering
(ML), and so uphold the reputation of their businesses, and also assist government
efforts against ML. One of these obligations is that of reporting certain unusual
suspicious transactions or matters to an appropriate authority in a way prescribed by the
government.
Under the national legislation of various countries, the reporting obligations are very
strict since this is one of the most important pillars of the AML regime. 2 In the early

1

Guy Stessens, Money Laundering, A New International Law Enforcement Model: Cambridge Studies in
International and Comparative Law (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 134.
2
Tatsuo Ueda, ‘The Suspicious Transaction Reporting System and its Effective Use’ (2001) UNAFEI
117th International Seminar, Current Situation and Counter Measures Against Money Laundering 411,
411.

1

period of reporting, administrative or regulatory penalties were imposed on noncomplying institutions; today this is rarely the case. Now, it is not uncommon for a
failure to report to be a criminal offence. 3 Governments take enforcement measures
regarding reporting obligation non-compliance very seriously, and often a series of
actions is available against non-complying financial institutions.
Although regulatory authorities have the choice of several disciplinary alternatives
available when a particular non-compliance situation requires a response, in practice
responses are generally only expressed through a number of relatively ‘softer’ measures,
for example, persuasion, warning letters and so on. As Broome (2005) observes,
prosecutions for failure to report remain rare and finding such an instance is difficult
unless there is some reason for regulators to focus on particular transactions. 4
There could be several explanations for this leniency on the part of regulators (in AML
fields, the regulator is often the FIU but in many cases the role is performed by a
number of sectorial regulators) toward financial institutions (the ‘reporting institutions’
in AML). Broome (2005) notes that governments are probably not yet experienced
enough in the application of harsher punishment for non-compliance.5 Consequently,
more serious action has occurred over the last seven years and may be seen more
frequently in future as the pressure for full-compliance increases.

3

John Broome, Anti-Money Laundering, International Practice and Policies (Sweet and Maxwell, 2005)
292.
4
Ibid 293.
5
In this thesis, harsh(er) regulatory sanctions and/or penalties means the sanctions/penalties which have
more intrusive regulatory aspects ,with consequently higher levels of intervention and compliance costs,
while references to soft(er) regulatory sanctions/penalties means the use of sanctions/penalties with less
regulatory intrusive, lower levels of intervention and compliance costs. For example, warning letters or
requests for changes in procedures are less intrusive than mandated changes in processes. The level of
intrusion increases with changing sanctions such as requirements for corrective advertising and the
payment of refunds, requirements to terminate relationships with other entities (such as service providers)
and the suspension or cancellation of licenses.

2

Regulators also may decide not to apply severe penalties due to the impossibility of
knowing what the results would be in terms of a cost-benefit analysis of such an action.
Financial institutions are pillars of a country’s economic infrastructure; therefore, a
decision to revoke the licence of an institution for reporting obligation non-compliance
may not be easy to take. However, a reporting entity’s ‘blindness’ to a known criminal
activity in an account may be considered to have fulfilled the mens rea (guilty mind)
requirement and the institution may be prosecuted accordingly, as was held in the case
of United States v Bank of New England.6
Discussion of enforcement actions where reporting obligation non-compliance is
detected is relevant: reporting is the foundation of any AML regime. If there is no
strong enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance, the reporting system will fail,
causing the entire AML regime to ultimately fail. Therefore, it is necessary to assess the
FIU’s enforcement mechanism to identify its strengths and weaknesses.
In this thesis, the researcher is going to appraise the enforcement mechanism available
to the Australian FIU (the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre
(AUSTRAC)) regarding non-compliance with reporting obligations under Australian
AML legislation.
1.1.2 The Problem: AUSTRAC and its Enforcement Mechanism
AUSTRAC was established in 1989 under the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988
(Cth) (FTR Act) and continues its work under the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter
Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act). It is a financial intelligence unit
and regulator that works alongside Australian reporting entities in their compliance with

6

Matthew R Hall, ‘An Emerging Duty to Report Criminal Conduct: Banks, Money Laundering, and the
Suspicious Activity Report’ (1995-1996) 84 Kentucky Law Journal 669.

3

legislation to combat ML crimes. AUSTRAC fulfils an investigative role, and assists
law enforcement bodies and partner agencies by passing relevant information to them in
order to prevent financial crimes and facilitate the prosecution of criminals in Australia
and beyond.7
The FTR Act required ‘cash dealers’ to report to the CEO of AUSTRAC 8 regarding
international funds transfer instructions (IFTIs), significant cash transactions and
suspect transactions. Lawyers were then only required to report significant cash
transactions.
Under the AML/CTF Act 2006, ‘reporting entities’ were required to first undertake their
reporting obligations (these are the same obligations under the FTR Act 1988) by 12
December 2008. Reporting entities can be individuals, companies or other entities that
provide a ‘designated service’ as defined in the AML Act, including banks, non-bank
financial services, remittance (money transfer) service-providers, bullion dealers and
gambling businesses, 9 accountants, lawyers and real estate agents.
In order to assist reporting entities to comply with their reporting obligations,
AUSTRAC released a reporting implementation policy on 19 September 2008,
According to this policy, entities were required to report suspicious matters and, if
applicable, threshold transactions and IFTIs to AUSTRAC. 10 Figure 1 below represents
the AUSTRAC reporting system.

7

Jackie Johnson, ‘Australia: Working within the Law – The Attitudes of Reporting Officers to the
Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988’ (2000) 8(2) Journal of Financial Crime 162.
8
Ibid.
9
AUSTRAC, AML/CTF Act – Reporting Requirements (December 2008)1.<http://www.austrac.gov.au/
files/mfs_requirements.pdf> at 28 May 2011.
10
AUSTRAC, AML/CTF Act – Reporting Implementation Policy v.1 (September 2008) 1–
2.<http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/amlctfact_reporting_implementation_policy.pdf> at 28 May 2011;
AUSTRAC, Overview of the AML/CTF Act 1.<http://www.austrac.gov.au/elearning/pdf/intro_amlctf_
overview_amlctf_act.pdf>at 28 May 2011.

4

Figure 1: The AUSTRAC Reporting System
Source: AUSTRAC website
The AML Act has addressed several areas and includes a ‘tipping off’ offence,
strengthening the reporting system. 11Strict obligations regarding record-keeping
requirements are also imposed.12
The enactment of AML legislation using a risk-based approach (RBA) makes reporting
obligations more important. For example, RBA can enhance the AML reporting system
by requiring every entity that may be considered to pose a ML risk to submit suspicious
matter reports (SMRs). Customers considered to pose a higher ML risk would need to
provide additional information and be placed under stricter supervision. Thus, reporting
obligation compliance should be strategically targeted by AUSTRAC.

11

AML Act 2006 s 123 prohibits a reporting entity that has provided information or a document to a
person (under subsection 49(1)) from disclosing that material to anyone else.
12
The AML Act 2006 (Cth) as amended up to and including Act No 8 of 2010 (this compilation having
been prepared 22 March 2010), pt 10, and pt 11 div 3. See <http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/
Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsf/0/21AC5D1801F8FC5DCA2576EF001E3EC2/$file/AntiMoneyLaund
CountTerrFin2006.pdf> at 28 May 2011.

5

In fact, AUSTRAC believes that reporting obligation compliance is essential for a
successful AML regime. In instances of non-compliance, AUSTRAC is, therefore,
ready to take appropriate action to guarantee compliance and rectify the situation — the
AML/CTF Act equips it with a wide range of enforcement powers to be used in cases of
non-compliance with the Act.13
AUSTRAC has issued a number of circulars that explain and justify its use of the
enforcement mechanism. Documents include AUSTRAC’s Enforcement Policy, the
guiding principles within its Supervisory Framework Policy, and the Enforcement
Manual. AUSTRAC is to use its enforcement powers where non-compliance has been
identified. According to its Enforcement Policy, ‘[W]here cooperation and negotiation
have demonstrably failed, AUSTRAC will not hesitate to take measured but firm
enforcement action for the purpose of securing compliance and rectification’. 14
For the enforcement options available to AUSTRAC (as per its enforcement policy), see
Figure 2 below.

13

AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Annual Report 2007–08 (2008) 39.See <http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/
austrac_annual_report_2007-08.pdf> at 28 May 2011.
14
AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Enforcement Policy (pdf file undated, e-version last modified 3 March 2010) 1.
See <http://www.austrac.gov.au/enforcement_policy.html> at 25 May 2011.
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Figure 2: AUSTRAC Enforcement Mechanism
However, the 2005 FATF mutual evaluation report on Australia found AUSTRAC to be
only partly compliant in its application of sanctions where non-compliance was
detected. (See, for example, the Report’s recommendations 17, 35 and 40, below).
AUSTRAC’s actions demonstrate that it does not routinely apply formal sanctions in
such instances.
Recommendation 17 notes:
The penalty regime in the FTR Act provides for criminal sanctions or civil
injunction power under section 32 (Part V), where AUSTRAC may also seek to
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restrain unlawful conduct by application to Court for injunction relief under section
32 of the FTR Act. However, statistics reveal that this power is used by AUSTRAC
in limited circumstances. Criminal sanctions are also available in the Criminal
Code or the Crimes Act 1914. The lack of administrative sanctions means in
practice that formal sanctions are generally not applied. However, Australia notes
that agreed remedial action with the cash dealer, while not a formal sanction,
successfully encourages improvements. 15

Recommendation 35 reiterates much of the above but adds that ‘[t]he regulatory
sanctions available in the broader Australian financial supervisory and regulatory
environment include criminal, civil and administrative mechanisms. 16
Recommendation 40 clearly states a number of AUSTRAC shortcomings in its
approach, including an over-reliance on ‘education’ and a lack of compliance
inspections (in terms of frequency, type and range of target institutions), and a need to
introduce a ‘comprehensive administrative penalty regime’ and ‘specific measures’ for
licence revocation and other matters. It is worth reproducing here in full:
AUSTRAC’s on-site supervision activities do not cover the full range of
compliance tools available to it under the FTR Act. AUSTRAC currently focuses
on education visits and has conducted only two compliance inspections of banks in
the last two years. … educational visits include inspections of records to ascertain
whether an entity is a cash dealer, and if so, whether they have reporting
obligations and whether they are complying with them. Australia also notes that
education visits can result in agreed remedial action with the cash dealer which,
while not a formal sanction, successfully encourages improvements. Nevertheless,
the Australian government needs to develop an on-going and comprehensive
system of on-site AML/CFT compliance inspections across the full range of
financial institutions. There should also be specific measures that enable the
regulator to disqualify management or directors or revoke a licence to operate for
specific AML/CFT failings. There is also a need to introduce a comprehensive
administrative penalty regime for AML/CFT failings. 17

Even today, some five years later, under the latest AML Act which enhanced
AUSTRAC’s power in applying both civil and criminal penalties (especially after the
Policy (Civil Penalty Orders) Principles 2006), the reader of the AUSTRAC annual
15

FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of
Terrorism/Australia (FATF, 2005) 99.
16
Ibid 10.
17
Ibid.
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reports will not find much difference in the way AUSTRAC deals with non-compliance.
(The only exception is that there are some improvements in the level of persuasion.)
According to the retired AUSTRAC CEO, Neil Jensen, AUSTRAC has not enforced
civil penalties.18 In its 2008/09 annual report, AUSTRAC states that it had ‘investigated
a number of financial institutions and other regulated entities regarding breaches of the
FTR Act and AML/CTF Act’ and ‘received a legally enforceable undertaking from one
institution to rectify breaches and comply with its AML/CTF obligations’. 19
AUSTRAC has not applied civil or criminal penalties for non-compliance; rather it has
limited its action to a number of soft enforcement actions, such as accepting enforceable
undertakings from a number of non-compliant entities that had been found to have a
number of deficiencies and been in breach (including in regards to their reporting
obligations) of Australia’s AML/CTF laws.20 This reveals shortfalls in AUSTRAC’s
current response to reporting entity non-compliance.
Accordingly, an attempt to identify and examine the reasons for AUSTRAC not
pursuing civil and criminal penalties against non-compliant reporting institutions — and
determine whether it had any impact on the level of reporting compliance — is justified.
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Marsha Jacobs, ‘Money-Laundering Regulator to Get Tough’ Australian Financial Review, 1 April
2009, 9.
19
AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Annual Report 2008-09 (2009) 37.See <http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/
ar0809.pdf> at 10 May 2011.
20
AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Accepts Enforceable Undertaking from Mega International Commercial
Bank’ Media Release, 1 July 2009 <http://www.austrac.gov.au/1jul09.html> at 6 June 2011; AUSTRAC,
‘AUSTRAC Accepts Enforceable Undertaking from Barclays Bank, Media Release, 1 July 2009
<http://www.austrac.gov.au/1jul09_2.html> at 6 June 2011; AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Accepts
Enforceable Undertaking from George Thomas Hotels Pty Ltd, Media Release, 31 December 2010;
AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Accepts Enforceable Undertaking from Argos Investments Pty Ltd, Media
Release, 9 December 2010. For texts of the enforceable undertakings see AUSTRAC website:
<http://www.austrac.gov.au/enforceable_undertakings.html> at 6 June 2011.
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1. 2 Scope
First, the thesis will be limited to the issues of AML and not extend to cover CTF
related issues. Thus, it will be confined to the legislative and strategic aspects of
improving AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism regarding non-compliance with
reporting obligations, an element crucial to the strength of the Australian AML system.
Cultural, technical and practical matters do impact on enforcement mechanisms, which
could make measuring its effectiveness difficult.
Factors affecting the AML system in Australia (as elsewhere) include the regulatory
culture, corporate culture and the different interests of those who are part of the AML
system, political perceptions, and the nature of AML activities which continuously
change as criminals utilise new methods and types of operations. This last factor
inevitably leads to underestimations of criminal activity (due to the lag between
identification of a new type of activity, formulation of appropriate legislation,
subsequent detection, much less the imposition of appropriate sanctions). The level of
confidentiality to be observed and a lack of information available as to why AUSTRAC
has refrained from using its enforcement powers — and as to whether or how regulated
entities react to this lack of enforcement — further complicate matters.
Second, the AUSTRAC enforcement mechanism’s strengths and weaknesses regarding
reporting obligation noncompliance will be evaluated using what information is
available (taking into consideration the aspects mentioned above), and by doing field
research and collecting empirical data. The thesis findings will provide material from
which a better understanding of the actual reasons for the situation can be derived.
AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism will be examined in order to identify, and
critically evaluate, the factors that impact upon AUSTRAC’s enforcement decisions
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(particularly in relation to its enforcement mechanism). Data obtained will also be
examined in order to understand reporting entity perceptions of AUSTRAC’s
enforcement regime.
The following must be taken into consideration when evaluating AUSTRAC’s
enforcement mechanism regarding reporting entity non-compliance:
1

The regulatory and corporate cultures, including any political influences playing a
role in the way that AUSTRAC deals with non-compliance.

2

The different nature of the reporting entities, including the type of work
undertaken, organisational size, history of compliance and regulatory ‘capture’,
and how this affects the role of AUSTRAC when it applies sanctions on a noncompliant entity.

3

AUSTRAC’s self-regulation, including staff training, budget, information
technology system and relations with reporting entities and partner agencies.

When discussing enforcement powers, a comparison can be made between AUSTRAC
and other countries’ FIUs and their enforcement mechanisms, such as those of the USA,
the Netherlands. Comparisons can be drawn between AUSTRAC and other regulatory
agencies such as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) and their experiences with
enforcement compliance in the Australian context. These can inform evaluation of
AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism.
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1. 3 Significance
This thesis reports an important and original study, because of the lack of sources in this
field. By evaluating AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism, the thesis is able to make
theoretical and practical contributions to the field of combating ML crimes at national
and international levels.
This thesis represents the first intensive research into the AUSTRAC’s enforcement
mechanism and its implications for the AML system. It will enhance the literature in
this area by providing comprehensive knowledge and original data. This thesis will also
play a vital role in drawing attention to, and increasing the understanding of, the
Australian regime’s achievements and any inadequacies with respect to preventing ML
activities. Its findings should subsequently provide valuable conclusions for the
Australian AML regulatory model in its enforcement in relation to the non-compliance
issue, and ultimately contribute to the reduction of ML crimes.
On the international level, this thesis will provide valuable information to governments,
so they can benefit from the successes of the Australian regulatory experience, and
avoid its shortcomings.
1. 4 The Research Question
The research question is:
What are the strengths and weaknesses of AUSTRAC’s enforcement
mechanism with regard to non-compliance with reporting obligations under
the AML Act?
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1. 5 Overview of the Thesis
After discussing the thesis problem in Chapter 1, the next step in this chapter is to
undertake a review of the literature in the area of FIU enforcement mechanisms, in
terms of their descriptions or views on how to achieve the most effective enforcement
mechanism for these agencies so as to guarantee the highest level of compliance by the
reporting entities with the AML reporting obligations. The thesis methodology
including the data analysis is then provided, and the building of the theoretical
framework to be able to answer the research question.
Chapter 2 provides the required knowledge to identify and clarify ML crimes, and
reflects upon the international initiatives and conventions against such harmful illegal
activities, taking into especial consideration the FATF Recommendations as a
benchmark. The chapter then provides an historical overview of the Australian
experience in the AML domain.
Chapter 3 highlights the reporting obligations under the FATF Recommendations, and
reflects on the need for the compliance with these obligations, particularly in light of the
Mutual Evaluation of the FATF to Australia (before enacting the AML Act 2006) and
the US Department of State report 2008–2010 (after enacting the AML Act 2006). This
chapter reflects upon the need for clearer recommendations from FATF, the need for
Australia to comply with the reporting obligations, and also the need for more effective
AUSTRAC and AML system in the Australian jurisdiction.
Chapter 4 emphasises the need for this agency to consider the most effective
enforcement mechanism in order to achieve an effective enforcement profile, and
suggests four attributes and requirements (that have been found through the analysis of
the theoretical and practical approaches of the reporting entities interviewed) in
13

designing and adopting such a mechanism. These attributes are essential to any
regulators when enforcing compliance and not only for AUSTRAC. This chapter also
highlights the experiences of other countries’ FIUs (notably those of the United States
and The Netherlands) in enforcing compliance with reporting obligations and
demonstrates that a country’s regulatory culture and the pre-existing legal system can
play a vital role in the formulation and operation of a country’s regulatory system and
its regulator’s enforcement mechanisms. The Chapter also examines the experiences of
other Australian regulatory agencies (namely ASIC, the ACCC and APRA) and their
enforcement mechanisms. The experiences of the selected FIUs and those of other
Australian regulatory bodies are compared and contrasted to those of AUSTRAC with
the aim of discerning ways in which the local regulator’s performance could be
improved.
In Chapter 5, a number of AUSTRAC publications are discussed, including its
strategies, annual reports, surveys, and typologies and case studies. Even though
AUSTRAC has tried in these publications to reflect its role as an effective regulator and
its great achievements in the AML system, an analysis of these publications reveals
differences between ‘what AUSTRAC says’ and what actually occurs in regards to non
compliance with reporting obligations.
Given the facts and outcomes reported in the previous chapter, Chapter 6 came to
highlight a number of factors that are affecting AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism
for reporting obligation non compliance. An analysis of the responses obtained in a
number of interviews pointed to a number of these factors, including AUSTRAC’s lack
of experience and capacity, disengagement in the relationship between AML parties,
and AUSTRAC’s underachievement of its Guiding Principles.
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The final chapter, Chapter 7, presents the overall findings of the thesis, and reflects on
the current enforcement mechanism scenario of AUSTRAC in regards to non
compliance with reporting obligations in light of the four attributes and
recommendations that the thesis encourages AUSTRAC to consider when improving its
enforcement profile. Unless its enforcement operation and capacity improve,
AUSTRAC and the society it serves will continue to suffer from its weak decisions and
enforcement profile.
1. 6 Literature Review
AML systems rely on the power of their reporting regimes; therefore, the level of
compliance determines a regime’s strength. Regulators are always looking for
compliant entities; however, in the presence of non-compliance although regulators may
have sanctions at their disposal, their use of such sanctions appears uncertain, and often
limited. Some studies have discussed FIU enforcement mechanisms generally but, to the
best of our knowledge, AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism is yet to be externally or
independently researched and evaluated.
When studying any country’s AML system, it needs to be borne in mind that while ML
cannot be entirely eradicated, efforts can be made to regulate it. What countries should
be calling for is the best possible regulation, regulation that is able to reduce, even
minimise ML.
However, a number of factors (other than the FIU enforcement mechanism) challenge
an AML system’s regulatory processes. The literature on this area mentions, for
example, basic cultural issues, compliance costs, different interests of the various AML
system parties, and privacy costs. Influences usually extend to include political,
practical, economic and technical influences and so on.
15

1.6.1 Cultural Costs and the AML System
In the process of regulating the economic sector, many influences can play a vital role in
justifying a country’s regulatory system. Levi (1997) discussed ‘regulatory compliance
culture’ and its influences on the establishment of an effective AML regime. He argues
that various countries have different levels of willingness to control and regulate their
systems. Countries establish their regulatory systems to ensure the stability and the
efficiency of their economy. Alongside increased security and savings, a major role of
regulatory bodies is protecting the national financial system from illicit approaches and
misuse. However, the different approaches that countries adopt to regulate their systems
differ in their operations and reveal different priorities in combating ML crimes. Many
factors affect the way different countries respond in their efforts to combat such
crimes. 21 In her article, Gilboy (1998) states that such factors must be taken into account
when looking to regulate any system, as it is shaped by the country’s cultural forces,
which have social, professional, organisational and work-group impacts.22
1.6.1.1 Cost of Compliance
The regulatory compliance culture in the field of AML reflects the different interests
and priorities for the AML system parties within that country and even between
countries. Those parties are the reporting entities, FIU, law enforcement bodies, and
other partner agencies.
Masciandro and Filotto (2007) note that as profit is the main goal of financial
institutions, any regulatory decision militating against this interest would not be very
welcome. Compliance costs are one of the factors that could affect the formulation and
21

Michael Levi, ‘Money Laundering and Regulatory Policies’ in Ernesto U Savona (ed), Responding to
Money Laundering: International Perspectives (Harwood Academic, 1997) 259, 260–1.
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Janet A Gilboy, ‘Third-party Participation in the Regulatory Process: Legal Duties, Culture, and
Noncompliance’ 1998) 20(2) Law and Policy 135, 151.
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operation of the AML system, because ‘[a]s the cost of regulation rises, the level of its
acceptability to intermediaries declines’. This, in turn, affects the level of the
effectiveness of any AML regime by prompting those institutions whose operations are
proposed to be affected to actively oppose the introduction of the measure, and
ultimately affect the nature of the measure finally adopted. The ‘bottom line’ for a
regulatory system to be effective is, according to Masciandro and Filotto, that ‘it must
possess a sufficient level of acceptability to the regulated intermediaries’. 23
Braithwaite (1993), however, indicates that the effects of compliance costs do not stop
at the reporting entities stage, but also extend to the regulatory and government
agencies’ enforcement costs, including the ‘enforcement bureaucracies, prisons, courts
… involved in ML enforcement and … tax revenue forgone when criminal
organizations are prevented from laundering their money into legitimate businesses that
pay taxes and create honest jobs’. 24
As the regulatory compliance culture is affected by the compliance cost, if the cost of
compliance with the AML system is high, then the level of the compliance will most
likely decrease.
There are other factors. Verhage (2009) explains that the reporting entities also have a
reputational interest to guard, to prevent any association with criminal attitudes and
activities, protect their reputation, and avoid regulatory sanctions for non-compliance or
loss of confidence or trust from other reporting entities. The FIU and law enforcement
bodies, too, are looking to combat ML crime, and protect their reputation as successful

23

Donato Masciandro and Umberto Filotto, ‘Money Laundering Regulation and Bank Compliance Cost:
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Laundering Control 133, 133.
24
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authorities inside and outside the country. Other partner agencies care about keeping the
financial system’s integrity safe-guarded, and maintaining a healthy economic regime. 25
It can be added that ML can affect reporting entity reputation in the eyes of customers
or regulatory agencies; however, the level of reputational harm for any given event
varies from entity to entity and from one matter to another. For example, if ML activity
has occurred, the effect may vary with the size of the entity (having a disproportionate
effect on smaller entities) but also between similar sized entities. Therefore, the
influence of ML on reporting entity reputation is highly subjective, and should be taken
into consideration when examining their AML compliance. Also important is the high
reputation of the FIU, as a strong, active FIU inspires confidence and cooperation from
enforcement authorities and partner agencies.
Broome (2005), and Grabosky and Braithwaite (1993), however, draw attention to the
conflicting interests of regulators, customers and suppliers; the various regulatory
typologies; and the level of financial institutions’ compliance and implementation.
According to Broome, regulator, customer, and supplier all seek to serve their own
interests or concerns: the regulator to regulate the financial system, customers to buy
goods at the lowest possible price, and suppliers to achieve the highest price for their
goods. The interplay between these sometimes mutually exclusive benefits plays a vital
role in building regulatory model. 26
The nature of FIUs differs. Grabosky and Braithwaite clarified the typologies factor.
They observed that (i) some rejected law enforcement powers and concentrated on
bringing conflicting parties together to resolve disputes; (ii) some held powers to
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enforce but rarely used them; and (iii) others prosecuted offending financial institutions
in terms allowed by their regulatory process. 27
Entity compliance with the relevant regulatory regime also varies, reflecting and
affecting a country’s regulatory culture in a complex interaction.
Each in this chain is engaging in this preventive process from its own standpoint,
looking to fulfil its own purposes.28
1.6.1.2 Cost of Secrecy
‘Privacy cost’ is another example that demonstrates the regulatory culture issue and the
different interests at play in combating ML crimes. According to Masciandro (1999),
reporting entities would always prefer to avoid problems with regulatory agencies in the
combating of ML crimes and would like to comply with their regulation. Yet they are
aware of misusing their customer information during the process, which could affect the
level of their customer trust in their institution. 29 The FIUs, law enforcement bodies and
other partner agencies need to obtain as much information as they require without (or
with limited) privacy obligations to effectively combat ML. Publication of data on their
databases for access by different entities and agencies may also be viewed as highly
desirable by agencies;30 but however secure their databases, reporting entities or
customers may not view their use of ‘private’ data so calmly.

27
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In addition to the privacy issue and its influence on the level of the reporting entities’
compliance (referred to by Masciandro), it is important to add that reporting entities do
not immediately prefer to deal with law enforcement bodies in ML matters, because
these bodies always need information to pursue their investigations and prosecutions,
and such activities could harm the reporting entities and their clients’ privacy. Some
would argue that there is a need for the FIU to act as a filter for information in such
cases and take appropriate action before it becomes necessary for such material to go to
the enforcement authorities.
The multiple parties involved in the AML processes, and the differences in their
interests, make the creation of one single, operationally identical, effective global
system to combat such crimes unviable, and highlight the importance of the need to
identify and prioritise the conflicting interests. FATF with its ‘Forty Recommendations’
attempted to provide solutions for countries worldwide.
1.6.2 The Need for FATF
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) — the inter-governmental body whose
purpose is the development and promotion of national and international policies to
combat ML and terrorism financing (TF) — issued its Forty Recommendations to
provide a complete set of countermeasures against ML. They covered the criminal
justice system law enforcement, the financial system and its regulation, and
international cooperation. With these recommendations FATF adopted principles for
action and gave member countries a measure of flexibility in implementing these
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principles according to their constitutional frameworks, their financial system and legal
culture.31
1.6.2.1 FATF and the Obligation to Report
A number of important aspects have been covered by these international standards. One
of the most important, core requirements was the obligation for reporting entities to
report suspicious transactions. Recommendation 13 states:
If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds
are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should
be required, directly by law or regulation, to report promptly its suspicions to the
financial intelligence unit (FIU).

According to Ping (2005), the STR obligation is a very important tool in combating ML
crimes, and the most effective measure to accomplish cooperation between reporting
entities and government authorities. Ping also states that the concept of ‘suspicious
transaction’ is not defined in the international documents. 32 However, he did not posit
the possible reasons for this, such as the different financial and legal cultures of various
countries.
1.6.2.2 FATF and the FIUs
Recommendation 13 of FATF’s Forty Recommendations makes clear the reporting
entity’s obligation to report to the relevant FIU. On the issue of FIUs, an important
contribution to this thesis has been the analyses by Reuter and Truman (2004) and
Broome (2005). They point out that the local AML regime is dominated by the influx of

31
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international AML standards. They note that the FATF Recommendations were the
fundamental base for enhancing countries’ compliance with its standards and starting
the AML regulating process with the establishment of FIUs with respect to
recommendations 26 to 32.33
According to Ueda (2001), the FIU is a very important body in any AML regime, with
its role seen as a bridge between the reporting entities and law enforcement authorities. 34
Ping (2005) similarly notes that in the STR system the FIU is the centre for information
and plays a vital role in the cooperation between the financial institutions and
governmental authorities by providing the possibility of information exchange and
information sharing.35(See Figure 3)

STR System Flow Chart
↓ Suspicious
Transaction Report
Financial
Institutions
↓

Suspicious Transaction Report
Financial Intelligence Unit
Useful Information

↓

Law Enforcement Authorities

Figure 3: STR System Flow Chart
Adapted from Tatsuo Ueda, ‘The Suspicious Transaction Reporting System and its
Effective Use’.36
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However, none of the above authors (with the exception of Broome (2005)) discussed
one very important issue: the different FIU models, and their roles and obligations in the
STR system.
Okogbule (2007) and Broome (2005) clarify the availability of different FIU models.
Okogbule (2007) argues the importance of such units, which by their role provide the
required focus, increase effectiveness, and lead to better law enforcement. 37
Significantly, Broome (2005) details different jurisdictions’ experiences of establishing
FIUs, and distinguishes the structure of various models. Although all play a vital role in
the relationship between the AML system parties of their countries, they do so
somewhat differently, illustrating cultural, technical and situational differences and
variations. 38
Some FIUs have the right to collect and analyse information obtained from financial
institutions before passing it to other regulatory agencies and law enforcement bodies
(the ‘Administrative Model’). In this model the relationship between the FIU and other
authorities indicates a strong, interactive relationship, and most countries have adopted
it (for example, the United States of America, Monaco, Slovenia, France, and Australia
among others).
In contrast, the ‘Investigative Model’ carries out the investigative role in relation to ML
activities either alone or with other regulatory agencies and law enforcement bodies.
This reflects a direct relationship between the FIU, other authorities and the courts.
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In the third model, the ‘Judicial Model’ (adopted in Portugal and Luxemburg), the FIU
is a part of the judicial sector, or reports directly to the judicial authorities after
collecting and analysing information.
On the other hand, a fourth important model identified in Broome’s study is the ‘Law
Enforcement Model’. Here the FIU is a part of the police agency. This gives this unit
the opportunity to benefit from intelligence offered by law enforcement agencies and
other regulatory bodies. However, this last model (adopted by the New Zealand and UK
jurisdictions) 39 makes financial institutions feel uncomfortable as they deal with an FIU
which has a power of law enforcement.
Therefore, most countries, including Australia, follow the administrative model.
According to Thony (1996), Australia established its AUSTRAC in accordance with
this model. By law, it has the authority to supervise and regulate the reporting entities’
compliance with legal provisions on ML. AUSTRAC has created its own system of
automatic reporting for cash transactions and reporting of suspicious activities and
transactions. Such information is electronically transmitted from the reporting entities to
AUSTRAC databases, where it is then accessible by partner agencies, law enforcement
bodies and also foreign institutions that have agreements with AUSTRAC to do so.40
While a number of scholars mention that the choice of a particular FIU model depends
on the regulatory culture of the country, the administrative model is an effective model
for FIUs, especially in relation to STRs. However, it is not comprehensive.
In his study, Ueda (2001) argues that the model chosen can play an important role in
justifying an FIU’s abilities and powers generally, such as in dealing with the AML
39
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process, and, more specifically, by enforcing compliance with the STR obligation. Ueda
notes that the administrative model can have some problems. The Japan Financial
Intelligence Office (JAFIO), for example, follows the administrative model but has
limited powers to analyse STRs because it cannot carry out criminal investigations nor
access the necessary criminal database. As a solution, Ueda suggests that JAFIO acquire
investigative powers. These would enhance its enforcement mechanism by giving it the
ability to obtain the necessary crime-related information from the reporting entities and
law enforcement bodies. It would then be able to carry out high-quality analysis of the
STRs and provide law enforcement bodies with high quality information for their
investigations.41 Although Ueda’s suggestion involves enhancing JAFIO’s enforcement
mechanism, it should be clear that it would still differ significantly from the law
enforcement model. It would remain an example of the administrative model, but one
enhanced by some additional power which would increase its effectiveness and its
ability to analyse.
The FIU models can help increase understanding as to how these agencies operate, how
they work in supervising compliance, how they relate to other agencies, entities and
institutions, and the availability of the enforcement powers according to each model’s
style. One of the FIU’s main reasons for being, however, is the availability of an active
policy and utilisation of its enforcement mechanism, whether the FIU is operating
according to the administrative or another model. The level of understanding shown by
the reporting entities in regard to their obligations, especially reporting obligations, and
the degree of their compliance with those obligations is partly fashioned by FIU policies
and expectations as well as local factors.
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1.6.3 FIU’s Enforcement Mechanism and Reporting Obligations
Most of the above authors note that high compliance with a reporting system is not easy
to achieve but systems can move closer to the ideal by improving the cooperation
between the AML reporting system parties (especially between reporting entities and
FIU), and their responses to this system, and by taking into consideration the various
interests and cultural influences operating.
However, the success of any AML reporting system relies on the success of the
authority that is supervising this system, and its use of its powers where needed. Thus,
FIUs (or the relevant regulator where this role is not given to the FIU) have an
obligation to enforce compliance where non-compliance is detected.
But the question remains, how should an FIU deal with non-compliant reporting entities
regarding their non-compliance so as to achieve the highest level of compliance?
1.6.3.1 Enforcement Power and Regulation
Generally, the ‘regulatory approach’ is related to the form of law and enforcement that
has developed in areas of social regulation over a long period. Criminal law is often
considered essential to guard the public from threats from which they could not protect
themselves, with criminal sanctions defined as tools for prevention. 42 In terms of the
economy, one of the main purposes of the law is to protect and sustain high levels of
industry performance, ensuring conduct conducive to this goal, and through the law’s
most effective enforcement ensures a suitable balance between the differing interests of
trade parties and public protection.
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A number of enforcement strategies can be adopted. According to Croall (2003), the last
resort in enforcement is the use of criminal prosecution. A regulatory approach is
associated with compliance and linked with a minimal use of criminal sanctions. 43 It is
essential to note that this often emerges from lengthy negotiations between industry
groups, regulators and governments. Hutter (1997) notes that regulatory enforcement
usually relies on the adoption of cooperative compliance strategies, including
persuasion and education; nevertheless, regulators adopt a range of administrative
sanctions, including providing restrictions, imposing fines, and suspending or revoking
licences, which can affect the survival of a business. These play a vital role in
regulatory enforcement.44
1.6.3.2 Strategic Regulation Theory
Regulators adopt an approach to enforce compliance that varies according to the nature
and type of sanctions that are applied when non-compliance with the law and
regulations is detected.
Braithwaite’s theory, embodied in his Enforcement Pyramid, clarifies the regulatory
power; how it works, and how it should work, not only for business compliance, but
also in relation to a number of other areas. This theory is employed widely by
researchers

in

fields

as

diverse

as

43

environmental

regulation
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1984),45occupational health and safety (Gunningham and Johnstone 1999),46 and ML
(Fisse 1997).47
This theory provides a ‘macro perspective’ on the role of enforcement sanctions in
protecting regulatory compliance. It advocates regulatory compliance as best secured by
persuasion rather than legal enforcement. For persuasion to be effective, generally a
threat of punishment must lie behind the regulator’s appeasing actions. The threat of
punishment should take the form of a set of sanctions, which the regulator can threaten
to use where breaches occur. The sanctions should escalate in severity of response to
more serious breaches of the law, until the top of the enforcement pyramid is reached.
(See Figure 4)
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Figure 4: Enforcement Pyramid
Adapted from Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation,
Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford University Press, 1992) 35.
Many researchers argue that its purpose is to motivate the highest levels of regulatory
compliance. The rationale of this strategic regulation theory and its pyramid model is
that those regulated ‘will comply sooner or later’ through a combination of normative
aspiration and instrumental prevention. 48
However, Baldwin and Black (2007) indicated that this theory does not provide
guidance on what the regulator should do to detect non-compliance activities. Both
scholars explained that the Enforcement Pyramid is a limited theory mainly focusing on
how to punish non-compliant entities in order to achieve the aim of securing
compliance. They also pointed out that this theory does not help the regulator to insure
48
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it selects the inspection strategies which will lead to superior enforcement outcomes. In
addition, this theory does not tackle essential regulatory aspects when enforcing
compliance such as unclear objectives, changes in the regulatory environment,
conflicting institutional pressures and how the regulatory agency should evaluate the
effectiveness of its enforcement strategies and applications. 49
Nevertheless, Freiberg (2010) pointed out that the influence of the Enforcement
Pyramid in the regulatory arena has been profound and fruitful. The Enforcement
Pyramid has flourished to the level that a large number of regulators have developed
some variant upon this highly respected theory. Thus, he believes that this theoretical
accuracy has definitely enhanced the quality of regulation at both state and federal
levels in Australia. As a result, the Australian regulatory frameworks faced the
challenge of the global financial crisis (GFC) effectively. 50
Indeed, the Enforcement Pyramid is a rich source of information and applicable theory
for regulatory agencies and enforcers in different areas including AML. Through their
theory, Braithwaite and Ayres have identified regulatory compliance as a good
governance issue, and if a country has a high level of governance it will have an
improved regulatory framework. In the Australian AML context, AUSTRAC needs to
effectively adopt this kind of approach by giving the businesses it deals with a greater
interest in achieving compliance with the lowest level of regulatory intervention.

49

Robert Baldwin and Julia Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’ LSE Law, Society and Economy
Working Papers 15/2007, London School of Economic and Political Science (2007) 3.
50
Arie Freiberg, ‘Re-Stocking the Regulatory Tool-Kit’ Paper presented to The European Consortium for
Political Research (ECPR) Standing Group on Regulatory Governance [University College, Dublin]
Third Biennial Conference ‘Regulation in An Age of Crisis’ Dublin, 17–19 June 2010, 1.

30

Braithwaite (2002) declares that regulation works best with an image of punishment in
the background. If persuasion alone is to provide a more effective ‘ground level entry’
to the enforcement pyramid, then agencies should treat it as a real area of activity and
not leave a situation until there is no choice but to move to the top of the pyramid. Early
intervention is recommended to maximise the effectiveness of persuasion. Agencies that
speak or act softly and delicately must at the same time carry ‘very big sticks’ (‘the
Benign Big Guns’).51 Non-compliant or potentially non-compliant entities must be made
aware of this ‘threat’ that may be activated should compliance not occur. Sooner, in this
situation, is better (and more cost-effective) than later. Consequently, the base of the
pyramid is illustrated as being wide, signifying the larger number of matters involving
many entities whose activities become compliant relatively easily, using less force.
Continuing non-compliance results in an escalation up the pyramid, towards ever
harsher penalties. The model illustrates the progressively fewer cases being addressed
by increasingly harsher measures. Persuasion should first be utilised, then a warning
letter when dialogue fails, progressing to civil penalties, then criminal penalties, then
licence suspension and finally, when all else fails, permanent revocation of the relevant
licence.52
Thus, the regulatory agency has options, and can determine when and how to respond
where the level of regulatory intervention can be lesser or greater and where the costs to
both the regulator and the regulated effectively increase the further the regulator move
up to the top of the pyramid.
In other words, the real choices for the regulator are whether to be ‘soft’ by adopting a
lower cost, lower levels of intervention and lower compliance costs approach for the
51
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reporting entities, or to be ‘harsh’ by adopting a higher cost and higher level of
intervention approach.
According to Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), clear interaction (in cases of deterrence)
between the regulatory agencies and industry in accordance with the pyramid increases
the likelihood and extent of compliance and lowers the level of interventionism. Where
there is a lack of clear communication, escalation to the enforcement level and above
more frequently results.53
In conclusion, according to Braithwaite’s theory, the responsive regulatory approach
relies on how well people self-regulate, how they react when detected for breaches and
how effective the regulator’s disciplinary reaction is where and when required.
It is clear from the above discussion that sanctions which could be applied for noncompliance are diverse, and escalate in severity. However, the question in the area of
ML crimes prevention is which sanctions better achieve the purpose — is it better for
the regulator to take ‘measured but firm enforcement action for the purpose of securing
compliance and rectification in regard to the reporting obligations’?
1.6.3.2.1 Soft Sanctions
According to Tsingou (2005), FIUs always have one goal: compliance, and this is most
likely achieved through persuasion, cooperation, self-regulation, risk-based discretion
and, sometimes, ‘private remedies’.54 Thus, he recommends ‘soft’ rather than harsh
sanctions to ensure enforcement.
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Unger and van Waarden (2009) also support this argument, giving the example of the
Dutch legal culture which relies on persuasion, advice, provision of more information,
and education of potential transgressors in enforcement compliance. 55
What are the reasons behind applying the soft sanctions?
A number of reasons can convince an FIU to apply soft rather than harsh sanctions on
non-compliant reporting entities, especially initially:
1

Risk based approach (RBA): The AML policy has switched from the ‘rule based’
to RBA in a number of countries (including Australia). RBA entails a reporting
entity managing and mitigating their own risks, including the risk of suspicious
transactions, while the rule based approach involves a monitoring system
designed to detect certain laundering behaviours rather than suspicious
transactions.

According to Unger and van Waarden (2009), shifting from the rule based approach to
RBA aims to achieve the best level of compliance through avoiding over-reporting by
the reporting entities. The new approach led to a large range of definitions and
perceptions of ‘suspicious transactions’. Reporting entities have the right to determine
the suspicious behaviour that they need to report, making it more difficult for FIUs to
impose sanctions for wrongful reporting. In some jurisdictions, paradoxically, RBA led
to a flood of reports (see further below).
2

Regulatory Capture and Lack of Ascendancy: While RBA imposes self-regulation
on the reporting entities, it is also recognised that danger potentially exists if
regulators are drawn from the industry to be regulated. In this instance, the FIUs
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may be more ‘flexible’ in dealing with non-compliant entities, and the soft
sanctions may be the only powers used to enforce compliance. According to
Clarke (2000), a related issue is the extent to which a regulator can achieve
‘ascendancy’ (the opposite of capture). Indeed,
a lack of superiority [of the regulator’s power] and the truculence of major
companies were partly responsible for the difficulties faced by regulators in the
pensions “mis-selling” cases in which, despite regulatory action and attempts at
“naming and shaming”, major household names persistently denied any
misconduct.56

Etzioni (2009) makes a significant point when he illustrates how regulatory capture
weakens the enforcement of existing regulations and the regulator’s enforcement
mechanism. For example, in USA the US Sentencing Commission implemented
sentencing guidelines in 1989 and introduced large fines of up to USD364 million for
criminal activities. These guidelines faced opposition from powerful interests — major
trade associations and corporations — who used their influence to have the fines
reduced. As a result of pressure from such powerful lobbies, the Commission reduced
the penalties by as much as 97 per cent and, not only that, allowed offending
corporations in particular circumstances to reduce the remaining penalties to a small
amount, if not nil. 57 Thus, regulatory capture can constitute a problem in some instances
in the design of an enforcement mechanism and in the use of applicable sanctions.
3

Pre-existing legal institutional framework: Legal systems are the product of
decades of development of public policy regulation and case law. Thus the
adoption of an AML compliance system predicated on applying soft sanctions
rather than harsh penalties where the jurisdiction generally embodies a harsher
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approach may not be a policy option readily acceptable to the entities in that
jurisdiction nor may the adoption of a harsher approach be welcomed in a
jurisdiction where generally a softer approach is used elsewhere in that
jurisdiction. According to Schäfer (2002), the pre-existing legal context is very
important in determining the actual enforcement mechanism and its acceptability
in any country, especially when countries vary from developing to developed, and
have different legal traditions in dealing with non-compliance. An external source
(FATF) for seemingly arbitrary alterations to an AML regime (rules or sanctions)
may not be an option as the current regime is part and parcel of an entire existing
legal system. 58 Hence the variety encountered even between developed
jurisdictions (such as the USA and the Netherlands, further below). Unger and van
Waarden (2009) indicate that while the ‘soft’ Dutch legal framework invokes
criminal law; its sanctions are not harsh nor instantly imposed, without respect for
the person.59
However, will relying on soft sanctions help an FIU guarantee compliance in all cases?
From the above, it is clear that the use of the soft sanctions as the only sanctions to
enforce compliance may be preferable in many circumstances and jurisdictions, but not
all. It depends on the country’s political and legal systems. Nor are soft sanctions the
adequate way to deal with non-compliance in every instance. According to Croall
(2003), the use of soft sanctions to enforce compliance could encourage the ‘capture’ of
the enforcing agency as sympathy develops between regulators and the regulated when
they operate in a cooperative style.60 In other instances (as outlined earlier), the
existence of soft regulation or use of soft enforcement and light penalties, despite the
58
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availability of harsh sanctions, may be a symptom of such capture. The continual
application of soft sanctions could also reflect an FIU’s lack of experience, which
makes it impose ‘immature’61 and disproportionately low sanctions on non-compliant
entities.
According to the FATF Methodology for Assessing Compliance with the FATF 40
Recommendations and the FATF 9 Special Recommendations, an FIU should have
adequate and effective powers of enforcement and sanctions against the reporting
entities, and their directors or senior management for failure to implement or properly
implement requirements to prevent ML, consistent with the FATF Recommendations. 62
1.6.3.2.2 Harsh Sanctions
In some jurisdictions (such as the USA), harsh sanctions are used to enforce reporting
obligation compliance. According to Hall (1996), the US financial intelligence unit
(FinCEN) utilises strict enforcement sanctions, including harsh fines and criminal
sanctions. 63 Sanctions have significantly increased since the enactment of the Patriot
Act after the events of 11 September 2001. These included fines of USD25 million for
Riggs Bank in 2004 (for failure to report suspicious transactions), USD24 million for
Arab Bank PLC in 2005, and USD50 million for AmSouth Bank. 64
What are the reasons behind applying harsh sanctions?
1

Ingrained Cultural Values. One active, ingrained US cultural value is that
reporting entities are independent in their work but still responsible for their
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actions and deserve to be prosecuted if they behave badly. Unger and van
Waarden (2009) have pointed out that the basic US industry / regulatory body
relationship is one of distrust, so when entities misbehave an agency is more
likely to favour harsh sanctions over persuasion and education as the way to
guarantee compliance. 65
2

The Cost-benefit Analysis. Broome (2005) states that regulators may decide not to
apply harsh penalties if it is difficult for them to know the cost-benefit analysis of
such an action, but they will use them if they do know. 66 Unger and van Waarden
(2009) also note that government, especially in the US, believes strongly that
harsh sanctions have the ability to correct actions, so the importance of an FIU’s
experiences in dealing with non-compliance must be considered. Broome
maintains that government will use its powers and apply harsher punishment for
non-compliance if it is experienced in this area of law. As a consequence, more
serious action may be seen in future as the pressure for full compliance
increases. 67

What are the problems of applying harsh sanctions?
A number of scholars have mentioned some problems that could occur when applying
harsh sanctions to the reporting entities when they fail to implement or properly
implement requirements to prevent ML.
1

Crying Wolf. Hall (1996) explains that banks in the US carry different liabilities
in relation to the reporting system, including their liability to customers for filing
the reports and for terminating accounts after filing the reports, in addition to their
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liabilities to government for failure to file such reports, and for the bank’s
participation in the conduct described in the reports. These liabilities will push
banks to apply ‘safe harbour’ provisions, by reporting to the FUI as many as they
can of the transactions that they believe have clear indicators or even doubtful
indicators of their being suspiciousness transactions, just to ‘be on the safe side’,
leaving the analysis and investigative role to the regulator. This phenomenon is
called the ‘Crying Wolf’. 68
Therefore, excessive sanctions force reporting entities to report transactions which are
less suspicious, especially if the AML system relies on the RBA and identifying the
suspiciousness is a matter left to the reporting entities to specify. Levi (1997) mentions
that financial institutions sometimes struggle to identify suspicious transactions as it is
complicated to prove the actual level of trade that corresponds to the currency deposits
of customers.69 Beare (2002) supports this argument, arguing that suspicion is most
likely generated in an area of uncertainty and anxiety, where financial institutions
cannot tell if they are facing professional launderers, who are disguising the typical
features of suspicious transactions. 70
AUSTRAC’s public legal interpretation series provides a description of ‘to suspect’. An
SMR obligation arises when reporting entities suspect ‘on reasonable grounds’ any of
the matters specified as reportable under the AML Act, and this suspicion is based on
evidence that supports the truth of the suspicion.71 This should be helpful to the
68
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reporting entities, enabling them to determine a suspicious transaction and report it. If
they fail to do so, the regulator must utilise the appropriate enforcement power to
guarantee compliance.
Takats (2009) argues that harsh sanctions are not the tool to use to enforce compliance,
and banks should not be regarded as criminals but as honest informants. He
recommends that to encourage them to comply with reporting obligations, the regulator
needs to decrease the sanctions for negative false reports but introduce reporting fees to
discourage false positive reports.72
Banks and other reporting entities are trying to do their jobs, fulfilling their obligations
to depositors, customers/clients and shareholders as well as helping the FIU combat ML
which also threatens their integrity in the longer term. These reporting entities are
crucial to the AML system, but decreasing sanctions may not be the best solution for
non-compliance. According to Roule and Kinsell (2002), the UK is facing a major
problem with non-financial services reporting entities (such as lawyers 73 and
accountants), who filed only 180 of the 15,000 reports submitted in 2000. 74 In such a
situation, it would not appear that the best way to deal with semi or non-compliance
with reporting obligations would be to decrease sanctions or impose reporting fees.
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An interesting suggestion made by (former Northern Territory technology-based
gambling regulator and consultant) Alan Pedley was that the best solution for enforcing
STR compliance would be to minimise the number of these reports and achieve the
reporting of genuine STRs. He argues that this will never occur without the regulator
understanding all of the threats and vulnerabilities (which could be quite complex), and
then treating them as required.75
2

Low Quality Reports (Defensive Reporting). As harsh sanctions could push
reporting entities to report ‘less suspicious’ transactions (and more of them) to the
FIU, it could also introduce a correspondingly lower quality for these reports
(reporting less important or unreliable information) — an activity that called
‘defensive reporting’. According to Carrington and Shams (2006), defensive
reporting is a product of the difficulty of finding the right balance between
reporting entities meeting their reporting obligations and being a trustworthy
partner by providing the FIU with reliable and high quality data on which to
undertake its analysis. 76 Verhage (2009) indicates that banks should not be blamed
for the large number of STRs they send or for their poor quality. Rather blame
should attach to the FIU if (i) it fails to provide enough assistance to these entities
to clarify the suspicious transactions for them, thus enabling them to clearly
identify them; or (ii) the FIU utilises tough enforcement powers and harsh
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sanctions for non-compliant reporting entities, thus making them fear error and so
‘over-report’.77
However, instead of attempting to attribute blame, it would be better to take an
appropriate regulatory initiative to solve the problem. Of particular interest is how to
make the FIU more active in its relationship with reporting entities. By forming a close
and strong relationship, the FIU can have greater opportunity to approach these entities
and understand their workings, supervise them from a near distance and apply the most
effective enforcement powers on non-compliant behaviour. Effective relationships
could be formed in many ways (for example, building bridges between the FIU and the
reporting entities through presenting awards to the best reporting entities of the year).
The responsibility for compliance with reporting obligations in the AML system is not
only the responsibility of the reporting entities; it is also that of the FIU, which should
ensure compliance by using the right tools where non-compliance arises. The reporting
entities differ in size, history, type of work and culture; all of these factors should affect
the way in which the FIU deals with semi or non-compliance. In this context, it is
probably difficult to apply a high level of sanctions (such as licence revocation) on a
non-compliant entity, especially if it is large because such an action may affect the
economy by rendering many people unemployed and decreasing the value of
investments in this business. That does not mean that the offending entity should go
unpunished; several civil and criminal punishments could still be applied.
Thus, this thesis, from a review of the literature and available research, has come to
observe that the FIU should not concentrate on adopting a purely cooperative style (in
terms of soft sanctions) or take the opposite approach and be a tough regulator
77
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(applying harsh sanctions on non-compliant reporting entities). Rather, a more
qualitative approach should be adopted, individually tailoring the approach on the basis
of an examination of the FIU’s findings on entity non-compliance, and how it can best
operate its mechanism so as to ensure those entities comply effectively with their
reporting obligations.
1.6.3.3 Obligations for AUSTRAC and the Current Enforcement Mechanism
By enacting the Australian Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing
Act 2006 (Cth) (AML/CTF Act) (and its amendment in 2007), Australia has taken a step
forward in the process of meeting international standards, including the standards set by
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). According to part 15 of this Act, the
AUSTRAC CEO and AUSTRAC obligations to supervise the AML system entail (i) the
requirement to monitor compliance by reporting entities with their obligations under
this Act, the regulations and the AML/CTF Rules; and (ii) the responsibility to enforce
compliance by prosecuting offences and seeking civil and criminal penalties, issuing
remedial directions for reporting entities that have contravened civil penalty provisions,
seeking injunctions, exercising powers of questioning, issuing notices to reporting
entities, and accepting enforceable undertakings. 78
AUSTRAC clarified this in its enforcement policy, specifying its monitoring and
compliance enforcement role. Persuasion and education are followed by several
enforcement actions, including the prosecution of criminal offences, imposition of civil
penalties, issuing of infringement notices, remedial directions, injunctions, accepting
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enforceable undertakings, notices to take ML and TF assessment, and notices to
undertake external audits and compliance monitoring.79
As AML and the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) are two faces of the same coin,
one of FATF‘s concerns is the evaluation of the AML systems of member countries,
including Australia. When FATF examined AUSTRAC in its 2005 Mutual Evaluation
report, AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism was an aspect that attracted criticism. The
Report identified Australia as partially compliant with recommendation 29, noting that
‘AUSTRAC’s powers of enforcement and AML/CTF sanctions exist but are limited to
criminal sanctions and hence rarely applied; there is a need to institute a regime of
administrative penalties’.80 Recommendation 29 makes it clear that the FIU should
apply adequate enforcement powers for non-compliant behaviour:
Supervisors should have adequate powers to monitor and ensure compliance by
financial institutions with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing, including the authority to conduct inspections. They should be
authorised to compel production of any information from financial institutions that
is relevant to monitoring such compliance, and to impose adequate administrative
sanctions for failure to comply with such requirements. 81

In fact, AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism relies on persuasion, education and onsite visits. This is clear in the annual reports that it has issued from the year it was
established (1989) until its most recent annual report (2010/11). The content of the
FATF recommendation (above) and the application of Braithwaite’s theory to the use of
AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism reveals that AUSTRAC is not using its
enforcement powers as it should. (See Figure 5, below.)
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AUSTRAC
Figure 5: AUSTRAC’s Limited Use of Braithwaite’s ‘Enforcement Pyramid’
Looking at AUSTRAC’s enforcement policy, or the theory of Braithwaite or any other
theorist who is concerned with enhancing the system to achieve the goal of strategic
regulation, it is there recommended that enforcement tools be adequate and
proportionate to the breach that has occurred. When the regulatory agency does not
adequately fulfil this obligation, then there is a problem that needs to be addressed.
Yet examining the diagram above, which illustrates AUSTRAC’s partial use of the
Braithwaite enforcement pyramid and therefore limited use of the tools at its disposal, it
can be seen that AUSTRAC is applying a cooperative system in dealing with noncompliance and has chosen soft sanctions even in the longer term. Indeed, AUSTRAC’s
approach is based on acceptance of the view that it is better for both the regulator and
regulated to start at relatively low intensity interventions with relatively low costs.
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Crucial questions arise:
(i)

Why does AUSTRAC not use its available enforcement powers as it could? There
might be a number of reasons, including RBA, regulatory capture, pre-existing
legal and political institutional framework, and avoiding the problem of reporting
entities ‘crying wolf‘ and defensive reporting.

(ii)

How does AUSTRAC perceive its approach to enforcement and the methods it
uses to ensure compliance?

(iii) How does AUSTRAC deal with non-compliant entities, and how do these entities
perceive AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism?
1.6.3.4 Most Effective and Adequate Enforcement Mechanism Will Lead to a
Strong Reporting System
In earlier debate, scholars put forward a number of ideas about the affects of the FIU
enforcement mechanism on the AML reporting system, and the challenges that face the
use of the FIU’s enforcement powers on non-compliant reporting entities. However,
there is no indication in the literature as to how the Australian FIU, AUSTRAC, could
or indeed should improve its enforcement mechanism for reporting obligation noncompliance. The thesis will focus on and explore this area. As explained earlier, there
are no fixed standards for enforcing compliance; each country follows its own system in
regard to its FIU’s application of its enforcement powers, with some of them applying
soft sanctions and following a cooperative system, and others applying harsh sanctions.
However, a strong reporting system will never be instituted without the most effective
and adequate enforcement mechanism being in place in accordance with a country’s
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enforcement policy. AUSTRAC has its own enforcement policy which provides
AUSTRAC with the ability to apply soft and harsh sanctions.
The literature review has identified a few common enforcement/compliance issues
regarding AML reporting obligations; they could be a primary means of assessing the
enforcement mechanism when we look for ‘most effective and adequate enforcement
powers’ in relation to reporting obligation non-compliance. But the key issue is to
identify the ideal set of attributes that will prescribe the enforcement mechanism in the
AUSTRAC context, and this is what this thesis will do. However, should Braithwaite’s
theory be a benchmark, given that in the AML field it is not adequate in every respect?
Should AUSTRAC then examine the best practice of other countries’ FIUs and that of
other local partner agencies to learn from their experiences in enforcing compliance
before adopting an amended regime? If so, which countries and local agencies should be
examined? Australia has its own AML system. Although other countries’ different
political and economic systems will affect the way they deal with compliance issues, a
comparison could prove valuable. And while the nature of AUSTRAC’s type of work
differs from that of its partner agencies, making it difficult to judge how AUSTRAC
should utilise its enforcement powers, nevertheless consideration of all the above
aspects is important to gain an understanding of the strength and weaknesses of the
AUSTRAC enforcement mechanism, and how it should be constructed to best deal with
non-compliance regarding reporting obligations.
Therefore, this thesis will consider the previously reviewed literature that indicates that
AUSTRAC should adopt a more qualitative approach when it establishes its findings on
non-compliance by the different reporting entities (reporting entities are various and
have different sizes, natures and type of businesses they provide). In considering all the
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above, this thesis will clarify the theory that will reflect the core and sub-core problems
that will be built on the outcome of the research conducted using qualitative
methodology. This will identify the ideal set of attributes that will prescribe the
enforcement mechanism in the AUSTRAC context, an enforcement mechanism that
will ensure that those entities make their best efforts to comply effectively with their
reporting obligations.
1. 7 The Methodology
The thesis will discuss AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism and critically evaluate the
factors that influence its enforcement decisions that stem from that mechanism. A
theoretical approach is needed to evaluate AUSTRAC’s strengths and weaknesses in
dealing with enforcing compliance. A number of AUSTRAC publications, including
annual reports, typologies and case studies reports, and its surveys series will be
analysed for relevant statistical data and to determine entity self-perceptions.
After building the theoretical framework, the thesis will take a practical approach
through the collection of empirical data (via interviews) with staff from a number of
reporting entities, whose contributions would be helpful in this stage.
It will then analyse the findings and compare these with the outcomes of the
examination of the AUSTRAC publications. This will determine if there is a contrast
between ‘what AUSTRAC says’ (that is, its operations in theory) and ‘what AUSTRAC
does’ (its operations in practice), or not. This thesis will then conclude by making what
the researcher hopes will be some useful recommendations.
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1.7.1 The Approach: Development of a Theoretical Framework
Firstly, the thesis will develop a theoretical framework. This will be divided into two
main areas. In the first part, it will examine the FIUs of other countries and the
application of their enforcement mechanism in regard to non-compliance with AML
reporting obligations. Also examined will be the enforcement mechanisms of other
Australian regulatory agencies’ (partner agencies to AUSTRAC in combating ML
crimes) and the use of these mechanisms against non-compliant behaviour. The
countries selected for comparison purposes are the United States and the Netherlands,
and the partner agencies selected are the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (ASIC), the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC)
and the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA). The thesis will particularly
scrutinise their use of enforcement powers. These international and national
comparisons will serve to highlight a number of aspects of the topic and reveal factors
that could affect the strength and weaknesses of their mechanisms. Their experiences
can be compared to that of AUSTRAC. The discussion of other Australian partner
agencies’ enforcement mechanisms will be underpinned by the Enforcement Pyramid
theory of John Braithwaite and Ian Ayres.
The thesis will clarify the concept of the enforcement pyramid, and seek to determine
whether it is really provides a model solution to the non-compliance problem or whether
it is a part of the problem. What it is clear from previous discussion is that the
enforcement pyramid theory does not explain why AUSTRAC does not take further
action in enforcing compliance. Therefore, the thesis will test, amongst other things,
whether the use of the enforcement mechanism by AUSTRAC is consistent with its
desired regulatory outcomes. The thesis will examine whether the enforcement pyramid
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theory of Braithwaite is a useful basis for measuring how well AUSTRAC operates in
enforcing compliance.
After establishing the theoretical framework, the thesis will develop the concept by
analysing a case study. The thesis will select one enforcement sanction, the civil penalty
that AUSTRAC could apply in non-compliance area to determine the response of
AUSTRAC in applying such sanctions.
In this regard, the experience of other partner agencies that apply the same sanction and
deal with it more commonly than AUSTRAC will be closely examined. By comparing
the AUSTRAC experience in this domain with that of other partner agencies, the case
study will help to illustrate successful regulatory approaches in applying the
enforcement mechanism on non-compliant actions and enable some identification and
evaluation of the reasons for regulatory strengths and weaknesses in this field.
The main criteria for the selection of the civil penalties as a case study were:
-

AUSTRAC has the right to apply this sanction as do other partner agencies on
entities for non-compliant activities.

-

Partner agencies — including ASIC, ACCC — have used this type of sanction in
their enforcement powers. However, they have yet to apply it for AML failings as
they would say they have no role. According to the FATF Mutual Evaluation
Report (2005):
APRA and ASIC have wide-ranging powers to remedy breaches of their relevant
legislation, which apply to entities as well as their directors and officers (e.g. senior
management). Powers include the ability to compel specific remedial actions,
disqualify persons for management or directorship functions, and revoke a license
or authorisation to operate. Australia notes that these powers would apply for noncompliance with the FTR Act if the breach created risks or breaches relevant to
APRA’s and ASIC’s legislation. However, it was unclear to the evaluation team
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how these would be applied in practice, as there are no express powers to remove
management or revoke a license for a breach of AML/CFT requirements. No
sanctions have yet been applied by APRA or ASIC for AML/CFT failings. 82

-

Information should be available from a number of studies to illustrate the
experience of other agencies in this area, and on the websites of the respective
agencies as well as that of AUSTRAC.

Secondly, the thesis will look at AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism in depth and
address the role and function of AUSTRAC, and how AUSTRAC says it measures its
effectiveness in the field of the enforcement mechanism through its publications.
1.7.2 Data Resources
The data resources of this thesis will take into consideration primary and secondary
resources:
1.7.2.1 Primary Materials
In order to answer the thesis question, and to obtain the data that are needed, a number
of different resources are required, particularly resources that can inform and inspire the
qualitative research thesis. Thus, primary resources and secondary resources are
necessary to construct the practical approach of the thesis.
Primary Material A:
For the purpose of this thesis, interviews have been used as a first main methodology to
collect this thesis’s primary data. Recordings have been made and transcripts prepared
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and saved on a secure computer during the data analysis process, in accordance with the
rules of the ethics committee at the University of Wollongong. 83
Initially the researcher planned to interview (face to face or via telephone) a number of
staff from both reporting entities and AUSTRAC and its partner agencies. However,
this proved impossible as a number of partner agencies and law enforcement bodies
(including the Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Independent Commission Against
Corruption (ICAC), the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), and the Australian Crime
Commission (ACC)) refused to participate due to claimed privacy issues and other
concerns.
The researcher also tried repeatedly and over a prolonged period (four months from
June to October 2010) to convince AUSTRAC to participate in the interview process.
Both the researcher, and his main supervisor Professor Broome, contacted AUSTRAC a
number of times via email in an attempt to secure their cooperation. After some delay,
they decided not to accept the invitation to participate in the interview process due to
privacy issues and concerns. Thus, the researcher relied on their publications (frequently
available online) as a source of information regarding their activities and their
perceptions regarding their operations and to compare these with the responses obtained
from reporting entities’ interviews.
The interviews conducted therefore targeted reporting entities from different categories:
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-

A number of small, medium and large financial institutions in Australia, with
interviews conducted with a number of managers and employees from the Risk
Management Compliance Departments of these institutions

-

A number of managers of legal firms (lawyers), licensed accountants and licensed
real estate agents.

Primary Material B:
The second main reliable methodology adopted to enable the researcher to add to the
above data was his attendance of workshops and seminars that highlighted AML issues
and AUSTRAC performance in this domain. This was to help (to some extent) offset
the researcher’s inability to interview personnel from AUSTRAC or its partner agencies
and enforcement bodies.
The researcher is also a regular visitor to the Forensic Accounting Committee at the
Certified Practicing Accountants (CPA) Australia 84 and has a close relationship with its
members, and is a member of the Association of Certified Anti-Money Laundering
Specialists85 (ACAMS) Australasian Chapter and CPA Australia. Members of these
committees were happy to help the researcher with the data collection process, either by
84
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introducing the researcher to the reporting entities to facilitate interviews, or by inviting
the researcher to workshops and seminars that proved to be fruitful sources of data.
Using reliable institutional sources like the CPA and ACAMS as a source of data in this
field gives credibility to the data obtained and a status and value to this material which
helped to achieve the aim of this thesis.
1.7.2.2 Secondary Materials
Secondary data resources used in this thesis are diverse. They included:
a)

Books, journals, articles, academic reports, conferences papers

b)

Relevant Australian legislation and regulations, and some related legislation and
regulations for some other countries, such as the USA and UK.

c)

FATF documents and the FTAF website; websites of Australian government and
regulatory agencies, including AUSTRAC, ASIC, APRA and ACCC; and the
websites of international firms, and convention websites.

d)

Official reports of the regulatory agencies; such as their annual reports, policies
and Memoranda of Understanding; the financial institution policies and plans.

1.7.3 Data Analysis
This thesis relied on the Constant Comparative Method, also known as ‘Grounded
Theory’ and aimed to secure reliable results and outcomes from the collected
information.
What is Grounded Theory and how does it work?
Grounded Theory is a research technique that starts from a very indistinct preliminary
question/s and allows the theory to come from the data. Therefore, this approach is not
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about identifying and examining hypotheses; rather, it is more about the analysis of
responses elicited from interviewees or other data and ‘reading between the lines’ of the
phenomena to discover and generate a theory that is grounded in the data. 86
The process begins with data collection, which is achieved through a range of methods
(for example, interviews or surveys). In terms of interviews: interviews are recorded,
and the recordings then transcribed. This is a preliminary to the first step. The main
ideas in the transcripts are then highlighted using a number of main codes which will
themselves emerge from the transcripts. ‘Open Coding’ is the initial stage of coding
when the researcher codes all information collected during fieldwork, through
interviewing and literature review. The researcher constantly compares incident to
incident in order to assist emergence of concept, and when a concept emerges then it is
compared incident to concept, and categories are thereby generated. 87 The Open Coding
stage will arrive at codes that will fit into similar concepts in order to make them more
practicable. This is the ‘Axial Coding’ stage. The collected concepts then go through
another filtering process to categories. These then go through ‘Selective Coding’, where
a core category is established and other categories related to it. These categories form
the source of the establishment of a theory for the thesis.88
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Is ‘grounded theory’ a reliable source and approach?
Grounded theory is now by far the most common and popular analytic technique for
qualitative research and has become extremely popular in a number of academic
research fields, including law and legal studies. 89
Grounded theory has long been used. Its roots can be found in the work of Charles
Cooley and George Herbert Mead between 1863 and 1931. 90 However, more systematic
procedures for grounded theory were provided by Glaser and Strauss in 1967. Grounded
theory then became more common and two variations developed: 91
1

The first was Strauss and Corbin’s grounded theory in the Basics of Qualitative
Research (Strauss and Corbin 1990). In this version the grounded theory method
has been reworked to incorporate a strict and complex process of systematic
coding.

2

The second was Glaser’s grounded theory in The Discovery of the Grounded
Theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967), He argued that the theory should clarify the
phenomena.

These two variations differ in many respects:92
1

In the research questions: While Strauss and Corbin rely on a statement that
identifies the phenomenon to be studied, Glaser relies on two main questions:
What are the main problems/concerns that citizens are facing in the area of the
thesis, and what category does the concern point to?
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2

In processes: While the Strauss and Corbin’s methodological process is easy to
apply, Glaser’s is more difficult.

3

In how concepts are generated: While generating the concepts after Strauss and
Corbin will reflect a phenomenon that will lead with its concepts to the theory,
generating the concepts after Glaser is more complicated as it links the concepts
according to their relationships with each other to clarify and interpret the
differences in the outcome in the area of the thesis.

4

In producing the theory: While Strauss and Corbin keep the testing and
examination of the concepts and their relationship with each other as a key
element to establish and produce the theory, Glaser’s methodology is more about
establishing a verity of theoretical hypotheses without making any effort to test
the concepts.

Strauss and Corbin’s version is becoming the most popular and widely used method,
and this thesis follows their perspective.
In order to examine the actual scenario of the AUSTRAC enforcement mechanism, the
interview questions were designed to examine the Australian AML system and to
evaluate AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism regarding non-compliance with
reporting obligations. A total of nine respondents were interviewed: five representing
four groups of reporting entities (including major banks, trustees and executor services
institutions, investment and superannuation institutions, and bookmaker and betting
institutions); and four representing two non-reporting institutions (including accountants
and real estate agents who will be obliged under the second tranche of the AML Act to
carry out the reporting obligations).
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The structured interviews were conducted over a flexible period of time for each
interview, ranging from 25 to 90 minutes, with an average length of 50 minutes. All
were conducted in or from Sydney (Australia) in 2010 and comprised three telephone
interviews (two entities from Melbourne, one from the Northern Territory) and six faceto-face interviews.
The interviews began with more general questions to gauge the interviewees’
behaviours regarding AML policies and practices, then moved to more relevant
questions which became the basis for more specific questions that did not need to be
prepared in advance. These questions covered the reporting entities’ understanding of
their role under the AML Act and Rules, including customer identification and
verification as well as customer due diligence (CDD). The questions then turned to the
RBA and the AML training and the reporting entities’ viewpoints on these issues,
followed by questions about the transaction monitoring processes and the reporting
obligations of these entities. The questions were designed to discover the feasibility of
the AML Act and Rules as well as these entities’ behaviours in regard to their reporting
obligations and AUSTRAC feedback on these reports. The questions then centred on
AUSTRAC’s enforcement powers and its mechanism regarding this issue and
AUSTRAC’s operational transparency, as well as the reporting entities’ experiences in
this domain. Finally, the interviewees were asked to supply suggestions and advice to
AUSTRAC with the aim of eliciting and coming to an understanding of their deep
reactions and the overall viewpoint of these entities about the AML system in general
and AUSTRAC’s work and enforcement mechanism in particular.
Among the advantages offered by interviews and the use of Grounded Theory include
the wealth of information able to be obtained and the opportunity for contributions from
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participants in response to open-ended questions. In some instances this may lead to
unanticipated avenues of research or theorising that may arise organically from the data
rather than from the presuppositions of a researcher. Patterns of key words give rise to
concepts which can coalesce to form one or more primary concerns and associated
repeated observations. This in turn can give rise to a theory that reflects the patterns
observed in the phenomena being examined.
Answers to interview questions go through the three levels of analysis in accordance
with constant comparative method of ‘grounded theory’ outlined above, namely:
1

Open coding.

2

Axial coding.

3

Selective coding.

After the open coding and axial coding process are applied to the data collection,
selective coding is used to identify the core categories. The core problematic area arises
from those categories. Selective coding means ceasing other forms of coding that came
prior to this stage and delimits coding to variables closely related to the core category. 93
After the selective coding a core category or categories emerge through data analysis.
In terms of this thesis, these core categories revealed the core problematic area which is
that: ‘AUSTRAC is facing challenges in applying most effective enforcement
mechanism’. These challenges (as manifested in the interviewee responses) are related
to AUSTRAC’s incapability of applying the most effective enforcement mechanism on
entities that are non-compliant in regard to their reporting obligations. The thesis has
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observed the core categories that revealed the core problem area (as discussed in
Chapter 6 of the thesis), including:
1

AUSTRAC’s lack of experience and capacity.

2

Australia’s AML system was not ready for the risk-based approach, and
AUSTRAC is struggling to apply the risk-based approach to regulated entities.

3

Lack of efficiency in AML training for both reporting entities and AUSTRAC
employers.

4

Disengagement in the relationship between AML parties.

5

AUSTRAC enforcement powers are still to fully mature.

6

AUSTRAC: Underachievement of its Guiding Principles which leads it to appear
to be subject to influence during the Global Financial Crisis.
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Figure 6: The Core and Sub-core Problematic Areas (the Outcome of the Selective
Coding Stage)
From these analysed concepts, this thesis was able to derive its theory which requires
finding the main attributes that AUSTRAC needs to consider as solutions that will help
it to achieve an active, adequate and most effective enforcement mechanism on non
compliant reporting entities, namely:
1

There should be different and actively used sanctions in place to be applied in
response to non-compliance.

2

There should be concord and agreement between the main regulator of the field
and its partner regulatory agencies, and also between the regulators and the
regulated entities to comply with the regulation.
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3

There should be unquestioned legislation and regulation essential for a successful
enforcement mechanism.

4

The regulatory agency must avoid regulatory capture, and not draw away from its
responsibilities due to political pressure or economic problems.

This thesis will work to reflect the Australian AML’s experience and AUSTRAC
operations and enforcement mechanism in relation to this theory to find out to what
extent it succeeds in considering and addressing the above attributes, to be able to
answer the main question of this thesis which is:
What are the strengths and weaknesses of AUSTRAC’s enforcement
mechanism with regard to non-compliance with reporting obligations under
AML Act?
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2 CLARIFICATION OF MONEY LAUNDERING
2. 1 Introduction
Money laundering (ML) is one of the most serious crimes involving financial systems
worldwide. Although no-one has been able to determine exactly when this criminal
practice began, it is clear that ML was used by the Mafia in the United States, Italy and
Russia during the 20th century, and was among their range of illegal activities, such as
drug trafficking, gambling, prostitution, ‘protection’ rackets and similar profitable
criminal activities. The traditional way to ‘clean’ the mafia’s ‘dirty’ money was by
buying apparently legitimate businesses and mixing the money derived from criminal
activities with the legitimate earnings from new businesses. 94
Most countries started to deal with ML crime in the late 1980s, making every effort to
curb this offence, and curtail the sources of illegitimate earnings (such as drug
trafficking, human trafficking, political corruption, and fraud) and interrupt terrorism
financing (TF).95 The goal was the prevention of the laundering of huge amounts of
‘dirty’ money — indeed some estimate that the industry involves about USD1 trillion
annually around the world. 96
ML has a multiplicity of harmful influences on the world. It impairs a State’s economy
and sovereignty, diffusing through the economy under the cover of financial
institutions’ legitimate activities. Today the use of sophisticated technology in banking
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provides additional ML opportunities. Electronic banking and associated cards, for
example, are an extra source of risk in relation to the laundering of illicit gains. 97
Money launderers have directed their activities at financial institutions as the most
important channel for their operations. Such institutions are utilised for transferring the
funds to be laundered from one place to another, both within countries and across the
world. Therefore, money launderers depend on being able to take advantage of the
development of financial institutions and regulations. International money markets also
provide a further avenue for exploitation.
This chapter identifies ML crimes and highlights the international achievements in
combating such harmful illicit activities.
2.1.1 Money Laundering: The Definition
Obviously, there is no one simple way to identify and thereby characterise and define
ML activities. Efforts have been made by scholars and governments to ensure that there
is an appropriate definition. Scholars in their research and governments in the
formulation of their policies and laws have become increasingly more able to describe
ML accurately.
Large numbers of old as well as more recent empirical studies have shown considerable
variation in the development of a comprehensive definition of ML activities. For
example, a number of scholars (such as Savona (1997)) define ML as an activity
undertaken to conceal the illicit source of money. 98 Reuter and Truman (2004) similarly
define it as a method used to convert criminal proceeds into assets, the origins of which
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cannot later be traced.99 Hopton (2006) also points out that any ML activity is a process
to hide the original proceeds of criminal activities. 100 Newland (2008) identifies ML as a
process to conceal the existence of unlawful funds, or unlawful application of income,
and disguising that income to make it appear lawful. 101
Many jurisdictions have sought to identify and thus define ML activities. For instance,
the US Money Laundering Control Act 1986 (MLCA), reflects a belief that ML activity
has two elements: financial transactions, and specified unlawful activities. According to
this Act, an ML activity is an illegal practice to conceal the identity, source, or
destination of the illicit gains (Madinger 2006).102 On the other hand, in the United
Kingdom jurisdiction, 103particularly under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (UK), ML is
defined in such a way that it involves not only traditional ML by third parties on the
behalf of the offender, but also the possession by criminals of their own proceeds of
criminal activity. 104 Thus, in the UK, ML is an action involving property in any form
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(money, property, goods, and so forth), which is either wholly or in part the proceeds of
a crime. This reflects the reality of the various uses of funds that are originally criminal
proceeds.
However, the Australian jurisdiction has another approach to identifying ML activities.
The Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Finance Act 2006 (Cth) has
adopted the meaning of ML appearing in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth).105 Thus,
ML has been defined as a criminal activity occurring when money or property that are
the proceeds of crime are used or when there is a risk that money or property will
become an instrument of crime.106
Therefore, a number of objectives for money launderers can be found in most
definitions of ML activities: 107
a)

Money launderers are always attempting to disguise their true identity.

b)

Money launderers disguise property ownership.

c)

Money launderers are attempting to distance themselves from the property they
are about to launder.
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Thus ML is disguising the true nature of the illegal funds or other property (its source,
identity, the destination and/or application of income) which has been obtained from
criminal activities, by hiding the actual source of the economic goods and making it
appear legitimate fund. It is important to understand that ‘dirty money’ after laundering
looks ‘clean’, but it will never be so, whatever processing it undergoes or whatever
form it adopts. Moreover, it must be strongly emphasised that such activities are crimes
and need to be prevented. Most importantly it should be known that such activities are
being prosecuted under the criminal law in most jurisdictions with criminal proceeds
also available post-conviction. In some jurisdictions, the criminal proceeds are subject
to confiscation under civil law using a system of ‘civil recovery’ where illicit gains are
confiscated without the need for a criminal conviction. 108
2.1.2 Money Laundering: The Cycle
It has been clear that ML activity takes some time and involves a number of procedures
to complete the process. Indeed, the ML process may take several stages. Most scholars,
though not all, characterise ML as being comprised of three stages: 109
1

Placement: money or other economic goods obtained from illegal activities are
initially placed into the financial sector and its systems (for instance, by opening a
new bank account).

2

Layering: monies obtained from criminal activities are separated from the true
‘dirty’ sources and the disguising process is begun by creating complex layers of
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financial transactions designed to disguise or obscure the audit trail and provide
anonymity.
3

Integration: money is combined into the financial system and integrated with
other assets in the system. By this stage, it is extremely difficult to differentiate
between legal and illegal assets. For example, the transfer of money through an
electronic funds transaction to a lawful bank from a bank owned by the
launderers. (‘Shelf banks’ are purchased without any trouble in many tax havens.)

Thus, according to these scholars, ML needs to go through a cycle of three stages.
Moreover, these stages complement each other and occur in sequence.
Some scholars, however, have an expanded view of the stages of ML. According to
Broome (2005), such activities are more sophisticated than previously thought. He
argues that in addition to the three stages commonly described above, there are three
more stages crucial to the description of the whole ML process. The six stages he
believes are: ‘Creation’, ‘Consolidation’, ‘Placement’, ‘Layering’, ‘Integration’, and
‘Realisation’. 110
In the ‘Creation’ stage, ML activity originates in criminal activity (such as drug
trafficking) that produces the ‘dirty’ profits. ‘Consolidation’ follows, where criminals
combine illicit proceeds obtained from different criminal sources in such a way that the
criminals are safe from (or at least at reduced risk of) arrest and prosecution.
‘Placement’ follows where the ‘dirty’ profits are placed in the financial system (for
example, in newly-opened accounts). The next stage is ‘Layering’ and involves using
the ‘dirty’ profits from sources, and includes the purchase and sale of investment
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Broome, above n 3, 168–71.
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instruments, where the initial investment of illicit proceeds had been placed. Moving on
to the ‘Integration’ stage, the money which has been laundered, is inserted for a second
time into the financial system as a lawful income. Finally, the ‘Realisation’ stage is the
invariable outcome; money that was unlawfully produced now permeates the financial
system and flourishes.
Such a comprehensive analysis of the money-laundering process (dividing and
categorising the ML process) has three notable results:
1

Greater descriptive capacity: especially when the full length and breadth of the
trail of the criminal process is covered, from the originating criminal activity or
‘mother crime’ to the final goal of the launderer receiving the benefits of the
criminal proceeds.

2

Greater importance placed on description: by including the crime that created the
original ‘dirty’ profits, not just the ML process.

3

More realistic representation: by reflecting the real nature of ML and the funds
laundered both at origin and process end (that is, the status of criminal activity
adheres to funds and other property even after the ML process is completed).

In conclusion, ML activities are associated with highly organised criminal behaviour,
and involve six complicated stages. They are generally hard to trace. Every effort needs
to be made to raise awareness of this crime, and to combat, to curb and finally to
eliminate it. This involves both national and international efforts at a number of levels,
including that of government.
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2. 2 Global Conventions and Initiatives against Money Laundering
Most countries have taken steps to combat ML through their participation in a number
of well-designed international measures designed to prevent these activities.
2.2.1 United Nations Initiatives
UN Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances –
the Vienna Convention (1988)
In 1988, the UN Conference for the Adoption of a Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances was held in Vienna. 111 It produced one of
the most important UN conventions in terms of its inclusion of ML. 112 The Convention
addresses the issue of proceeds of crime, making ML a transnational crime, and
encouraging international efforts to combat it.113
The Convention came to effect in 1990 and has been ratified by a number of countries
including the 13 member countries114 of the International Narcotics Control Board
(INCB).115 The INCB was calling for comprehensive international cooperation,
regulation and law enforcement to combat drug trafficking as well as ML crimes. It

111

United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
opened for signature 20 December 1988, E/CONF 82/15, (entered into force on 11 November 1990)
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currently in force. The remaining two are the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs (1961) and
Convention on Psychotropic Substances (1971). For full text of the Vienna Convention, see UNODC
website <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/convention_1988_en.pdf>at 10October 2011.
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114
The INCB is comprised of Ghana, Turkey, India, Brazil, Russian Federation, Nigeria, Italy, Iran,
Austria, Colombia, Netherlands, USA, and Australia.
115
The Vienna-based Board is an autonomous body founded by the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic
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the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances.
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cooperates with other international bodies, 116 and other related UN expert agencies, 117
but also with bodies outside the UN, especially the International Criminal Police
Organisation (INTERPOL) and the Customs Co-operation Council. 118
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime – Palermo Convention (2000)
The UN held a series of meetings in Palermo (Italy) in 2000 leading to the agreement on
the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.119 This represents a further
expansion of UN efforts to combat the highly organised illegal activities (such as ML)
by their prevention and investigation, and the prosecution of relevant offences. 120 In
addition, a number of protocols to the Convention were subsequently issued,
specifically addressing the prevention of the harmful influences of organised crime. 121
However, their provisions only apply to States that are parties to the Convention. 122
Under this convention, corrupt activities and ML are to be prevented, investigated, and
prosecuted. This is provided in Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention:
Article 7: Measures to combat money-laundering
(1) Each State Party: (a) Shall institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and
supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions and, where
appropriate, other bodies particularly susceptible to money-laundering, within its
116

For further information on the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs, see UNODC website
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/commissions/CND/> at10October 2011.
117
Such as the World Health Organisation (WHO).See <http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/ quality_
safety/Framework_ACMP_withcover.pdf> at 10October 2011.
118
For more, see the International Narcotics Control Board (INCB), The Role of the International
Narcotics Control Board (2004) <http://www.incb.org/pdf/e/tr/pre/2004/precursors_incb.pdf>at
10October 2011.
119
For full text, see UNCJIN website, <http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/ dcatoc/final_
documents_2/convention_eng.pdf>at 10October 2011.
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See text of Convention and associated protocols at: United Nations (UN), United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols (2000) <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/
en/treaties/CTOC/index.html>at 11October 2011. Many details regarding measures to be taken (and
others to be considered) in relation to the prevention of ML activities and those applicable in relation to
the criminalisation of corruption are outlined in Articles 7 and 8 of the Convention. See text overleaf.
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Children;
2. The Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and
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competence, in order to deter and detect all forms of money-laundering, which
regime shall emphasize requirements for customer identification, record-keeping
and the reporting of suspicious transactions;(b) Shall, without prejudice to articles
18 and 27 of this Convention, ensure that administrative, regulatory, law
enforcement and other authorities dedicated to combating money-laundering
(including, where appropriate under domestic law, judicial authorities) have the
ability to cooperate and exchange information at the national and international
levels within the conditions prescribed by its domestic law and, to that end, shall
consider the establishment of a financial intelligence unit to serve as a national
centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding
potential money-laundering.
(2) States Parties shall consider implementing feasible measures to detect and
monitor the movement of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments across their
borders, subject to safeguards to ensure proper use of information and without
impeding in any way the movement of legitimate capital. Such measures may
include a requirement that individuals and businesses report the cross-border
transfer of substantial quantities of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments.
(3) In establishing a domestic regulatory and supervisory regime under the terms of
this article, and without prejudice to any other article of this Convention, States
Parties are called upon to use as a guideline the relevant initiatives of regional,
interregional and multilateral organizations against money-laundering.
(4) States Parties shall endeavour to develop and promote global, regional,
subregional and bilateral cooperation among judicial, law enforcement and
financial regulatory authorities in order to combat money-laundering.
Article 8: Criminalization of corruption
1 Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:
(a) The promise, offering or giving to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an
undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in
order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official
duties;
(b) The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an
undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in
order that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official
duties.
(2) Each State Party shall consider adopting such legislative and other measures as
may be necessary to establish as criminal offences conduct referred to in paragraph
1 of this article involving a foreign public official or international civil servant.
Likewise, each State Party shall consider establishing as criminal offences other
forms of corruption.
(3) Each State Party shall also adopt such measures as may be necessary to
establish as a criminal offence participation as an accomplice in an offence
established in accordance with this article.
(4) For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this article and article 9 of this Convention,
"public official" shall mean a public official or a person who provides a public
service as defined in the domestic law and as applied in the criminal law of the
State Party in which the person in question performs that function.’
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UN International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999)
The escalation of acts of terrorism across the world (and especially the example of 11
September 2001) encouraged countries to sign the UN International Convention for the
Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism which had been adopted in 1999. 123
According to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), members must respect the antiterrorism measures that have been adopted by the Convention. The Convention clarified
that TF, including the intention to use funds in a terrorist act, is a crime. 124
UN Convention against Corruption (2003)
The UN adopted its Convention against Corruption in October 2003, in order to combat
corruption activities in general, such as bribery and embezzlement, and those are
particularly linked to the ML process.125 Thus, the Convention lists a variety measures
that accord with the obligation of States parties to strengthen international efforts to
prevent corruption and ML in Article 14. 126
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The International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism opened for signature
10 January 2000 GA Res 109, UN GAOR 54thSess, Supp No 49 UN Doc A/54/49 (vol 1) (1999) (entered
into force 10 April 2002) The objective of this convention is to improve the international collaboration in
developing and adopting effective methods for the prevention, investigation, and punishment of the
financing of terrorism. See <http://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/Special/1999%20International%20
Convention%20for%20the% 20Suppression%20of%20the%20Financing%20of%20Terrorism.pdf>at 10
October 2011. (This document also details reservations of individual parties.)
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Alison Deitz and John Buttle, Anti-Money Laundering Handbook (2008) 9–10.
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Abdullahi Y Shehu, 'International Initiatives Against Corruption and Money Laundering: An
Overview' (2005) 12(3)Journal of Financial Crime 221.
126
Those negotiating the text of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (2000) met between
21 January 2002 and 1 October 2003. The text approved by the Ad Hoc Committee was adopted by the
General Assembly by its resolution 58/4 of 31 October 2003 (entered into force 14 December 2005). See
<http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html>at 12October 2011.
Article 14: ‘Measures to prevent money-laundering’ states
1. Each State Party shall:
(a) Institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank
financial institutions, including natural or legal persons that provide formal or informal services
for the transmission of money or value and, where appropriate, other bodies particularly
susceptible to money-laundering, within its competence, in order to deter and detect all forms of
money-laundering, which regime shall emphasize requirements for customer and, where
appropriate, beneficial owner identification, record-keeping and the reporting of suspicious
transactions;
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The Convention also outlines the preventive measures that states must undertake,
including the adoption of anti-corruption policies and practices, and the use of a proper
body (or bodies) to ensure compliance and implementation of those policies and
practices.127
2.2.2 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
By 1989, and through the Paris Economic Summit, the (at the time) Group of Seven 128
founded the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) whose goal is the development and

(b) Without prejudice to article 46 of this Convention, ensure that administrative, regulatory, law
enforcement and other authorities dedicated to combating money-laundering (including, where
appropriate under domestic law, judicial authorities) have the ability to cooperate and exchange
information at the national and international levels within the conditions prescribed by its domestic
law and, to that end, shall consider the establishment of a financial intelligence unit to serve as a
national centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential
money-laundering.
2. States Parties shall consider implementing feasible measures to detect and monitor the movement of
cash and appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders, subject to safeguards to ensure
proper use of information and without impeding in any way the movement of legitimate capital. Such
measures may include a requirement that individuals and businesses report the cross-border transfer of
substantial quantities of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments.
3. States Parties shall consider implementing appropriate and feasible measures to require financial
institutions, including money remitters:
(a) To include on forms for the electronic transfer of funds and related messages accurate and
meaningful information on the originator;
(b) To maintain such information throughout the payment chain; and
(c) To apply enhanced scrutiny to transfers of funds that do not contain complete information on
the originator.
4. In establishing a domestic regulatory and supervisory regime under the terms of this article, and
without prejudice to any other article of this Convention, States Parties are called upon to use as a
guideline the relevant initiatives of regional, interregional and multilateral organizations against
money-laundering.
5. States Parties shall endeavour to develop and promote global, regional, subregional and bilateral
cooperation among judicial, law enforcement and financial regulatory authorities in order to combat
money-laundering.’
127
Sean D Murphy, 'Adoption of UN Convention Against Corruption' (2004) 98(1) American Journal of
International Law182.
128
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encouragement of national and international policies to fight ML and TF activities. 129
Activities against such crimes inevitably involve the prevention of ML activity. 130
FATF is an independent body, with a steering community chaired for each single year
term by a president who is a senior government official selected from amongst FATF
member countries. In addition, a specialist secretariat office based in the Organisation
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) offers support to its president
and steering community in their work, especially in relation to combating ML. 131
FATF began with 28 member countries. 132 Member countries have a number of
obligations in relation to the creation of comprehensive international standards to
combat ML, enhancing non-member countries’ compliance with these standards, 133
improving regional AML bodies, and working in conjunction with other international
organisations. Countermeasures are outlined that will apply to countries that fail to
apply, or who inappropriately apply, the FATF guidelines. 134
FATF began by issuing its Forty Recommendations in 1990 as a useful tool for
originating cohesive policy and a framework to prevent ML. Although such
recommendations have no legal effect, the recommendations relating to the legislative
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FATF, FATF 40 Recommendations (FATF-GATI, 2004)<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/7/40/
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Recommendations, but this thesis is referring to the (2003) iteration. In fact, after the research had been
completed and the thesis written and submitted, FATF issued revised Recommendations which
consolidated the 40+9 and made some changes of substance. However, while some of these changes dealt
with issues that the thesis discusses (eg, identification of beneficial ownership) the changes do not
fundamentally change this thesis conclusions and the basis for criticism which has been made about these
provisions. For more information about the FATF Recommendations, please see the list of the old and
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requirements, the supervision of financial institutions and law enforcement activities are
a valuable resource for those wishing to implement effective policies and practices. 135
Over time they have become quasi legislative rules in ways never originally envisaged.
The Forty Recommendations identify several areas of concern and supply AML
measures, as follows. 136
1

Recommendations 1 and 2 outline the possibilities of applying the criminal
offences of ML to all legal persons who have the intention to commit and/or
knowledge of the intention to commit offences — including ML.

2

Recommendation 3 notes that countries ought to adopt measures to stop the use of
illicit gains (that is, the proceeds of crime).

3

Recommendation 4 notes that bank secrecy law must not conflict with the
obligation of complying with FATF Recommendations.

4

Recommendations 5 to 12 clarify the obligations regarding CDD and record
keeping. According to these recommendations, financial institutions must have
comprehensively identified their customers, keep records for five years at least,
and also must adopt the principle of due diligence, especially in relation to
complex transactions which may include ML activities.

5

Recommendations 13 to 16 cover the issue of the reporting of suspicious
transactions and compliance issues in depth, and point out that financial
institutions must follow their legal obligations in this regard, and encourage them
to improve their AML systems and staff training programs.

135
136

Broome, above n 3, 34–5.
FATF, FATF 40 Recommendations, above n 129.
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6

Recommendations 17 to 22 list the necessary requirements for countries regarding
combatting ‘shell’ banks and reporting of the cash transactions over a threshold
amount. These recommendations call for solutions to be found to prevent noncomplying countries from facilitating ML and TF. They also call for financial
institutions to be enhanced so that they are able to detect and report any
transactions from those non-complying countries.

7

Recommendations 23 to 25 encourage countries to ensure that their financial
institutions and non-financial businesses fully comply with regulatory and
supervisory measures adopted (such as licensing requirements for casinos).

8

Recommendations 26 to 32 reflect the need of countries to establish financial
intelligence units for their financial systems, and encourage them to do so.

9

Recommendations 33 to 34 mention that countries must have sufficient data about
the customers (both individual and corporate) so that they would be able to assist
the relevant bodies in their investigation and prosecution.

10

Recommendations 35 to 40 cover the requirement for countries to ratify a number
of important conventions, such as the Vienna Convention, Palermo Convention,
and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism. In addition, an obligation has been set for countries to provide a
variety of mutual legal assistance.
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It is clear that the Forty Recommendations cover several areas, such as law enforcement
powers, the financial institutions and internal regulations, the criminal justice system,
and countries’ collaboration in terms of AML. 137
Another Nine Special Recommendations were put into place after the crisis of 11
September 2001 in the USA. One of the main reasons behind issuing these
recommendations was to cover the TF and ML in an inclusive regulation to combat
such illegal activities. 138
Consequently, these additional recommendations define TF as a crime, and recommend
the implementation of UN efforts regarding freezing and confiscation of terrorist assets.
Moreover, these recommendations reflect the necessity of supervising funds transfer by
implementing measures to detect and regulate the international transactions, and
reporting suspicious deals that are related to terrorist groups. In addition, they reflect
effective worldwide cooperation in respect of the prevention of TF, and to combat the
abuse of non-profit organisation status by terrorists.139
In conclusion, FATF has covered a number of major issues, and its recommendations
are considered great resources in the search for an ideal AML regime for countries and
organisations worldwide. The guidance FATF has provided on implementing risk-based
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approach in 2007 is one of its most recent achievements and reflects its continuing
important role.140
2.2.3 Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG)
APG is an international body established in 1997, with 13 member countries 141 working
to combat ML activities. APG works in conjunction with FATF, using its style,
mechanism, and 40+9 Recommendations as standards in the prevention of ML and
TF.142
APG has a number of goals which reflect its role as a regional organisation concerned
with AML measures. Roles include evaluating the level of members’ compliance with
international standards on curbing ML and increasing cooperation between members,
and their cooperation with other global organisations. APG researches and analyses the
nature of ML, the risk of it occurring, methods adopted by money launderers, and its
use in TF. Moreover, it seeks to improve global policy and standards in combating ML
by actively participating as an associate member in FATF. 143

140
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2.2.4 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are two separate
organisations, and while each has a slightly different aim, they collaborate with each
other144 in AML efforts.
The World Bank was established in 1944 to help fund the re-building of Japan and
Europe in the aftermath of the Second World War. It is not an actual ‘bank’ doing
financial services for customers, but a global development organisation. Its
development obligations have expanded to encompass several fields, such as education,
health, finance, nutrition, justice, law, and environmental concerns. 145 The IMF was also
established in 1944, its foundation also prompted by the same concern for rebuilding
countries damaged by the Second World War. However, the IMF concentrates on
economic issues, such as international trade policy and exchange rates, while the World
Bank is interested in a country’s structure.146
Both organisations have made significant contributions with respect to combating ML
activities, by providing technical assistance to member countries and instituting and
maintaining adequate surveillance of members’ economic systems. 147 By 2001 both had
encouraged beneficiaries of their financial assistance programs to include in their
financial systems impressive AML and counter terrorism measures, and to fully
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implement a regime involving the relevant UN conventions. 148 Moreover, in 2003 the
World Bank introduced a Global Dialogue Series to enhance expertise and encourage
the exchange of knowledge and information between experts and senior government
officials, in terms of AML and CTF. In the same year, the World Bank and IMF
instituted and participated in training programmes for other FATF style regional bodies,
such as the Eastern and South African Anti Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG),
the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF), the APG, the Financial Action
Task Force on Money Laundering in South America (Grupo de AcciónFinanciera de
Sudamérica (GAFISUD)), and the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money
Laundering (GroupeIntergouvernementd’Actioncontre le Blanchimentd’Argent en
Afrique de l’Ouest (GIABA)).149
In 2004, the World Bank and IMF adopted the 40+9 FATF Recommendations as
comprehensive global standards for preventing ML and TF in member countries. 150
2.2.5 European Directives on ML
The issue of the prevention of the use of the financial system for ML purposes was
important to the European Union (EU). Therefore, the European parliament and council
adopted three directives relating to combating ML through the financial institutions.
These are called the ‘European Directives on ML’.
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The First EU Directive on ML
In 1991, the EU issued the First Directive regarding ML, and required member states to
fully implement its provisions which involve an improved and comprehensive regime
and legislation to combat such activities in their financial systems. 151
The Second EU Directive on ML
The Second Directive was issued in 2001, and extended the compass of the First
Directive to include non-financial services, such as lawyers, accountants, real estate
agencies, and casinos. This directive also extends its overview, categorising tax evasion
with drug trafficking as a dangerous crime, which needs to be reported and prevented. 152
The Third EU Directive on ML
The EU’s third and (thus far) final Directive was issued in 2005. According to the Third
Directive, TF is a serious crime and may be separate to ML. Furthermore, it directed
that currency exchange offices and casinos need to be licensed before they start to
provide services; that an FIU be established to detect ML activities and other financial
crimes; that RBA principles be applied to the financial framework; and CDD
requirements must be met. Addressing these issues in the Third Directive has resulted in
an extension of the scope of the First and the Second directives of the EU in terms of
AML. 153
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2.2.6 Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervision
In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervision 154 adopted a
Statement of Principles, which is concerned about maintaining bank stability and
combatting criminal behaviour (such as ML activities) 155 in the financial sector. The
Committee has also pointed out a number of important issues, such as the bank’s
obligation for adequate customer identification, and the implementation of adequate
protection for banks themselves against customers who are linked to ML through
suspicious transactions.156 The Committee is concerned with developing responses to
the ML issue, the implementation of sufficient regulatory standards, and the formation
of a comprehensive AML regime. 157
The Committee has issued several papers regarding AML crime, which have reflected
on some critical issues, for example, the basic difficulties for financial institutions when
they are not fully protected against ML risk, and the risk of fraud in dealings with
criminal customers. They are: 158
1

1988: The Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purchase of
Money Laundering.

2

1997: The Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.

154

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was established by the central-bank Governors of the Group
of 10 countries in late 1974. It is a committee of central banks and bank supervisors and regulators from
major industrialised countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States). The Committee provides a forum for
regular co-operation on banking supervisory activities and is concerned with the stability of the global
financial system, seeking to protect it from criminal activities, such as corruption, fraud, ML, etc. The
original Committee’s countries has expanded to include Luxemburg, India, Brazil, China, Mexico,
Russia, Korea, and Australia.
155
Graham, Bell and Elliott, above n 113, 29.
156
Savona, above n 98, 40–1.
157
Broome, above n 3, 103.
158
For more details about Basel Committee and its papers, see its website: The Basel Committee, About
The Basel Committee <http://www.bis.org/bcbs/index.htm>at 29October 2011.

82

3

1999: The Core Principles Methodology.

4

2001: Customer Due Diligence for Banks.

5

2002: The Report on Sharing of Information between Jurisdictions in Connection
with the Fight against Terrorism.

6

2003: Consolidated ‘Know Your Customer’ Risk Management.

2.2.7 Egmont Group
After decades of fighting ML activities, countries began dealing with this issue
positively. Important units have been created to supervise countries’ financial systems,
and combat organised crimes such as ML. Such units are known as FIUs.
By 1995, a number of the FIUs of FATF member countries met at the Egmont Arenberg
Palace in Brussels on the need for a cooperative intelligence unit network to facilitate
sharing of information, expertise and training. Its focus includes ML prevention, and
more recently TF. The network of the FIUs and the Egmont body are determined to
collaborate in regards to combating ML. Meetings are held regularly to find the best
way to create an effective synergy, especially regarding training and sharing of
expertise. Indeed, the Egmont Group became another significant mechanism in the
AML structure, and Australia contributes to it through the work of AUSTRAC.
AUSTRAC was a founding member of the Egmont Group and senior AUSTRAC staff
have consistently taken part in working groups and the leadership of Egmont. However,
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what began as a loose network of like-minded FIUs has become a more formal
organisation with entry criteria.159
A fundamental role of the FIUs is to analyse suspicious transactions in regional
financial institutions. In fact, most of the FIUs have no jurisdiction outside their
domestic focus although they will look at any transaction originating in or coming into
its jurisdiction. Thus, there can also be a very fruitful exchange of information between
FIUs. A MoU has been issued to group members, with an aim to share data and help
provide financial institutions, law enforcement authorities, and regulatory agencies,
with important information within and between countries, in order to curb ML and
highly organised crimes. 160
In conclusion, many initiatives and achievements have been taken to prevent ML, and
many countries — among them Australia — have been involved in these efforts.
Nevertheless, the question remains, are these achievements quite enough to curb the
laundering of illicit gains? What has Australia done to combat ML?
2. 3 Historical Overview - The Australian AML perspective
Since the late 1980s, Australia (like many countries) has made a number of significant
improvements to its AML regime, especially when the then G7 (now G8) 161 decided that
ML has a dangerous impact on financial systems and should be curbed. 162 As mentioned
above, the Vienna Convention was the first international move to enhance countries’
ability to combat such a crime. Australia was one of those countries that sought to do

159

Hopton, above n 100, 14–15. For more information about Egmont Group, see The Egmont Group,
Egmont Group Procedure < http://www.egmontgroup.org/membership/procedure> at 3November 2011.
160
Graham, Bell and Elliott, above n 113, 33.
161
The G8 is a group for the governments of eight major economies in the world (G8: Japan, United
States, Germany, United Kingdom, Italy, France, Canada, and Russia). See <http://www.g8italia2009.it/
G8/Home/Summit/Partecipanti/G8-G8_Layout_locale-1199882116809_PaesiG8. htm>.
162
Broome, above n 3, 28–9.
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so; it took many steps until it had created its own AML regime, and built a high
reputation for preventing such crimes.
The first Australian step in combating ML activities was the amendment of the Custom
Act 1901 (Cth) in 1977 to include the power to arrest criminals and confiscate their
proceeds from drug trafficking crimes.163
The Australian Attorney-General’s Department then developed a policy and drafted a
Bill that became the Proceeds of Crime Act 1987 (Cth) (POCA 1987).164 This plays a
vital role in controlling criminal assets while criminal proceedings are taking place,
combating the hiding of assets that might be subject to confiscation. 165 Thus, the
Australian regime against organised crime has developed from concerns not just about
drug trafficking proceeds, but also about the proceeds from other criminal activities
(such as ‘protection’, prostitution and fraud) and their potential for use for further
criminal activities (such as funding terrorism).166
The Act was amended in 2002. The main difference between the 1987 and 2002 Acts
was the lack of civil forfeiture provisions in POCA 1987.167

163

See the Australian Institute of Criminology, Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime: Federal Overview
(2008) 2 <http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/5/7/5/%7B575861BD-8901-4BAE-A7DB-B61DEFEED3
AD%7Dtcb001.pdf>at 4 November 2011. ‘The Customs Act 1901 (Cth) (Customs Act) provided the first
avenue for the confiscation of criminal assets in Australia prior to amendments in 1979, which allowed
for civil pecuniary penalties for dealing in narcotics. The Act only allows the confiscation of assets in
relation to activities associated with prescribed narcotics that are in contravention to the Act.’
164
The Proceed of Crime Act 1988 (Cth) (POCA), the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth)
(FTRA), and Anti Money-Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) will be further
discussed in Chapter 3.
165
Clayton UTZ, The Essential Guide To Australian Anti-Money Laundering Reforms (2006) 12.
166
Australian Institute of Criminology, Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime: Federal Overview (2008),
above n 163.
167
Ibid 1–2: ‘The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth) (POCA 2002) came into force on 1 January 2003
and is the instrument used to recover the largest proportion of criminal assets associated with federal
crimes. The Act was the result of a review, which found that the inclusion of civil forfeiture at a federal
level would vastly extend the capacity to recover funds from breaches of federal law (ALRC 1999). Once
confiscated, assets are paid into an account and can be shared with those jurisdictions and foreign
countries that made a significant contribution to the recovery under the equitable sharing program. The
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Another important amendment was to sections 81 and 82 of the Act by the Criminal
Code Act 1995 (Cth), when the Government inserted Division 400 into the Criminal
Code in 2002, replacing the ML offences in sections 81 and 82 of the POCA. The new
version was added to reflect the reality of ML and to apply recommendations contained
in the Australian Law Reform Commission Report, Confiscation that Counts.168
The initial Bill for Cash Transaction Reports was drafted in 1987 to supervise the
widespread use of facilities provided by financial institutions, as well as tax evasion and
ML activities. 169 This Bill became the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth)
(FTRA), and was a step to monitor financial transactions. Rather than simply
supervising cash flows through financial institutions, it enhanced their ability and
obligation to detect and report any suspicious transactions that may be involved in ML
activities. 170
Therefore, Australia — through several Acts and their amendment — has tried to create
a comprehensive AML regime to effectively combat ML crimes in Australia.
At the same time, Australia has participated in international moves to thwart ML. It
adopted the relevant international conventions and participates in global efforts to curb

total amount of money recovered using the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Cth), between January 2003 and
30 June 2007, was $41,377,790.’
168
For Division 400 of the Australian Criminal Act 1995, see: The Australian Government, Criminal
Code Act 1995 Division 400-Money Laundering (1995) <http://www.comlaw.gov.au/ComLaw/
Legislation/ActCompilation1.nsf/bodylodgmentattachments/5A22EA6D7A20887ECA256F71004F4B19
?OpenDocument#TOC104>at 3November 2011. Also, see the website of Australian Government’s
Attorney-General’s Department: the Attorney-General's Department- Criminal Justice Division, Proposal
For Amendments to the Money Laundering Provisions in Division 400 of the Criminal Code Act 1995
(2008)
<http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(CFD7369FCAE9B8F32F341DBE097801FF)~c_
Discussion+Paper+-+Division+400+-+money+laundering+proposals.pdf/$file/c_Discussion+Paper++Division+400+-+money+laundering+proposals.pdf>at 5November 2011.
169
Caslon Analytics, FTR and 100 Points ID<http://www.caslon.com.au/100pointsnote.htm>at
5November 2011.
170
Joo-Cheong Tham, 'A Risk-Based Analysis of Australia's Counterterrorism Financing Regime' (2007)
34(2) Social Justice 138.
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ML activities. Thus, Australia was a founding member of FATF in 1989, 171 and took
into consideration the FATF Recommendations as a fundamental umbrella to improve
countries’ ability to create an effective AML system and one that complies with
international moves in this direction (for instance, FATF Recommendation 3, which
reflects the need to adopt measures similar to those adopted by the Vienna Convention,
and the Palermo Convention and its protocols). 172 Australia therefore ratified a number
of important international conventions and is involved in significant global
organisations whose goals include the ML prevention. The relevant Conventions and
bodies include those listed below.
1

Ratified the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna Convention) in 1992173

2

Ratified the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the
Financing of Terrorism in 2002174

3

Ratified the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime
and its Protocols (Palermo Convention) in 2004175

171

Attorney General’s Department, The FATF Mutual Evaluation of Australia<http://www.ag.gov.au/
www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Anti-moneylaundering_TheFATFsmutualevaluationofAustralia>at 5November
2011.
172
Australian Institute of Criminology, Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime: Federal Overview (2008),
above n 163.
173
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
opened for signature 20 December 1988 (entered into force on 11 November 1990)in accordance
withart.29(1) <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,LEGAL,ECOSOC,,,49997af90,0.html>. Australia
ratified the convention in 1992. See <http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tcb/1-20/
tcb001.aspx>at 7November 2011.
174
United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism opened
for signature 10 January 2000 (entered into force 10 April 2002). Australia ratified the convention in
October 2002. See <http://www.ag.gov.au/www/agd/agd.nsf/Page/Nationalsecurity_Counter-terrorism_
Internationalcounter-terrorismmeasures>at 5November 2011.
175
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols opened for
signature 12–15 December 2000 (entered into force 29 September 2003). See <http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.html>at 5November 2011. Australia ratified the convention in 2004, see
<http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20series/tcb/1-20/tcb001.aspx>at 7November 2011.
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4

Ratified the United Nations Convention against Corruption in 2005176

5

Membership of International Monetary Fund (IMF) Development Committee in
1947177

6

Founding Member of the Egmont Group in 1995178

7

Founding Member of APG on Money Laundering in 1997 179

Nevertheless, Australian achievements regarding combating ML did not cease there.
Australia had been one of a few countries sharing the honour of legislatively
criminalising ML activities, which it initially did with the insertion in January 2003 of
Division 40 in the Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995 under the Proceeds of
Crime Act 2002(Cth).180Other such efforts include the US Money Laundering Control
Act 1956 (MLCA), the Italian Anti Money Laundering Act 1991, and the French Anti
Money Laundering Act Number (96-392) among others.181 In December 2003 the
Australian government reconsidered the idea of adopting an Anti Money Laundering
and Counter Terrorist Financing system (AML/CTF) as a further step to improve the

176

United Nations Convention against Corruption opened for signature on 9–11 December 2003 (entered
into force 14 December 2005), see <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html>at
7November 2011. Australia ratified the convention in 2005. See <http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/
current%20series/tcb/1-20/tcb001.aspx>at 8November 2011.
177
See IMF, A Guide to Committees, Groups and Clubs, <http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/
groups.htm>at 10November 2011.
178
See AUSTRAC, Multilateral Engagement, <http://www.austrac.gov.au/multilateral_engagement.
html>at 13November 2011.
179
Ibid.
180
Australian Institute of Criminology, Charges and Offences of Money Laundering: Transnational
Crime Brief No 4 (2008)<http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current series/tcb/1-20/tcb004.aspx>at
13November 2011.
181
Wouter H Muller, Christian H Kalin and John G Goldsmith, Anti-money Laundering: International
Law and Practice (Wiley, 2007).
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level of implementation and bring it into line with the international standards issued by
FATF.182
By 2005, an exposure draft of the Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism
Financing Bill had been prepared and was widely circulated to receive comments from
the financial institutions, and government bodies and agencies. Such consultative
processes have the goal of enabling the government to enact the most appropriate
legislation and to enshrine international best practice so as to combat ML effectively. 183
After an extensive consultation process, the Anti Money Laundering and Counter
Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) was passed, and replaced the existing Financial
Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth) (FTRA).184
In 2007, the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth)
(AML Act) was amended. This Act, together with the second tranche 185 of legislation
that continues to be developed, will ensure that Australia complies with the FATF
recommendations on AML and their special recommendation TF. 186
In 1989 the Australian government created an FIU, the Australian Transaction Report
and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) under the FTR Act 1988which continued to work in
conjunction with the AML Act as a regulator and monitoring authority, and to assist
reporting entities meet their obligations under the AML/CTF Rules and non-binding

182

See The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), The FATF<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/ 0,3417,
en_32250379_32235720_1_1_1_1_1,00.htm>at 14November 2011.
183
Tham, above n 170, 138–52.
184
Ibid.
185
The first tranche covers the reporting entities who are providing ‘financial services’, such as gambling,
cash dealers, brokers, insurance sellers and others. The second tranche extends the coverage of the current
AML/CTF package to lawyers, real states agents, jewellers, accountants when they provide ‘non financial
services’.
186
Clayton UTZ, above n 165, 15.
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guidelines that AUSTRAC has issued. 187 The AML/CTF Rules set out specific
requirements on matters such as customer identification, ongoing customer due
diligence (OCDD), reporting of suspicious matters and AML/CTF programs. 188
AUSTRAC has a high standard organisational structure that sustains a number of
internal committees to provide the required support for corporate governance
throughout the agency. These include the Enforcement Committee, the Intelligence
Oversight Committee, the Audit Committee and the Finance Committee, the
Supervisory Oversight Committee, and the Program Management Governance
Committee.189
AUSTRAC also has its Executive Committee (ExCom), comprising the AUSTRAC
CEO, the Executive General Manager Intelligence, the Executive General Manager
Supervision, the six general managers, the Chief Information Officer and the General
Counsel. ExCom is in charge of setting AUSTRAC’s strategic direction and providing
administrative supervision of the delivery of the agency mandate. ExCom has a monthly
meeting to examine the agency’s performance regarding a number of key performance
indicators and provides an advisory service for the AUSTRAC CEO on main
management, and strategic and organisational aspects.190
However, AUSTRAC is not the only authority working in Australia to combat ML
activities, there are also a number of regulators and law enforcement authorities who
should work with AUSTRAC to stop such activities. For example, in 1997 the Wallis
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The full text of the Rules are available on AUSTRAC’s website at: <www.austrac.gov.au> at
20October 2011.
188
Deitz and Buttle, above n 124, 22.
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AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Annual Report 2009–10, 14 <http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/annual_report
2009_10.pdf> at 13 March 2011.
190
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Committee191 made numerous recommendations, including the establishment of the new

Australian financial sector framework in a ‘twin peaks’ model. 192
1

APRA: the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority was established to carry
out prudential regulation of deposit taking institutions, life and general insurance
and superannuation.

2

ASIC: the Australian Securities and Investments Commission was established for
consumer protection in the financial sector in respect of securities, futures, life
insurance and general insurance, superannuation, retirement savings accounts, and
deposit taking activities (other than credit).

One of the main issues in relation to these authorities’ work is the extent to which they
cooperate with AUSTRAC, and the necessity for them to have an inclusive relationship
with each other so they collaborate when necessary to combat laundering of illicit gains.
However, this design of the regulatory agencies was achieved only after decades of
experience with financial matters in order to attempt to develop a better regulatory
model to guard against financial problems.

191

In 1996, the Commonwealth Government of Australia commissioned a committee of industry and
regulatory experts to examine financial services and regulation. The Committee was named after its chair,
Stan Wallis. It published its report in 1977. It had been charged with various tasks such as:
• Reviewing financial and technological improvements;
• Considering the elements likely to bring further change; and
• Making recommendations for possible further developments to the regulatory framework.
192
Sheelagh McCracken and Anna Everett, Banking and Financial Institutions Law (Lawbook, 7thed,
2009) 12–13. Before 1997, the Australian framework had a system of four regulators:
• the Australian Securities Commission,
• the Consumer Protection Regulation Functions of the Insurance and Superannuation Commission
• the Australian Payments System Council, and
• the Reserve Bank of Australia.
The first three regulators were replaced by ASIC, and then the government established APRA. The
Reserve Bank Australia continued to hold the key responsibilities of monetary policy and system stability
and the regulation of the payments system under its Payments Systems Board. It works alongside APRA
and ASIC.
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Even so, according to the latest estimates (published in 2004), the amount of laundered
money in and through Australian financial system, is approximately AUD4.5 billion per
year. 193 In other words, real risks persist in the Australian financial system. Far higher
levels of awareness are needed of the Australian government’s policies and regulatory
frameworks, and greater compliance to prevent the continuing occurrence of ML
crimes.
2. 4 Conclusion
In recent years, ML has posed a serious risk to the financial system of every country,
and there is an increasing panic that undetected ML activities will bring problems to the
financial system and facilitate an increase in a diversity of predicate offences. The
maxim, ‘opportunity causes crimes’, 194 applies in the area of ML crimes; countries know
that if there is a possibility of disguising and hiding proceeds of crime, then this will
motivate illicit activities. The AML system has evolved over time and become
increasingly comprehensive, with a number of international Conventions having been
agreed upon, ML activities criminalised, international and regional bodies having
worked towards producing clear guidelines, new or improved supervisory bodies have
been established at national and international levels, and a global AML regime having
opened a new horizon for countries worldwide to benefit from these achievements.

193

John Walker and John Stamp, 'Money Laundering in and through Australia, 2004' Trends and Issues
in Crime and Criminal Justice No 342 (Australian Institute of Criminology, 2007)12–13
<http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/6/4/2/%7B6427C6F9-BDE8-462E-A3AC-F68DB2C6505D%7Dtand
i342.pdf> at 17 April 2009, 5. Both authors, John Stamp as an AUSTRAC employee and John Walker as
a consultant criminologist, have admitted in their article that measuring money laundering accurately is a
challenge and not easily or conveniently capable of being done. They have estimated the cost of the
money laundering activities to the economy as a way to focus on the danger of such activities, based on
surveys, interviews and empirical data.
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Marcus Felson and Ronald V Clarke, Opportunity Makes the Thief, Practical theory for crime
prevention (1998) 9.
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Australia has commenced a sequence of actions to minimise ML risks. Australia is a
foundation member of FATF in 1989, the APG in 1997, and the Egmont Group in 1995,
Australia has also ratified a number of relevant UN conventions.
The criminalising of ML activities was secured through a number of new pieces of
legislation and amendments, the last and the most important was the Anti Money
Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth), which obliged the
reporting entities to adopt AML measures and submit various types of reports to
AUSTRAC, which is the FIU and regulator for the Australian AML system and has the
power to receive and analyse the reports and disseminate them to partner agencies, such
as ASIC, APRA, law enforcement bodies and others.
While Australia appears to be one of the leading countries (not only in terms of
combating ML and proceeds of crimes but also in covering new arrangements for
extradition), the FATF evaluation of 2005 found fault with the Australian AML system,
and one of the matters critically evaluated was the reporting system (see below).
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3 COMPLIANCE WITH REPORTING OBLIGATIONS
3. 1 Introduction
As has been shown previously in Chapter Two, countries began working seriously
against ML activities after the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was founded in
1989.FATF has put in place AML rules or standards that countries worldwide have
adopted. These are its Forty Recommendations on AML (and more recently the
additional Nine Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing).
FATF is today the main global policy maker in the field of AML activities. Thus, it is
essential to examine its recommendations, discern the reporting obligations suggested
by FATF and reflect on the Australian AML regime in relation to those obligations. An
assessment of the FATF Recommendations will show that there are inherent AML
reporting obligations, but the task will be to find how many of these obligations are
actually contained in the Australian reporting mechanism.
In this thesis, ‘reporting obligations’ means reporting that includes all forms of reports
such as the Suspicious Transaction Report (STR), Suspicious Activity Report (SAR),
Suspicious Matter Report (SMR), Suspect Transaction Report (SUSTR), the Cash
Transaction Report (CTR) and International Funds Transfer Instruction (IFTI) as well as
the annual compliance report.
This chapter will consider compliance with the reporting obligations as a basic element
in strengthening the Australian AML system, and will also consider the level of
compliance of the Australian AML system with FATF Recommendations.
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3. 2 Reporting Obligations and FATF
The FATF Recommendations are regarded as a benchmark that countries should follow
in preventing ML activities. 195 They represent a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach that has
been adopted as suitable for all countries, but the question must be asked whether this is
possible?
The FATF Recommendations cover activities starting from initial customer
identification and verification by reporting entities, and their fulfilment of their
obligation to report relevant transactions to the FIU; and the FIU report analyses and
their subsequent circulation to law enforcement bodies if required.
In Recommendations 5–12, FATF outlines the measures that a reporting entity needs to
take (and what must be taken into consideration) when starting a relationship with its
customers. These provide a solid basis on which reporting entities can rely when
carrying out their reporting obligations. These identifying and verifying measures
include CDD and Record Keeping. Under Recommendations 13–16, reporting entities
are required to report suspicious transactions to the FIU. Reporting entities are
encouraged to comply with this requirement because it is an important pillar for any
AML system. The FIU then undertakes its analysis of these reports in accordance with
Recommendation 26, and then finally circulates the outcome of these reports to the
appropriate law enforcement bodies as per Recommendation 26. 196
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FATF, What is the FATF? <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/57/0,3343,en_32250379_32235720_
34432121_1_1_1_1,00.html>at 20November 2011.
196
For the text of the FATF Recommendations, please see FATF, above n 129.
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Figure 7: FATF Reporting Obligations
R. 26, 30,
This chapter will consider the reporting obligations to be undertaken in accordance with
32
the FATF scenario and then reflect on the Australian reporting obligations for the
purpose of combating ML activities.
3.2.1 Identifying and Verifying Customers
To fulfil the required reporting obligations, accurate information on customers is very
important. Reporting entities should undertake CDD 197 in accordance with
Recommendations 5 to 12, which include identifying and verifying the identity of new
and existing customers.

197

Customer Due Diligence (CDD) is one of the most effective measures that reporting entities could take
to protect their institutions from any threat of ML activities. The process is also known as ‘Know Your
Customer’ (KYC) and it is included in the customer identification and ongoing customer due diligence
(OCDD) processes. It is worth mentioning that CDD is a basic element in the reporting system because
the information that have been collected within this process will be transferred to the report when it is
needed. See Debra Geister, Concepts in Customer Due Diligence: Meeting the Challenge of Regulatory
Expectations (LexisNexis Information & analytics Group, 2008) 1.
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3.2.1.1 Customer Due Diligence
These recommendations should be clear enough to the financial institutions that are
providing the designated services and those who are designated non-financial
businesses and services (such as casinos, gold bullion merchants, real estate agents,
accountants and lawyers).
This is one of the most important pillars of any AML system, particularly when the
reporting entity first comes into contact with a new customer. It is at this stage — when
establishing a relationship with a new customer — that it is easiest for the reporting
entity to detect a possibility of ML activity before it’s too late. Thus, utilising reliable
documents, data and information is a major issue that any reporting entity should be
concerned about.
However, FATF was not clear in illustrating the verification process. Neither the
reporting entities nor the regulators could understand exactly which type of verification
or method (that the FATF Recommendations have asked countries to follow for the
purpose of the AML and its reporting obligations) should be used in any given instance.
This ambiguity could offer the opportunity for some jurisdictions to create their own
verification system with the minimum level of verification requirements (such as such
as verifying customers and accepting them on the basis of appearance or behavior)
which could probably bring a large number of problems to the AML reporting system
and the whole AML regime. 198
Customer identification and verification is a serious problem, especially for those
countries which are somewhat lacking in some of the online screening list services.
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T Flemming Ruud, Auditing as Verification of Financial Information (Norwegian University Press,
1989) 61.
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FATF needs to fill this gap and identify a means of maintaining a FATF approved
verification system in these circumstances as soon as possible. FATF should keep
asking itself what needs to be revised to reflect experience and respond to emerging
issues? And to be fair it is going through a major exercise to do this now by revising its
Recommendations.
In Australia, reporting entities have been required since 12 December 2008 to identify
their customers on an ongoing basis under the AML Act and its amendment. Previously,
under the Financial Transactions Reporting Act1988 (Cth) (FTR Act), reporting entities
did have to conduct customer identification and verification from the outset, but there
was no obligation for entities covered by the Act 199 to conduct OCDD on their business
relationship with customers. The 2005 FATF mutual evaluation report for Australia
indicated that the Australian Transactions Reports and Analysis System (AUSTRAC)
— through its Suspect Transaction Guideline 200 — was encouraging reporting entities to
adopt ‘Know Your Customer’ (KYC) in order to be aware of their customer’s business
activities, but, as the Report pointed out, this guideline did not create any legally
enforceable obligations.201 The passing of the AML Act of 2006, filling this gap, is
commendable.
According to the AML Act, reporting entities are required to have an AML program.
‘Part B’ of this program ought to specify the reporting entity’s ‘applicable customer
identification procedures’ to verify a customer’s identity before providing a ‘designated
service’ to the customer. The Act also requires a reporting entity to keep records for
199

Including financial institutions, insurers, financial services licensees, unit trust managers, bullion
sellers, real estate agents, and currency dealers: Financial Transactions Reports Act1988 (Cth) s 3.
200
AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Guideline No 1 – Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 – Suspect
Transaction Reporting (2002) <http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/2003_guideline_1_suspect_transaction_
reporting.pdf> at 28 September 2011.
201
FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report, above n 15, 72. Also filed as IMF Country Report No 06/424
(2006). For text, see <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2006/cr06424.pdf> at 5 November 2011.
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seven years after the end of that entity’s relationship with the relevant customer. In
some specific circumstances, an identification procedure may be provided after
supplying a designated service.
The AML Act and Rules clarified some important issues regarding FATF, including
different identification and verification requirements for different types of customers,
such as individuals (including sole traders), companies (both domestic and registered
foreign companies), trustees partnerships, incorporated and unincorporated associations,
registered co-operatives and government bodies. The AML Rules in addition permit
reporting entities to have authorised agents hold customer identification on behalf of the
reporting entity.
In fact, the reporting entities interviewed for the purpose of this thesis and who have
been obliged under the AML Act to identify and verify their customers were found to be
screening their new customers against various lists, with most of them doing so through
the Department of the Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) ‘LinkMatchLite’ software
program, 202 which facilitates access to a consolidated list of persons and entities on the
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 203 and International
Business Aviation Council (IBAC) websites. In the banking sector some banks were
found to be also relying on some other additional lists, such as the Reserve Bank of
Australia (RBA) list,204 and some of them extend that to include the New Zealand Police
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list,205 and the lists of the US Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), 206 Her Majesty’s
Treasury (HMT) in the UK,207 Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Monetary Authority of
Singapore, European Union208 and United Nations lists, as well as other lists that are
mandatory in the areas in which they operate.
Even so, the verification style or method to be used still needs to be clarified, even for
countries like Australia, where some still struggle with which is the best way to verify
customers and cover all necessary information about them, whoever they are or
wherever they are from, so as to ensure an active reporting system is in place.
3.2.1.2 Risk Based Approach
As previously identified, as a concept RBA utilised by the reporting entities aims to
have them manage and mitigate the risk themselves. It can play a vital role in the
reporting system if it is used the way it should be within a jurisdiction.
FATF in its recommendations considered the risk of the ML activities and included
RBA in different recommendations and from different perspectives: from an industry
and regulatory perspective in Recommendations 5, 6, 8, 20, 23 and 24; and from a risk
management

perspective

in

Recommendations

9

and

15. 209

The

FATF

Recommendations left the door open to countries to choose the way that best suits their
system to regulate the process of combating ML crimes. FATF left the decision to
countries to choose their own regulatory framework, whether it came from the regulator
205
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(known as a ‘Rule Based Approach’, or from the regulated in an ‘RBA’). These
different concepts depend on the source of managing and mitigating the ML risk for a
jurisdiction. Under the rule based approach a regulator assesses the risk and decides the
applicable measures that the reporting entity must use in combating ML activities, and
sets this out in ‘rules’. Under the RBA reporting entities carry out the obligation to
manage and mitigate their risk according to the degree of risk that they face and
implement their own measures applicable to preventing ML activity. The RBA involves
delegation of many regulatory tasks to the entities being regulated. This has its own
risks. It is relying on the quality of the reporting entities’ internal systems and these are
different from entity to entity.210
However, a number of Australian compliance managers indicated that there is no ‘pure’
RBA for the purpose of AML activities. They explained that:
…the rule based approach still has an important role in the [RBA]. In fact both
approaches join together, when we are looking to the components being regulated
from both approaches. By the end of the day there is no [RBA], it will turn to the
rule based approach.211

This opinion did not come from ‘empty space’; it came from a few years of experience
with the RBA issue and applying it at work. It also came from managers struggling with
the meaning of ‘risk’ and ‘level of the risk’. This is despite AUSTRAC having provided
some significant online material on risk analysis that could help these entities in their
RBA. These materials warrant closer examination.
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The comment above, however, indicates that some require more and more explanations
(‘rules’) to apply to given situations, and thus (for them) RBA increasingly resembles
rule-based approaches, as the source of guidance inevitably must be the regulator.
What Does ‘Risk’ Mean?
FATF has tried in many publications to clarify RBA. It has published a number of
documents in an attempt to solve the complexity of the RBA terminology, but the
question remains, ‘Did it succeed?’.
The most important such document was the 2007document, Guidance on the Risk Based
Approach in Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing (2007 RBA
Guidance).212 FATF has also issued a number of guidance documents for particular
types of businesses that it believes should be obliged by law to report any suspicions
they have about customers. These documents include the RBA Guidance for
Accountants in 2008,213 RBA Guidance for Legal Professionals (2008),214 RBA
Guidance for Trust and Company Service Providers (2008),215 RBA Guidance for Real
Estate Agents (2008),216 RBA Guidance for Casinos 2008,217 RBA Guidance for Dealers
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in Precious Metals and Stones 2008, 218 Guidance for Money Services Businesses-Risk
Based Approach (2009)219 and Guidance for the Life Insurance Sector (2009).220
Despite all of these efforts to clarify RBA for different types and sizes of businesses,
critical issues remain, one such issue being the meaning of the ‘risk’. For example, in its
2007 RBA Guidance, and particularly in the section on the purpose of RBA, FATF
notes that:
Adopting a [RBA] implies the adoption of the risk management process for dealing
with money laundering and terrorist financing. This process encompasses
recognising the existence of the risk(s), undertaking an assessment of the risk(s)
and developing strategies to manage and mitigate the identified risks. 221

No one can tell exactly what FATF means by ‘risk’ in that part of the 2007 guidance
document, nor in other publications. FATF does not refer to the risk in regard to the
amount of the money laundering in the 2007 guidance document,222 instead the matter is
left to the relevant legislature (or if a similar approach is taken by the legislature, to the
entity itself to determine). The recommendations are advisory, not compulsory; even so
the legislative and regulatory outcomes will necessarily vary from country to country.
Later documents again contain no precise reference to threshold amounts, and instead
issue cautionary warnings about the need for thresholds and awareness of the danger
posed by split or multiple transactions. 223 Yet in at least one exception, a 2009 guidance
document,
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transactions.224 However, this is because these are dealing with cash transactions on
which thresholds have been applied long before the RBA.
In regard to the entity that provides the service, again there is no indication regarding
‘risk’ in the primary 2007 guidance document.
If ‘risk’ refers to the amount of money, then it could refer to either ‘any amount’ of
money that has been laundered or is suspected to have been laundered; or to a
‘particular’ amount of money that has been laundered. These are different: if it is any
amount of money, then it means any level of risk, including high or low risk; but if it is
a particular amount of money, then it could include the high level of risk and exclude
the low level of risk — FATF did not clarify whether it meant the first (threshold-free)
or the second (threshold-dependent) risk type.
On the other hand, if ’risk’ refers to the entity that provides the services, then it could be
restricted to high risk entities, excluding low risk entities; or it could include both high
and low risk entities. Again FATF is unclear. However, it is more likely that FATF is
referring to the risk of ML activity in general terms.
Thus it is important to address the meaning of the risk and the consequences of the
various definitions so as to better clarify the concept. In relation to the risk of ML
activity, there are four main areas of risk, namely the customer, the service, the delivery
process or the (geographical) location.
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This ambiguity in the meaning of risk affects the way reporting entities understand and
comply with the reporting system. Entities unable to correctly ascertain the level of risk
— whether it is about the quantity of money they are dealing with or the level of risk
according to the type of the services that they are providing —can hardly be expected to
identify accurately the risk the customer may pose and so comply with any AML
system and its reporting obligations. In the absence of clear, easily comprehensible
definitions, they may be unable to correctly distinguish low risk from high risk
products. And, if the FIU itself does not know exactly what ‘risk’ means (or its
personnel are uncertain), then how can it supervise the level of the reporting entity
compliance and enforce compliance when this is needed?
The Level of the Risk
Through the FATF Recommendations and the 2007 RBA Guidance it is easy to notice
that the considerable level of risk that RBA continues to pose. It calls for a high level of
awareness regarding persons and activities with a higher risk, and a lesser degree of
awareness regarding those posing a low risk.
If the problem of the meaning of the risk is put aside, there is still a major problem
when one looks at the level of the risk. In its 2007 RBA Guidance, FATF noted that:
A country could decide that it will apply the full range of AML/CFT measures set
out in Recommendations 5-11, 13-15, 18 and 21-22, to all types of financial
institutions. However, that country may also decide to take risk into account, and
may decide to limit the application of certain Recommendations provided that
either of the conditions set out below are met. Where there are limitations or
exemptions, this should be done on a strictly limited and justified basis:
 When a financial activity is carried out by a person or entity on an occasional
or very limited basis (having regard to quantitative and absolute criteria) such
that there is little risk of money laundering or terrorist financing activity
occurring, a country may decide that the application of AML measures is not
necessary, either fully or partially.
 In strictly limited and justified circumstances, and based on a proven low risk
of money laundering or terrorist financing, a country may decide not to apply
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some or all of the Forty Recommendations to some of the financial
activities. 225

Thus, FATF indicates that countries are able to decide not to apply the AML measures
for persons or activities deemed to pose a low risk, but the actual problem is not
generally associated with this scenario. The problem appears when a low risk reporting
entity has high risk customers, in which instance the AML system appears inadequate to
deal with such issues in accordance with the FATF standards. Another scenario where a
problem exists is where a low risk reporting entity (under FATF standards) has quite
large numbers of small value transactions of less than the threshold amount of
AUD10,000 which nevertheless (as an aggregated amount) could reflect a considerable
risk.
The freedom of countries to determine their own regulations and legislation in
accordance with FATF standards may result in a lack of reference to a threshold for
aggregated multiple transactions (or measures in relation to them) in national
legislation. In such a situation, FIU enforcement of reporting entity compliance and
insistence that they take RBA measures in relation to such transactions appears
problematic. Threshold variations between jurisdictions would cause further problems
in regard to consistency.
The Australian AML system follows RBA and its AML Act is built on this principle. A
number of compliance managers have complained that it is the mix of risks that poses
particular difficulty for them as reporting entities:
[T]he Act basically says the obligation is on the reporting entity to identify,
monitor and manage their own risk by themselves. The risk posed by offering that
particular product to that particular customer. So the customer could be quite low
risk and the product could be quite high risk and vice versa, it could be a high risk
225
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customer and it could be a very ‘vanilla’ low risk product. So they are ‘mixing their
metaphors’ there to start with. Transaction activity is one thing, the risk profile of
the investor or the customer it is a different category altogether. 226

While some may argue that this says more about the person who made the comment that
the RBA concept, it does reveal existing actual or attitudinal /perceptual difficulties of
those enmeshed in administering the system, and perhaps their inability to come to grips
with it. In addition, transaction activity appears to be perceived as easier to identify and
monitor. The involvement of customer risk profiles adds a qualitative rather than easily
quantifiable dimension, and, traditionally at least, those involved in banking and finance
are more accustomed to and are more comfortable with ‘numbers based’ judgments.
Various ‘lists’ may therefore be resorted to.
3.2.1.3 Beneficial Owner
One of the core matters needing to be resolved in the CDD process is identifying the
‘beneficial owner’. FATF’s Forty Recommendations mention the ‘beneficial owner’ in
a number of places.227 The entire document encourages reporting entities to take CDD
measures, including identifying the beneficial owner at the beginning of the relationship
or thereafter, and taking necessary legal or regulatory measures to prevent money
launderers from being the beneficial owners in specific circumstances (such as
operating or holding a management function of a casino). It also encourages countries to
have adequate, accurate and timely information about the beneficial owner to prevent
the unlawful use of legal persons by money launderers.
In the Glossary to the FATF Methodology, FATF defines the ‘beneficial owner’ as:
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The natural person(s) who ultimately owns or controls a customer and/or the
person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted. It also incorporates those
persons who exercise ultimate effective control over a legal person or
arrangement.228

The risk of the ML activities will never be managed or mitigated by any reporting entity
when applying the RBA without identifying the beneficial owner; therefore, it is a core
matter for any AML system of any country if it is to be a successful and useful regime.
However, from the Australian regulatory viewpoint the beneficial owner is limited to
including individuals but not legal persons, as is clear in Chapter 1 of the AML Rules
where it defines the term ‘beneficial owner’: ‘[I]n respect of a company, [it] means any
individual who owns through one or more share holdings more than 25 per cent of the
issued capital in the company’. 229 This restriction in identifying the beneficial owner
through the Rules that have been issued by AUSTRAC to suit the AML/CFT Act makes
compliance with FATF Recommendation 5 unachievable for the reporting entities when
it comes to knowing what level of beneficial ownership must be identified and how,
especially in regard to proprietary or private companies which are not licensed and
subject to regulatory oversight by Commonwealth, State and Territory statutory
regulation.230
The flaw in identifying ownership resulted in FATF indicating in its 2005 mutual
evaluation that the Australian AML system is non-compliant with Recommendation 5.
Since 2005 and up until the date of this thesis, FATF has insisted on Australia providing
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an annual report on its AML system achievements and has refused to make reporting on
a biennial basis. It is clear that FATF is dissatisfied with the Australian way of applying
the RBA to CDD and the AML system. 231 It appears particularly dissatisfied with the
Australian regime permitting ‘financial institutions to [themselves] determine whether
or not to apply certain measures, including identifying and verifying beneficial owners
for companies’, which AUSTRAC itself reports was ‘beyond what can be determined
using a RBA as defined by the FATF Recommendations’. 232 This indicates that the
bankers want even less regulation while FATF wants more regulation — so AUSTRAC
is being criticised by bankers for ‘too much’ and by FATF for ‘too little’ regulation. 233
The development of the AML Act was marked by lengthy and detailed consultation
with the Australian Bankers Association (ABA), its members and other entities affected,
over a period of around two years. The AML Rules were also developed in close
consultation with industry, including the ABA and its members, and AUSTRAC
continues this practice in developing its rules. Some might say that the weaker regime
was the product of too close consultation with the industry (and perhaps even a degree
of ‘regulatory capture’) though from the response to this document it is obviously that
the ABA would like even less burdensome regulation and greater flexibility to
determine to whom to apply the Rules.
However, the question is why are there difficulties in fully complying with FATF’s
requirements in regards to beneficial ownership?
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Analysis of this issue has revealed that the cause is the difficulty in identifying the
beneficial owner, which in turn is due to five important reasons:
1

FATF standards for identifying the beneficial owner contribute some ambiguity,
as accurate information must be provided that identifies the beneficial owner.
Clarification of this concept is required.

2

The different types of entities that are obliged under the AML Act 2006 and its
amendments to carry out the reporting obligations — including those to be listed
under the second tranche of the AML Act, such as lawyers, accountants, real
estate agents and gold bullion sellers and buyers — contribute to the difficulty in
identifying the beneficial owners. The ambiguity of the FATF Recommendation is
unhelpful.

3

Reporting entities are not engaging with the regulator — in Australia, AUSTRAC
— in identifying the beneficial owner. The informal interpretation supplied to
clarify the rules is insufficient, especially when the reporting entities see
themselves as ‘rule followers’ without any need to discuss the matter or be
involved in any further complicated issues of the AML system.

4

Regulators within the same jurisdiction are working too removed from each other
in terms of the AML system, even in cases where they have MoUs. In the
Australian jurisdiction the role of every single authority in the AML scheme is
clear — most regulators view the AML supervisory role as solely belonging to the
FIU unit.

5

The need to fill these gaps is great, because identifying the beneficial owners
means lower ML risk, and not identifying them means high ML risk.
110

AUSTRAC is carrying too much on its shoulders in regard to this matter. In order to
improve the system to meet the FATF Recommendations as FATF requires in terms of
identifying beneficial owners and other issues, AUSTRAC needs to improve many
processes and procedures. This requires greater resourcing.
In fact, AUSTRAC is not the only authority in Australia that has responsibility for
combating ML crimes in general and regulating beneficial ownership and other issues
related to the AML system. Other government agencies also have a role in collaborating
with AUSTRAC. In this regard, and particularly in identifying beneficial owners, ASIC
has an important role to play. As the reporting entities are facing difficulties in
identifying the beneficial ownership, and with the different standards of identification
and verification, they become more reliant on ASIC working as a regulator and
supervisor for the integrity of the financial sector. ASIC should have processes and
procedures in place to ensure that the information gained about the reporting entities
and its directors is true and not by any chance false. This is important as reporting
entities and particularly the financial institutions rely on the information that they
receive from ASIC about other reporting entities and their directors. AUSTRAC surely
cannot be blamed for not detecting false information about a reporting entity if the
accuracy of such information is an ASIC responsibility. ASIC’s role in CDD needs to
be clarified and its effectiveness determined. In fact, ASIC currently comes under the
portfolio responsibilities of the Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasurer, which means
that there are multiple portfolios involved with multiple Ministers, making coordination
and cooperation less likely.
If other regulators were to work in conjunction with AUSTRAC, and the important
roles that these authorities actually could play in the AML system were identified
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clearly, then there is no doubt that the whole situation would be changed and a new,
improved climate created to combat ML crimes more effectively. This would
particularly be the case if other reasons for difficulty in identifying the beneficial were
addressed. However, ASIC clearly does not see itself performing such a role.
Recently, AUSTRAC made a submission to the Productivity Commission’s Annual
Review of Regulatory Burdens on Business – Business and Consumer Services, and
took the opportunity to respond to submissions from industry groups and others
regarding the legislative regime and its impact on business. It revealed its desire to
comply with the FATF requirements in regard to identifying beneficial owner and other
important issues. 234 It is hoped that further engagement of the reporting entities with
AUSTRAC can bring the required solutions and secure the best possible regulatory
system as soon as possible.
3.2.2 Reporting the Suspicion
While the FATF Recommendations are legally non-binding, a number of them are
presented as if they are obligations with which a country must comply.
A number of the recommendations issued oblige reporting entities (including the
financial institutions and DNFBPs) to detect and report suspicious transactions to the
FIU. Recommendations 13 to 16 cover STRs that the reporting entities are required to
submit when a suspicion transaction has occurred. The Recommendations require such
reports not only from reporting entities who offer designated services but also from nondesignated financial institutions, including accountants, gold bullion buyers and sellers,
lawyers, real estate agents and so on.
234
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FATF has thereby tried to cover all businesses that could reliably be a source of ML
activities. FATF is to be commended for taking these various types of entities into
consideration when designating what entities should be obliged under a country’s
legislation to submit STRs to the FIUs. In Australia, as previously mentioned, the
second tranche of the Act to include the non-designated financial institutions in the
reporting system has not yet come into force and there it is no indication of an
implementation date. AUSTRAC is currently more focused on implementing a pricing
regime for reporting entities for its services. The idea of a second tranche was
announced by the Australian Government years ago (2005)235 in large part of it remains
‘on the back burner’ despite the introduction of the AML-CTF Act 2006.
In fact, a number of dilemmas are associated with STRs, including the uncertainty of
suspicion. This issue could add to the challenges that are facing or potentially
undermining the achievements of the STRs’ goals including reducing and preventing
crime, and also add greater difficulty to measuring the effectiveness of such types of
reports and problems in separating their influence from other aspects of an AML
regime.236
3.2.2.1 Uncertainty of Suspicion
Although the FATF recommendations are a benchmark in regard to reporting suspicious
activities, it has yet to define what ‘suspicious’ or ‘suspicion’ means. It has been said
that this is because it is a subjective rather than objective matter. The ground of
suspicion that entails a reporting entity’s FIU reporting obligation remains unclear to
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the reporting entities themselves and also to the FIU. The FATF Recommendations
failed to clarify ‘suspicion’ or its grounds for two reasons:
1

FATF issued the recommendations to suit all systems of all countries, whatever
their financial or the political system.

2

FATF issued the recommendations to cover all types of businesses; those offering
designated services and those who are designated non-financial businesses and
professions. The different businesses represent different kinds of risks and
suspicious activities that are conducted through their institutions.

So it was difficult for FATF to identify ‘suspicion’ as suspicion has to arise in a context.
It does not matter whether the country is Australia or Jordan or Mexico. ‘What is
suspicious’ must be a decision made in the context of transactions involving customers
and services in a location, however, while the concept is not difficult, the problem is
that FATF has not explained these basic concepts and many FIUs seem unable to deal
with them either.
Clarifying ‘suspicion’ is not a simple issue at the national or entity level either. In this
regard, Levi (1997) pointed out that with their varying levels of economic and social
development, countries have dissimilar views about the way of controlling ML
activities. 237 This calls into question the suitability of the FATF Recommendations and
their ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.
Beare (2002) shares this opinion and also mentions that at a local level it is easy for the
expert launderers, when dealing with the reporting entities face-to-face, to mask their
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deception, where the less able would betray themselves with faltering speech for
example. 238
This uncertainty of suspicion made many reporting entities uncomfortable in dealing
with this problem, especially when FATF in Recommendation 13 indicates that:
If a financial institution suspects or has reasonable grounds to suspect that funds
are the proceeds of a criminal activity, or are related to terrorist financing, it should
be required, directly by law or regulation, to report promptly its suspicious to the
financial intelligence unit (FIU). 239

Thus, suspicion and having reasonable grounds for suspicion are different concepts for
FATF, or let us to say different levels. Both levels prompt reporting. FATF appears to
have failed to recognise that if it asks reporting entities to identify suspicion of criminal
activity, reporting entities will rightly say that they are unable to do so. This is the
wrong question and it has been the wrong question from the outset. It is the problem for
R13, who should ask if the transaction is unusual or suspicious from the perspective of
what is known about the customers and their businesses. It also failed to take into
account the need for quality reporting. A decrease in quality is probable if reporting
entities report every single suspicious transaction, whether that report is built on a
‘reasonable grounds’ or not. Low or poor quality SMRs could lead to overburdening
systems with finite resources.
Consequently, it is very important for the reporting entities and the FIUs to define
‘suspicion’ (as in ‘suspicious transfer’, ‘suspect’ or ‘reasonable ground to suspect’), to
be more accurate when dealing with ML activities.
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That various legislatures attempting to implement FATF compliant AML legislation
enact different requirements in this regard demonstrates lack of understanding of the
concept or at least its openness to interpretation.
In the case of the Shah & Anor v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd,240 the High Court in
England and Wales rejected the argument that an SMR must be based on ‘reasonable
grounds’. In this case, the claimants indicated that they suffered significant damages
occurring out of delays by HSBC in completing four transfers from the claimants'
account. While HSBC did not provide explanations for the delay, the fundamental
reason for the delay was that HSBC suspected that the funds in the claimants' account
were criminal assets.
As a result, HSBC had to make an authorised disclosure to the relevant authorities
before it could proceed with each transaction and then it waited for appropriate consent
under the POCA. Here the claimants indicated that the reporting obligation was not
generated under the POCA unless HSBC had reasonable grounds for their suspicion. If
no reporting obligation existed, HSBC could have been in breach of their contractual
obligation to deal in accordance with the customers' instructions and hence liable for
damages. The Court held that there was no legal basis for the requirement of
‘reasonableness’ in the UK legislation and that ‘the issue of suspicion under POCA was
purely subjective’. There was no legal requirement that reasonable grounds exist for the
suspicion. Thus, it was only open to the claimants to insure that the suspicion was held
fraudulently. As no such assertion was made, their damages claim could not succeed.
This was the case even if the suspicion was not established on reasonable grounds.
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Shah & Anor v HSBC Private Bank (UK) Ltd ([2009]
http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2009/79.html> at 19 July 2012.
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EWHC

79

(QB))

<

Therefore, the court rejected the claimants' argument that the suspicion must be
reasonably held indicating that 'to impose a superadded requirement of reasonableness
would put a banker in an impossible position and mean that he could be in breach of
duty even though he was acting as the law compelled him to. That would be neither
sensible nor principled.'
However, a ‘reasonable grounds’ requirement is embodied in the Australian approach
(see below),241 and is reflected in at least one banking entity statement on the matter.242
AUSTRAC attempts to define ‘suspicion’ for AML purposes. Its Public Legal
Interpretation Number 6 of 2008, Suspect Transactions and Suspicious Matter Reports,
focussing on the fact that the ground to suspect has to be ‘reasonable’ and notes that:
“Reasonable ground to suspect” indicates that the test is both objective and
subjective. That is, the cash dealer must have a real suspicion of the relevant
matters and the suspicion must be based on matters or evidence that supports the
truth of the suspicion. 243

In its most recent survey (March 2010), AUSTRAC indicated that a large number of
reporting entities did not report any AML matters to their boards or equivalent
executive body during the previous financial year. Therefore, AUSTRAC is
encouraging these reporting entities to guarantee that appropriate oversight
arrangements are in place. 244
Sir Stephen Lander (2006) discussed the role of SOCA (Serious Organised Crime
Agency of UK) in the SARs’ system and the skills and resources that SOCA needed to
fulfil its duties and responsibilities under the AML regime. One of the essential skills
241

AUSTRAC, ‘Reporting Obligations’ in AUSTRAC Regulatory Guide [ch 9] (as at 31 August 2009)
109–15 <http://www.austrac.gov.au/regulatory_guide.html>.
242
Westpac Group, Corporate Governance AML/CTF(n d) <http://www.westpac.com.au/aboutwestpac/the-westpac-group/corporate-governance/> at 1 October 2011.
243
AUSTRAC, Public Legal Interpretation Series No 6 of 2008, above n 71, 5.
244
AUSTRAC, AML/CTF Compliance Officers in Australia, AUSTRAC Survey Series No.1 (2010) 28.
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that SOCA needed was the capacity to develop effective collaboration. It also needed
the resources to help the reporting entities in identifying suspicion. He indicated that the
recommendations in his report were predicated on the belief that if SOCA delivered
better communication and performance, that of itself should make it easier for other
participants in the AML regime to deliver better outcomes, including targeting
suspicious activities. He added and import qualification: ‘SOCA management is
prepared to take on the responsibilities and programmes set out on that basis, but as
long as there is a wider recognition that it has no power to direct other participants, and
that success will depend equally on their efforts’. 245
Thus, an effective regulatory agency with improved performance and levels of
communication with the reporting entities is essential to identifying suspicion, not only
for SOCA but also by any other FIU including AUSTRAC.
However, in a 2010 ACAMS workshop in Melbourne, 246 a number of compliance
managers claimed that the term ‘suspicion’ is still unclear, and asked what was meant
by the phrase ‘reasonable ground’ — particularly and more specifically in regard to
what decision they should make about which activities it is that their entities should
investigate and which activities need a report to be sent to AUSTRAC as suspicious
transactions or matters. A number of them also claimed that when they contact
AUSTRAC to get some clarification about such subjects, AUSTRAC staff sometimes
did not know the answers and their response was that they would ‘try to get back to you
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Sir Stephen Lander, ‘Review of the Suspicious Activity Reports Regime’ (The SARs Review) (2006)
Serious Organised Crime Agency, 47.
246
ACAMS workshop, AUSTRAC Consultation: Making Your Voice Heard, above n 211.
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soon with the answer from the right people who know about this issue’, but ‘sometimes
they never get back to us with the required information’. 247
‘Suspicion’ thus remains an important issue that FATF has failed to clarify to the extent
required by the reporting entities persistent ambiguities and a lack of experience in the
field are still two of the main difficulties that reporting entities and AUSTRAC face.
3.2.2.2 High Value Cash Transaction Reports
The high value cash transaction reports (CTRs) 248 which are also called threshold
transaction reports (TTRs) are another important pillar for the AML reporting system,
because it relies on reporting of transactions that involve the transfer of physical
currency or e-currency, where the total amount transferred is not less than the specified
threshold amount. According to FATF Recommendation 19:
Countries should consider the feasibility and utility of a system where banks and
other financial institutions and intermediaries would report all domestic and
international currency transactions above a fixed amount, to a national central
agency with a computerised data base, available to competent authorities for use in
money laundering or terrorist financing cases, subject to strict safeguards to ensure
proper use of the information.249

In its interpretative notes to the Forty Recommendations, and particularly for
Recommendations 5, 12 and 16, FATF has tried to clarify the value of the cash
transaction:
The designated threshold for transactions (under Recommendations 5 and 12) are
as follows:
 Financial institutions (for occasional customers under Recommendation 5) –
USD/EUR 15,000.
247

Ibid.
A Cash Transaction Report (CTR) is a report that the reporting entities are required to file for each
deposit, payment or transfer of currency, by, through, or to the reporting entity which involves a
transaction in currency of more than a specific amount. A number of countries, including Australia, have
specified a threshold amount of $10,000. In this context, currency means the paper and/or coin money of
any country that is designated as legal tender by the country of issuance.
249
FATF, The 40 Recommendations, above n 129, 7.
248
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Casinos, including internet casinos (under Recommendation 12) – USD/EUR
3000.
 For dealers in precious metals and dealers in precious stones when engaged in
any cash transaction (under Recommendations 12 and 16) – USD/EUR
15.000.
Financial transactions above a designated threshold include situations where the
transaction is carried out in a single operation or in several operations that appear
to be linked. 250

Although FATF has clarified the threshold values (above), the purely voluntary nature
of Recommendation 19 remains a concern, as there is no obligation to follow it. Broome
(2005) claims that FATF has failed to cover CTRs in the way they should be. He
believes that CTRs can prove valuable instruments against ML and corruption. More
specifically, he criticises FATF’s ‘failure to endorse high value cash transactions
reporting as an essential element of an AML regime’. 251
It must be mentioned that specifying threshold amounts can help to protect the integrity
of the financial system if correctly set.252 When the Government decides the threshold
value, it believes that this is the amount that can affect the integrity of the financial
institution for that jurisdiction (that is, it believes that if ML transactions were on or
above this amount, such integrity would be affected). Nevertheless, in practice the value
is often set for political reasons to reduce the level of CTRs and, in some jurisdictions,
to ensure free flow of large amounts of questionable funds.
A substantial problem remains, however, in regard to transactions of amounts slightly
lower than the threshold value (for example, AUD9000 instead of AUD10,000). Not
only does the source of the funds taint the institutions but even the lower value surely
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Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Interpretative Notes for the Forty Recommendations (2003)
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/document/28/0,3343,en_32250379_32236930_33658140_1_1_1_1,00.html> at
10 October 2011.
251
Broome, above n 3, 555.
252
Too high and it will have little impact: Asian Development Bank, Effective Anti-money Laundering
Regime in Mongolia (ADB, 2007) 25–6 <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/anti-money-laundering/
Anti-Money-Laundering.pdf>.
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affects the integrity of the financial institution, particularly where such transactions are
repeated without detection.
Even amounts over a threshold that are reported may pass seemingly unnoticed, as
occurred prior to 9/11.
The financing arrangements for the September 11 attacks on the US appear to have
gone unnoticed by security agencies except on one occasion... the leader of the 19
hijackers, opened a bank account in southern Florida in June 2000, a wire transfer
of $69,985 from the Gulf three months later prompted ‘SunTrust Bank’ to make a
suspicious transaction report to the US Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network. Like most of the 125,000 similar reports sent in each year, it went
unremarked, until it was discovered by investigators searching for information on
the people behind the hijacking of the four airplanes. The rest of the $500,000 or so
needed to finance the attacks arrived in the US through much smaller transfers or in
cash or travellers cheques for amounts that rang no alarm bells with the banks. 253

FATF has specified the value that needs to be reported as USD/EUR15,000 (a ‘face
value’ of 50 per cent more than the Australian threshold ofAUD10,000.254The value
specified by FATF appears to have been based on a parity between the Euro and the US
dollar, whereas by late 2011, the US and Australian dollar regularly approach parity and
the value for the Euro had fallen against both currencies, rendering comparisons more
difficult in terms of intention in regards to value. However, that notwithstanding, lesser
amounts are considered low risk and reporting entities can be less measured in
supervising such transactions or not applying measures to them if the reporting entity
believes that there is no risk involved. Yet several low transactions can affect the
financial system integrity if such transactions are combined and misused by money
launderers for TF (as above). Technical difficulties combine with transaction volumes to
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John Willman, ‘Trail of Terrorist Dollars That Spans the World’ Financial Times, 29 November 2002,

1.
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Such figures would have been affected by the falling value of the USD relative to both the Euro and
the AUD in the wake of the ‘Great Financial Crisis’ which began in 2007/2008 and worsened through to
2010, so that the value would now be approximately AUD 15,000 given the current USD/AUD dollar
parity Euro 1: USD 1.41; and Euro 1: AUD 1.4: Figures (corrected to 2 decimal places) from Citibank
NA website at 5 November 2011.

121

make reliable ML/TF identification difficult in such instances. Many countries did not
agree with the CTR obligation as a tool to initiate investigations, but use the threshold
as a tool to identify suspicious transactions, relying on the receipt of other
intelligence. 255
In fact, the AML complex — as was shown in Chapter 1— has different members,
including the regulator and law enforcement bodies, and other regulatory agencies and
reporting entities. Each sees the AML system from their own perspective: the regulator
and law enforcement bodies would like to combat the risk of the ML activities; other
partner agencies care about keeping the financial system’s integrity safe-guarded,
ensuring a healthy economic regime; while reporting entities are looking to protect their
reputation and avoid regulatory sanction for non-compliance or the loss of confidence or
trust of other reporting entities. Thus, a reporting entity could choose not to apply AML
measures on transactions below the threshold, because it does not want to risk its
reputed integrity, and under the Act it has the option to choose not to apply these
measures.
In its recommendations and publications, FATF provides standards to the regulator and
other partner agencies in the AML system, but not to the reporting entities, who have
the obligations to comply with this system and need to understand strategic risk
management and apply the RBA in their operations. In regard to many issues, both
regulators and partner agencies regard FATF materials as not sufficiently clear and as
only adding more ambiguity to an already complex AML system.
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Neil J Jensen, ‘Technology and Intelligence’ (2005) Journal of Money Laundering Control 227, 230.
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3.2.3 Analysing and Circulating the Reports
Information received from reporting entities (whether STRs, SMRs, or CTRs) are
analysed by the FIU.
In its analysis, the FIU test the reports, and according to the results, contact other
partner agencies as well as the source reporting entity to obtain clarification and collect
more data about the suspicious matter. Recommendation 29 further states that
production of relevant data should be able to be compelled and sanctions available for
failure to comply:
Supervisors should have adequate powers to monitor and ensure compliance by
financial institutions with requirements to combat money laundering and terrorist
financing, including the authority to conduct inspections. They should be
authorised to compel production of any information from financial institutions that
is relevant to monitoring such compliance, and to impose adequate administrative
sanctions for failure to comply with such requirements. 256

Thus, the process of analysing data actually provides the FIU with possibilities of
adding more information and enhancing the value of the reports that have been sent by
reporting entities.
Nevertheless, the ability of the FIU to ‘add value’ to the received reports will rely on
many aspects. Factors include the regulatory culture of the regulatory agencies (which
plays a vital role as specified for AML issues), the presence of well trained and
committed staff for both reporting entities and regulatory agencies, adequate
information security tools, dependable technology and systems, legislative support, a
favorable strategic framework, the FIU budget, high levels of connectivity in the
relationship between the FIU and its partner agencies, and extent of international
information sharing. Countries should consider the FATF Recommendations in this
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FATF, The 40 Recommendations, above n 129, 11.
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regard and FATF should consider these challenges when it comes to evaluate a
country’s AML system and its FIU.
Following analysis, the FIU circulates and disseminates data collected to law
enforcement bodies for them to take the appropriate action.
Law enforcement bodies are the last beneficial party of the AML reporting system.
They receive the system’s outcome — the reports. Improving the quality of data in a
report is fundamental to making it a useful source of information to law enforcement
bodies, and for the overall success of the AML system.
Another aspect could emerge from the Recommendation 26, where FATF indicates
that:257
Countries should establish a FIU that serves as a national centre for the receiving
(and, as permitted, requesting), analysis and dissemination of STR and other
information regarding potential money laundering or terrorist financing. The FIU
should have access, directly or indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial,
administrative and law enforcement information that it requires to properly
undertake its functions, including the analysis of STR.

Therefore, it is crucial for countries’ AML systems in this regard to not only have
MoUs between the FIU and its partner agencies (including law enforcement bodies), but
to also consider the need to have an active FIU that knows how to evaluate the reports
and circulate the useful ones to various law enforcement bodies, so system operations
will be enhanced and optimal results achieved.

257

Ibid 10–11.
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3. 3 How FATF Sees the Australian Reporting Obligations258
Although Australia, like so many other countries, is attempting to comply with the
FATF Recommendations, it does so in the context of its own legal and regulatory
system and sets its own reporting obligations in accordance withthat system. Its
implementation of the FATF Recommendations is, however, subject to review by
FATF.
3.3.1 Australia’s Reporting Obligations
Before 2006, the Australian jurisdiction combated ML, tax evasion, and other major
crimes under the Financial Transaction Reports Act 1988 (Cth) (FTR Act). Under this
Act cash dealers259 were obliged to submit reports of: 260


suspicious transactions



cash transactions equal to or in excess of AUD10,000



international funds transfer instruction.

258

It is important to understand the Australian reporting system at this stage and compare it with the
FATF recommendations and how Australia is complying with these recommendations in terms of the
reporting obligations. However, the Australian reporting entities experiences in this domain will follow in
Chapter Six.
259
Cash Dealers as defined in the FTR Act includes banks, building societies and credit unions, referred
to as ‘financial institutions’; insurance companies and insurance intermediaries, securities and derivatives
dealers, futures brokers, cash carriers managers, trustees of unit trusts, firms that deal in travelers’ money
orders and like persons who collect, hold, exchange or remit currency on behalf of other persons,
currency and bullion dealers, casinos and gambling houses, bookmakers and totalisator agency boards.
260
According to the FTR Act 1988 (Cth) s 15 Reports in relation to transfer of currency into or out of
Australia:
(1) Where:
(a) a person:
(i) transfers Australian currency or foreign currency out of Australia; or
(ii) transfers Australian currency or foreign currency into Australia; and
(b) the amount of currency involved in the transfer is not less than $10,000 in value; and
(c) a report in respect of the transfer has not been given in accordance with this section;
the person, subject to subsections (2), (3) and (4), commits an offence against this subsection.
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In addition, any person making any international cash movement of AUD10,000 (or a
foreign currency equivalent) or more, into or out of Australia, whether as a passenger, in
person, or by post had to report that transfer to AUSTRAC. 261
Thus Australia had reporting obligations through the FTR Act before the FATF
Recommendations were first issued in 1990, 262 which makes the Australian AML
system one of the first to take the risk of the ML activities into consideration, even if
261

FTR Act 1988 (Cth) s
(7) A report under this section shall:
(a) be in the approved form;
(b) contain the reportable details in relation to the matter being reported;
(c) be signed by the person giving the report; and
(d) be given to:
(i) if the transfer is effected by a person taking the currency out of, or bringing it into, Australia
with the person –a customs officer; and
(ii) in any other case – the AUSTRAC CEO or a customs officer.
(7A) A report under this section, other than a report mentioned in paragraph (5)(c) or (d), must be
given:
(a) if subparagraph (7)(d)(i) applies – at the time the currency concerned is brought into, or taken
out of, Australia; and
(b) in any other case – at any time before the transfer takes place.
(7AA)For the purposes of subsection (7A), if currency is taken out of Australia by a person by
consignment of the currency:
(a) through the to a place outside Australia; or
(b) to another person for carriage to a place outside Australia by that other person or by a third
person; the time when the currency is taken out of Australia is the time when it is irrevocably
committed by the first-mentioned person to the Australian Postal Corporation or to the other
person, as the case may be.
(7B) For the purposes of paragraph (7A)(a), the time at which currency is brought into Australia by a
person is:
(a)if the person:
(i) transfers the currency into Australia when a passenger on an aircraft or ship; and
(ii) after disembarking, goes through an area set apart for customs officers to examine the
passports and personal baggage of, and perform other duties in respect of, disembarking
passengers and for such passengers to collect personal baggage; as soon as the person reaches
the place in that area at which customs officers examine personal baggage or, if the person
does not go to that place, when the person leaves that area; or
(b) in any other case – the first opportunity after arrival in Australia that the person has to give the
report under this section.
(7C) For the purposes of paragraph (7A)(a), the time at which currency is taken out of Australia by a
person is:
(a) if the person:
(i)transfers the currency out of Australia when a passenger on an aircraft or ship; and
(ii) before embarking, goes through an area set apart for customs officers to examine the
passports of, and perform other duties in respect of, embarking passengers; when the person is
at the place in that area at which customs officers examine passports; or
(b) in any other case – as soon as the person reaches the customs officer who is to examine the
person’s passport in relation to the person leaving Australia or, if there is no such examination, the
last opportunity before leaving Australia that the person has to give the report under this section.
262
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), The 40 Recommendations (1990)<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/
dataoecd/25/61/33635879.pdf> at 15 Oct 2011.
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there were shortcomings in the actual Act (or later legislation) in terms of the
comprehensiveness of the reporting obligations.
In the current system, the AML Act 2006 (Cth) under its first tranche, and particularly
under Part 3,263 requires reporting entities who provide ‘financial services’ to carry out
their reporting obligations and report to AUSTRAC the following types of reports:


Suspicious matter report (SMR)264



Threshold transactions report (TTR) of transactions equal to or more than
AUD10,000265



International funds transfer instruction report (IFTI).266

These types of reports are very important to the AML system, because they may prompt
AUSTRAC and law enforcement bodies to take further steps in detecting, investigating
and prosecuting groups and individuals involved in any ML or terrorism activities.
In addition to the required types of reports in Part 3 of the Act, Part 4 covers the two
further important types of reports, those relating to: 267

263

According to Part 3 Reporting Obligations, Division 1 Introduction, s 40 Simplified outline ofthe
AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth): A reporting entity must give the AUSTRCCEO reports about suspicious
matters.
If a reporting entity provides a designated service that involves a threshold transaction, the reporting
entity must give the AUSTRAC CEO a report about the transaction.
If a person sends or receive an international funds transfer instruction, the person must give the
AUSTRAC CEO a report about the instruction.
A reporting entity may be required to give AML/CTF compliance reports to the AUSTRAC CEO.
264
AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) ss 41–42. See also re SMRs, AUSTRAC, Reporting Requirements, An
Introduction to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (AML/CMF
Act) Reporting Requirements (n d) Doc no 140/1008/CC <http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/reporting_
requirements.pdf> at 5 November 2010, 3.
265
AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) ss 43–44. See also re TTRs, AUSTRAC, Reporting Requirements, An
Introduction to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 Doc no
140/1008/CC, above n 264, 3–4.
266
AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) ss 45–46 See also re the two types of IFTI reports, AUSTRAC, Reporting
Requirements, An Introduction to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter terrorism Financing Act 2006
Doc no 140/1008/CC, above n 264, 4.
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Physical currency



Bearer negotiable instruments.

It has been clear that the AML Act (2006) and AML Rules delivered a number of
remarkable achievements with regards to the verification and identification of
customers, and reporting of suspicions.
Ongoing Customer Due Diligence
Ongoing Customer Due Diligence (OCDD) is one of the core issues for any AML
system, and Australia has been taking its importance into account since the issuing of
the AML Act (2006) and AML Rules, particularly under Part 2 Division 6 of the AML
Act, and Chapter 15 of the AML Rules.
Reporting entities (who provide designated services) are obliged under the system to
continue to supervise customers and their transactions, utilising RBA by managing and
mitigating the risk of these institutions themselves.
To achieve the required level of compliance with the OCDD obligation, the reporting
entities must take into consideration three compulsory elements, stated in the Chapter
15 of the AML Rules. These include:

267

According to the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth), Part 4 Reports about cross-border movements of physical
currency and bearer negotiable instruments, Division 1 Introduction, s 54 Simplified outline:
 Cross-border movements of physical currency must be reported to the AUSTRAC CEO, a customs
officer or a police officer if the total value moved is above a threshold.
 If a bearer negotiable instrument is produced to a police officer or a customer officer by a person
leaving or arriving in Australia, the officer may require the person to give a report about the
instrument to the AUSTRAC CEO, a customs officer or a police officer.
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1

Collecting and verifying of any additional information for customers under the
KYC principle:268
In this element, reporting entities in their AML programs must maintain a process
of collecting information about their own customers and verifying it before
providing any designated service to them. They also decide when it could be
essential to obtain additional KYC information. They must also update or verify
existing

KYC

information when needed.

Therefore,

OCDD

is

more

comprehensive than CDD, because it is a continual process in relation to
identifying and verifying customer information and is not simply conducted when
a relationship is begun.
2

Having a program of transaction monitoring: 269
According to the AML Act, reporting entities must have Part A within their AML
program. 270 This must include monitoring suspicious, complex, unusual large

268

According to AML/CTF Rules 2006, ch 15 OCDD, KYC information:
15.2 A reporting entity must put in place appropriate risk-based systems and controls to determine
whether any further KYC information should be collected in respect of customers for ongoing customer
due diligence purposes.
15.3A reporting entity must put in place appropriate risk-based systems and controls to determine whether
and in what circumstances KYC information should be updated or verified in respect of its customers for
ongoing customer due diligence purposes.
269
According to AML/CTF Rules 2006, ch 15 OCDD, Transaction Monitoring Program:
15.4 A reporting entity must include a transaction monitoring program in Part A of its AML/CTF
program.
15.5 The transaction monitoring program must include appropriate risk-based systems and controls to
monitor the transactions of customers.
15.6 The transaction monitoring program must have the purpose of identifying, having regard to ML/TF
risk, any transaction that appears to be suspicious within the terms of section 41 of the AML/CTF Act.
15.7 The transaction monitoring program should have regard to complex, unusual large transactions and
unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent economic or visible lawful purpose.
270
AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Regulatory Guide <http://www.austrac.gov.au/rg_3.html> at 6 November
2011. According to AUSTRAC: ‘AML/CTF programs are a new requirement introduced under the
AML/CTF Act. The primary purpose of Part A of an AML/CTF program is to identify, mitigate and
manage the risk that a reporting entity might knowingly, inadvertently or otherwise, facilitate money
laundering or terrorism financing in the provision of designated services. Identification: is the
assessment and recognition of ML/TF risks associated with a designated service a reporting entity
provides. Mitigation: involves analysis of the identified ML/TF risks, prioritisation of the risks according
to likelihood of occurrence and the consequences if it did, developing a strategy to prevent the risk
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transactions and unusual patterns of transactions that are occurring in their
systems.
Reporting entities, in accordance with their RBA, can decide which system will
best monitor these transactions; whether an electronic based system using specific
software for this purpose or not is up to the reporting entities to decide.
3

Having a program for enhancing customer due diligence: 271
In this element the reporting entities must utilise the best techniques to identify
and verify a customer who has been found by the reporting entities to have a high
level of risk. For this purpose, reporting entities must verify, analyse, clarify, reverify, update, or analyse and monitor the customer’s transactions, collect any
KYC information about a customer, clarify the nature of the customer’s ongoing
business with the reporting entity, and/or report any suspicious matter to
AUSTRAC.

occurring and implementing that strategy. Management: is monitoring and reviewing mitigation
strategies’.
271
According to AML/CTF Rules 2006, ch15 OCDD, Enhanced Customer Due Diligence Program:
15.8 A reporting entity must include an enhanced customer due diligence program in Part A of its
AML/CTF program.
15.9 The reporting entity must apply the enhanced customer due diligence program when:
(1) it determines under its risk-based systems and controls that the ML/TF risk is high; or
(2) a suspicion has arisen for the purposes of section 41 of the AML/CTF Act.
15.10 The enhanced customer due diligence program must include appropriate risk-based systems and
controls so that, in cases where enhanced customer due diligence is applied, a reporting entity gives
consideration to whether any one or more of the following applies:
(1)further information ought to be sought from the customer or from third party sources in order to:
(a) clarify or update the customer’s KYC information;
(b) obtain any further KYC information;
(c) clarify the nature of the customer’s ongoing business with the reporting entity;
(d) consider any suspicion that may have arisen for the purposes of section 41 of the AML/CTF
Act;
(2) more detailed analysis should be undertaken in respect of the customer’s KYC information;
(3) KYC information ought to be verified or re-verified in accordance with the customer identification
program;
(4) more detailed analysis and monitoring should be undertaken in respect of the customer’s
transactions – both past and future;
(5) a suspicious matter report ought to be lodged in accordance with section 41 of the AML/CTF Act.
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Reporting Suspicious and Unusual Matters
One of the great achievements of the Australian AML system and its AML Act is that
the reporting obligation has broadened from the obligation under the FTR Act to report
suspicious transactions (STRs) to reporting any suspicious matters (SMRs) including
suspicious transactions.
The suspicious matters reporting obligation came into effect in December 2008. 272 This
obligation is broader than suspicious transaction obligation under the FTR Act, and
includes these types of transactions and other suspicious matters, such as prospective
provision of services to a person whom the reporting entity suspects (on reasonable
grounds) may be other than s/he claims, or suspects that a proposed service or
transaction may be related to tax evasion, an offence against a law of the
Commonwealth or of a State or Territory, TF and/or ML. 273

272

AUSTRAC, Reporting Requirements, An Introduction to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter
terrorism Financing Act 2006 Doc no 140/1008/CC, above n 264.
273
Section 41 of the AML/CTF Act states:
(1) A suspicious matter reporting obligation arises for a reporting entity in relation to a person (the first
person) if, at a particular time (the relevant time):
(a) the reporting entity commences to provide, or proposes to provide, a designated service to the first
person; or
(b) both:
(i)the first person requests the reporting entity to provide a designated service to the first person;
and
(ii) the designated service is of a kind ordinarily provided by the reporting entity; or
(c) both:
(i) the first person inquires of the reporting entity whether the reporting entity would be willing or
prepared to provide a designated service to the first person; and
(ii) the designated service is of a kind ordinarily provided by the reporting entity; and any of the
following conditions is satisfied:
(d) at the relevant time or a later time, the reporting entity suspects on reasonable grounds that the first
person is not the person the first person claims to be;
(e) at the relevant time or a later time, the reporting entity suspects on reasonable grounds that an
agent of the first person who deals with the reporting entity in relation to the provision or prospective
provision of the designated service is not the person the agent claims to be;
(f) at the relevant time or a later time, the reporting entity suspects on reasonable grounds that
information that the reporting entity has concerning the provision, or prospective provision, of the
service:
(i) may be relevant to investigation of, or prosecution of a person for, an evasion, or an attempted
evasion, of a taxation law; or
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In fact, the Australian AML Rules encourage reporting entities also to have a program
to monitor suspicious transactions and unusual transactions. Consequently, matters may
or may not eventually be determined to be ‘not suspicious’ but ‘unusual’ and would
need to be reported to AUSTRAC.
AUSTRAC sees SMRs as an important source of intelligence for AUSTRAC’s law
enforcement, national security, revenue collection and social justice partner agencies.
SMRs are seen as a tool for investigation able to provide vital intelligence to support an
existing investigation, or prompt law enforcement officers to carry out supplementary
risk assessment on the area of the report,274 or prompt an investigation by law

(ii) may be relevant to investigation of, or prosecution of a person for, an evasion, or an attempted
evasion, of a law of a State or Territory that deals with taxation; or
(iii) may be relevant to investigation of, or prosecution of a person for, an offence against a law of
the Commonwealth or of a State or Territory; or
(iv) may be of assistance in the enforcement of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 or regulations
under that Act; or
(v) may be of assistance in the enforcement of a law of a State or Territory that corresponds to the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 or regulations under that Act;
(g) at the relevant time or a later time, the reporting entity suspects on reasonable grounds that the
provision, or prospective provision, of the service is preparatory to the commission of an offence
covered by paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of the definition of financing of terrorism in section 5;
(h) at the relevant time or a later time, the reporting entity suspects on reasonable grounds that
information that the reporting entity has concerning the provision, or prospective provision, of the
service may be relevant to the investigation of, or prosecution of a person for, an offence covered by
paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of the definition of financing of terrorism in section 5;
(i) at the relevant time or a later time, the reporting entity suspects on reasonable grounds that the
provision, or prospective provision, of the service is preparatory to the commission of an offence
covered by paragraph (a) or (b) of the definition of money laundering in section 5;
(j) at the relevant time or a later time, the reporting entity suspects on reasonable grounds that
information that the reporting entity has concerning the provision, or prospective provision, of the
service may be relevant to the investigation of, or prosecution of a person for, an offence covered by
paragraph (a) or (b) of the definition of money laundering in section 5.
Report
(2) If a suspicious matter reporting obligation arises for a reporting entity in relation to a person, the
reporting entity must give the AUSTRAC CEO a report about the matter within:
(a) if paragraph (1)(d), (e), (f), (i) or (j) applies – 3 business days after the day on which the reporting
entity forms the relevant suspicion; or
(b) if paragraph (1)(g) or (h) applies – 24 hours after the time when the reporting entity forms the
relevant suspicion.
(3) A report under subsection (2) must:
(a) be in the approved form; and
(b) contain such information relating to the matter as is specified in the AML/CTF Rules; and
(c) contain a statement of the grounds on which the reporting entity holds the relevant suspicion.
274
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enforcement or other bodies (for example, the Australian Taxation Office, the
Department of Social Security and so on).
However, AUSTRAC expects reporting entities to make greater efforts in adding value
to AUSTRAC’s SMRs, in addition to the greater effort by AUSTRAC in supervising
and enforcing compliance in dealing with this issue. AUSTRAC notes: ‘In addition to
the details of the actual transaction, frontline staff are encouraged to include any
comments or observations in the SMR that may provide useful leads to investigating
agencies.’275 This viewpoint was discussed by Braithwaite (1993) when he indicated
that:
Indeed one of the strengths of enforced self-regulation is that it enables
governments to require banks to generate evaluation research that should be
generated, but that governments have been too defensive to require themselves to
produce concerning their own law enforcement performance. 276

In fact, to achieve what AUSTRAC asks the reporting entities to do regarding this issue,
a balance in this obligation must be struck that will not involve these institutions (rather
than the appropriate authorities) committing to investigatory work instead of adhering to
their role as core elements in the economic system and the financial scheme.
3.3.2 The FATF Third Mutual Evaluation of Australia Regarding Reporting
Obligations
FATF’s Third Mutual Evaluation to Australia issued in 2005 277 is the most recent
evaluation by FATF of Australia, so there has been no evaluation to Australia since the
enactment of the AML Act in 2006. However, the United States Department of State
(US DoS) did issue a number of notices regarding the Australian AML system after
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2006, with the most recent being issued in 2010 (further below following a review of
the FATF Report).
If one looks at the FATF Report, the following summary for Australia’s level of
compliance with the FATF Recommendations can be extracted:

Level of Compliance
Compliant

Number of Recommendations

(C)

12

Largely Compliant

(LC)

9

Partially Compliant

(PC)

10

Not Compliant

(NC)

9
0.53

Average compliance level

This makes Australia a country that is between
‘Partially Compliant’ and ‘Largely Compliant’ with
FATF Recommendations
Table 1: A Summary of the FATF Evaluation of Australia’s Level of Compliance
with the FATF Recommendations
FATF and Australian Reporting Obligations (Before the AML Act 2006)
When FATF tried to evaluate the Australian reporting obligations in 2005, it found that
Australia’s preventive measures in terms of reporting entities relied on the FTR Act
1998 which was lacking in reporting obligations when assessed against the revised
FATF recommendations and found that: ‘Australia’s legislative framework does not
distinguish between financial institutions or specify AML/CFT obligations for financial
institutions on the basis of risk’. 278 Therefore, it found the level of the compliance by
Australia with the reporting obligations as follows:
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Measurement Category

Statement of Compliance Level

Identification and verification

Non-compliant

(NC)

Reporting suspicion

Non-compliant

(NC)

Analyses the Reports

Compliant

Circulation

Largely Compliant

(C)
(LC)

Table 2: FATF Measures of the Level of Australia’s Compliance for
Reporting Obligations
FATF indicated that Australia is ‘non-compliant’ with Recommendation 5 in terms of
CDD, Recommendation 6 on politically exposed persons, Recommendation 7 on
correspondent banking, and Recommendation 8 concerning new technologies and non
face-to-face financial relationship.279 The Report saw Australia as ‘non-compliant’ with
Recommendation 5 because several weaknesses had been found including the
inadequate scope of CDD obligations on cash dealers that did not provide coverage of
all types of financial institutions and inadequate customer identification and verification
throughout account opening, cash and non-cash transactions. 280
Regarding Recommendations 6, 7, 8 and 9, the Report found Australia ‘non-compliant’
noting that the country had no precise legislative or enforceable obligations
concentrating on the identification and verification of politically exposed persons
(PEPs), correspondent banking, and no effective CDD measures for non-face-to-face
customers or for third party referees. 281 On the other hand, the Report found Australia
‘partially compliant’ with Recommendations 10 and 11 on record keeping and the
monitoring of unusual transactions, and ‘largely compliant’ with Recommendation 13
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regarding suspicious transaction reporting and ‘compliant’ with Recommendations 14
and 19 which are about protection and no ‘tipping-off’ and other forms of reporting.282
However, the Report mentioned two main weaknesses regarding STRs:


Limitation on the definition of ‘cash dealer’, which does not cover all financial
institutions, and



Inadequacies in the scope of the TF offence and the impact of the limitation on the
reporting requirements.283

In fact, FATF indicated that the reporting and essential STR guidelines were sufficient,
but that the CDD principle, internal controls and the feedback about the STRs were not
covered, so Australia did not comply with the reporting of the suspicious transactions
the way that it should.284 Australia has worked hard since then to raise the level of
compliance, with a number of improvements made through the AML Act in 2006, such
as including any person who is providing designated services to a customer as a
reporting entity, further broadening the reporting scope by requiring reporting of
‘suspicious matters’ (rather than simply of suspicious transactions, though these are of
course included in ‘matters’), and reporting of certain transactions above a threshold as
well as of international funds transfer instructions.
On the other hand, the Report found Australia ‘partially compliant’ with
Recommendations 17, 23 and 29 on the subject of sanctions, regulation, supervision and
monitoring of AUSTRAC on the level of compliance by the reporting entities in terms
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of the AML system.285 The Report adjudged Australia to be in the category of partially
compliant with Recommendation 17 because:


AUSTRAC was applying only criminal sanctions to non-compliance, and then
only very infrequently;



There was a lack of clarity on the powers of the Australian Prudential Regulation
Authority (APRA) and the Australian Securities and Investment Commission
(ASIC) to apply sanctions; and



AUSTRAC had limited powers for enforcing compliance. It lacked the power to
revoke the licence of cash dealers or to prohibit persons from being a director,
manager, or employee due to serious non-compliance with the FTR Act.286

In terms of Recommendation 23, FATF found AUSTRAC under the FTR Act failed to
provide an effective AML supervisory system. 287
Overall, according to FATF Australia falls between ‘largely compliant’ and ‘partially
compliant’, but regarding the identification and verification, and reporting suspicion,
Australia was non-compliant with the recommendations concerned with these issues.
The question remains, though, what of the Australian level of compliance with these
recommendations after passage of the AML Act in 2006?
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US Department of State (DoS) and Australia’s Reporting Obligations (After the AML
Act 2006)
The United States Department of State (US DoS) reports from 2008–2010 highlight the
improvements that have occurred in the Australian AML system after the issuing of the
AML Act in 2006. These reports took into consideration the FATF Third Mutual
Evaluation Report, and tried to show the difference in the level of compliance of the
Australian AML system with the FATF Forty Recommendations before and after
enactment of the Act.
In terms of the reporting obligations, the US DoS reports indicate that the Australian
government was conscious of the shortcomings that had been mentioned in FATF
evaluation report and was drafting legislation on the AML system in order to comply
with FATF Recommendations following that evaluation report. Therefore, most of these
shortcomings were addressed by the AML Act 2006 (Cth). This Act has been
implemented in tranches and will ultimately replace the FTR Act. The first tranche of
the Act has already been implemented, covering reporting entities that provide
‘designated services’. These entities include the financial sector, gambling sector, and
bullion dealers. These types of reporting entities now face sterner obligations regarding
CDD, reporting requirements, and record-keeping obligations than those in the FTR Act
era. General improvements in CDD have been provided by the new system which is
probably altering the face of the Australian AML system to one of greater compliance.
However, the AML Act is still going through the process of the implementation and the
FTR Act is still in force until all tranches are in force.
The US DoS reports reveal that AUSTRAC received a large number of FTRs
(15,740,744) in 2006–07 with 99.7 per cent of the reports submitted electronically.
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AUSTRAC received 24,440 STRs for the same period, a decline of 1.5 per cent,
following a 44.1 per cent increase the previous year.288
Nevertheless, the Australian Institute of Criminology reported that
[b]etween January 2003, when the Criminal Code was amended, and January 2008,
the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions dealt with 77 charges of
offences of money laundering in Australia, a substantial increase over the
preceding period in prosecutions for money laundering (Commonwealth Director
of Public Prosecutions n.d.). Of these, 54 (70%) were in the 18 months
immediately prior to January 2008. The type of charges dealt with has also changed
over the five-year period. The initial charges for offences of money laundering
under the Criminal Code, dealt with in the 2003–05 period, were for summary
offences (Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions 2004; Commonwealth
Director of Public Prosecutions 2005; Commonwealth Director of Public
Prosecutions 2006). Almost all of the later charges were for indictable offences. A
total of 35 individuals were convicted of 46 money-laundering offences out of the
77 charges dealt with under Division 400 from January 2003 to January 2008.289

Thus, in the period 2006–2007 AUSTRAC received 24,440 STRs (the year before
issuing the Australian Institute of Criminology’s analysis in 2008), yet between 2003
and 2008 only 77 charges of offences of ML in Australia were instituted. According to
the FATF Report:
the key issue in terms of effective implementation of the money laundering offense
is the low number of money laundering prosecutions at the Commonwealth level
(ten dealt with summarily and three on indictment since 2003, with five
convictions), indicating that the regime is not being effectively implemented. 290

The 2010 DoS report indicated that Australia should increase its efforts to prosecute and
convict money launderers, besides enhancing its focus on AML and TF deterrence. 291
Who should be blamed if the regime is not being effectively implemented? Contenders
include: (i) FATF and its recommendations that contain some ambiguity in a number of
288
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places which some entities feel makes compliance obligations unviable; (ii) the current
Australian AML system with its shortcomings in different areas; or (iii) the Authority
charged with regulating the industry groups to guarantee the highest level of compliance
and enforce compliance when and where it is needed; or (iv) the reporting entities who
see themselves somewhat removed from the AML system and whose compliance may
only be secured on the basis of a need to protect their business integrity?
The answer will be as complicated as the question. Each and every contender above has
its role in the system and its obligation to bring forth a better outcome, to make a better
Australian AML system.
3. 4 Conclusion
FATF still regards Australia as a country that ‘needs to work harder’ in number of
areas, including applying RBA and CDD. Therefore, in the FATF 2009/2010 annual
report, it rejected any suggestion that Australia be removed from the list of the countries
that should provide follow up reports annually rather than biennially. 292
On the question of whether Australia is the only jurisdiction that partially complies with
the 40+9 Recommendations with continuing FATF concerns about its CDD, the answer
is negative. Most countries with which FATF mutual evaluations have been conducted
have been advised that their CDD principle is not compliant or only partially compliant.
Indeed not one FATF member was found to be CDD compliant. However Australia
must continue to provide follow up reports annually, yet many other countries have
moved, despite ongoing problems, to annual reports, so complaints of a degree of
differential treatment are not unwarranted.
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FATF itself is not blameless. It should fill the gaps in its Recommendations and its
interpretations of these Recommendations to facilitate greater clarity and compliance.
Meanwhile those in the Australian AML system should look more seriously at the gaps
in its system and compliance that have been identified by the FATF Report and work
harder to fill them, especially regarding concerns about CDD, the application of the
RBA, matters regarding the identification of the beneficial owner, SMRs, and so on.
AUSTRAC needs to understand the reporting obligations and industry groups more than
ever before, especially when Australia is working towards issuing the second tranche of
the AML Act and complying with the FATF recommendations. Thus a huge number of
businesses will be obliged to submit reports to AUSTRAC in the near future.
AUSTRAC needs to encourage them as to how they are to comply with their reporting
obligations. More active powers to enforce compliance should be available to
AUSTRAC to further motivate compliance.
If it eventuates that AUSTRAC does not enforce some of the FATF rules because it
believes that these rules are ineffective or have a significant shortcomings, then
AUSTRAC has a reason not to insist on the enforcement of such rules. It is not just a
question of whether the reporting entities are following the rules; AUSTRAC should be
ensuring that the system is effective. This might mean ignoring impractical rules. For
example, how effective is the reporting of suspicious transactions? If it is not effective,
then why is that? What do the reporting entities think they must do and are there
problems with this requirement? The answer is complex.
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AUSTRAC needs to consider these questions and when answers are found there will be
important consequences for the reporting obligations and the entire Australian AML
regime. An improved AML system will then be in place.

142

4 INTERNATIONAL AND LOCAL PRACTICES IN ENFORCING
COMPLIANCE
4. 1 Introduction
Despite the shortcomings of the FATF Recommendations, including uncertainty about
some issues related to the AML reporting obligations, Australia can play a vital role by
filling these gaps in its AML system and thus provide guidance to the international
AML community. This Chapter will address a very important issue that illustrates the
operation of the enforcement mechanism in the course of answering the questions posed
in Chapter 1, namely:
1

How can this thesis identify the ideal set of attributes that could be used to
prescribe the optimal enforcement mechanism in the AUSTRAC context?

2

Should Braithwaite’s theory be a benchmark or an alternative, (given that his
theory in the field of the AML is not comprehensive in every aspect, as indicated
in Chapter 1)?

AUSTRAC can benefit from other countries’ experiences in supervising and enforcing
AML compliance, as well as from the experiences of other local agencies in relation to
their policies, structures, and compliance enforcement.
The different models of the FIU can assist to define the role of the FIU and the way in
which it deals with non-compliance. (Australia follows the administrative model but
there are significant differences between countries which adopt this general model).
On the one hand, therefore, this chapter will highlight the experience of two FIUs that
fairly closely follow the administrative model, namely the FIUs of the United States and
the Netherlands. The US FIU represents an administrative model that provides an
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example of an FIU that utilises a harsh enforcement mechanism. The Netherlands FIU
represents a hybrid administrative and law enforcement model and provides an example
of an FIU with a soft enforcement mechanism. The aim is to tease out the differences
between the two systems and assess them according to the requirement for the most
effective enforcement mechanism and its attributes (to be discussed below). This
examination will assist analysis of the experiences of Australia and other countries in
the AML field.
4. 2 Minimum or Most Effective Enforcement Mechanism?
According to Carson (1979), the regulatory framework is usually linked with the form
of law and enforcement. These have improved since the 19 th and early 20th centuries
during the development of social regulation, and both were enhanced by the
consideration of criminal law as a significant element in protecting the public from
danger by enabling the application of criminal sanctions as a means of deterrence. 293
However, the use of the enforcement mechanism in terms of prosecution (criminal or
civil), especially in a self-regulatory atmosphere, often becomes the last option to be
taken when non-compliance has occurred, because
Governments are more likely to become involved in co-regulation, or to set up
external regulatory and enforcement regimes if they believe the level of risk and/or
the seriousness of consequences that may flow from a breach justifies the expense.
In the case of AML/CTF, the perception is that the consequences of deviance are
serious.294

So the question is what is the role of the enforcement mechanism? And what is its aim?
Is it just to play the role of a ‘long stick’ that appears ‘at the ready’ to punish noncompliant entities; while the reality is that a minimum level of enforcement (in terms of
293
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both frequency and timeliness of prosecution and the relatively low levels of any
penalties ultimately imposed) is still considered acceptable? Yet the 21 st century is an
era of rapid and continuing technological change where, despite huge improvements in
the financial system, such improvements are often equalled by the adoption of new
methods and avenues by those bent on crime.
Nevertheless, in the area of ‘regulation’ there is a ‘regulatory debate’ that concerns the
limit to which criminal law or regulatory approach should be used to control businesses
and its activities, 295 and that debate includes the enforcement mechanisms of regulatory
agencies and their role in this domain. Different approaches in this debate that view this
matter from their own perspectives make for a complex answer, including views
reflecting a conservative, liberal or radical approach. 296 One answer will reflect the
conservative perspective and affirm that situation should remain the same, arguing that
the enforcement mechanism need only operate at the minimum level as market forces
provide adequate protection. Often the intention of this perspective’s proponents is to
keep compliance costs low, with the enforcement mechanism operating at the lower
levels. As enforcement actions increase, regulated entity costs rise.
The proponents of the liberal perspective will provide a more diplomatic answer,
arguing that enforcement is necessary but agencies should seek a balance in using this
power, choosing to use it only when it is necessary to regulate the system or to impose
criminal sanctions.
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Finally, a more radical perspective would call for strong and harsh enforcement
mechanism as the optimal option in the face of non-compliance, as it would operate at a
distance from the regulated entities’ interests.
None of these perspectives can alone help to find the solution as to how to use the
enforcement mechanism the way it should be used, that is, in the manner in which the
best outcome is secured. When examining the enforcement mechanism and its use, its
design and operation will be viewed from each perspective but decisions will be made
regarding recommendations and so on not from an ideological perspective but from an
outcomes based approach. Here it is essentially not about the level of the enforcement,
rather it is about whether the enforcement mechanism is effective and properly suited to
the task and hence achieves successful outcomes in terms of a reduction in the specific
activities (in frequency and/or magnitude) for which the mechanism is designed.
4.2.1 How to Determine whether an Enforcement Mechanism is Suited to the
Task at Hand
A regulatory agency should, in terms of its enforcement mechanism, assess the basic
intention of the law it administers, to protect and maintain the business and the financial
system. The enforcement power that it uses should guarantee a suitable balance between
the interests of the financial system entities and public protection. It should also
highlight prosecution and punishment, not only as a deterrent for non-compliance, but
also to secure justice and protect the transparency of the financial system.
Thus, where there is non-compliance, enforcement mechanisms used by regulatory
agencies generally involve first using the strategies of persuasion and education, with
the threat of prosecution in the background as a second option to be used only when
necessary. However, the frequency and circumstances of the use of these sanctions
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should be examined. A comparison between theory and practice in this domain reveals
that while harsh sanctions may be ‘on the books’, it is most likely that these are rarely
used.
From a theoretical viewpoint, for example, Clarke (2000) states that persuasion and
education are more effective in dealing with complex offences which involve the use or
abuse of the financial system and make detection difficult and prosecution lengthy and
expensive.297 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) in their regulatory enforcement ‘pyramid’
illustrate their belief that the first step in enforcing compliance is persuasion and
education. 298 Its primary role in the event of non-compliance (and also to prevent
potential non-compliance) is reflected in its occupation of the largest space in the
enforcement pyramid, and its location at its base.299
The idea of the pyramid is often invoked when requiring industry groups to selfregulate. The threat of external regulation remains should self-regulation fail or prove
inadequate. If self-regulation fails, the regulatory agency moves from persuasion
through to warnings issued regarding the possibility of prosecution, then to prosecution
involving first civil, then (higher up the scale) criminal penalties, to the upper levels
where a licence (for example, to operate in whatever is the relevant field or activity) is
first suspended and, if compliance is not secured, revoked.
Problems arise, however, when the regulatory agency is not activating its powers when
their use is needed and is reluctant to escalate enforcement action to the level where
harsher sanctions are imposed. This is the actual scenario with AUSTRAC when
enforcing compliance in practice (as shown in Chapter 1).
297

Clarke, above n 56, 249.
Ayres and Braithwaite, above n 53,35.
299
Baldwin and Black, ‘Really Responsive Regulation’, above n 49, 5.
298

147

However, the most effective enforcement mechanism is not determined by the use of
softer or harsher sanctions per se, it is — more accurately — the use of whatever is the
more effective sanction that guarantees greater compliance. 300 This may not always be
persuasion and education, especially where this leads to ‘sympathy between regulators
and the regulated, as Croall (2003) indicates, and possibly ‘regulatory capture’. Here,
over a period of constant exposure to the ‘mindset’ (values, aims and ambitions) of the
regulated, their methods, and prolonged interaction with them, the regulator loses sight
of its primary objectives as a regulator. The ‘lead’ actor becomes a ‘follower’,
essentially a regulator more inclined to act in the interests of the regulated entities, and
lenient in its dealings in regard to non-compliance.301
4.2.2 What are the Ideal Attributes that Can Ensure the Regulatory Agency’s
Ability to Impose the Most Effective Enforcement Mechanism?
Through the analysis of the theoretical and practical approaches of the reporting entities
interviewed for the purpose of this thesis, a number of important requirements and ideal
attributes were found to be effective in the context of the work of AUSTRAC and other
regulators and to have positive influences on their enforcement mechanisms. Logically,
these four important requirements and attributes (listed below) would be able to help the
regulatory agencies to ensure compliance by utilising the most effective enforcement
action. These are:
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1

There should be different and actively used sanctions in place to be applied in
response to non-compliance:

To have available a variety of sanctions (from soft to harsh) is positive in regards to
financial system regulation. While the softer options (persuasion, education, the giving
of advice and the issuing of warning letter) will be used as the first steps in enforcing
compliance, the option of harsher sanctions must be used when circumstances arise that
prompt their use, and not just allowed to languish. Their disuse may weaken their
salutary effect on behaviour. It is rather like having a stick on the shelf; if left there long
enough it may no longer be feared. Overuse, however, may be counterproductive,
breeding disrespect and resentment, and bringing the regulator into such disfavour that
cooperation will not be willingly forthcoming. Therefore, both the soft and the harsh
sanctions must be ‘in play’ and used where and when appropriate. This attribute
operates using Braithwaite’s theory of the regulatory enforcement pyramid. Balance and
appropriateness in using the sanctions is the key issue: too frequent use of the ‘soft’
could cause a low level of compliance; too frequent use of the ‘harsh’ could cause a
culture of resistance among the regulated entities.
Braithwaite himself states that regulated entities in the financial domain must also move
from having ‘mere compliance policies to substantive rules’ and adds that ‘publicly
ratifying plans, and giving them the force of law are not such huge steps’. 302 Therefore,
to achieve all the above, educated and experienced personnel in the regulatory agency
and appropriately trained personnel in the regulated entities are needed as is a
willingness to use all sanctions at the disposal of the regulator as and when required.
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2

There should be agreement between the main regulator of the field and its partner
regulatory agencies, and also between the regulators and the regulated entities to
encourage regulatory compliance:

In order to attain the highest level of compliance, it is very important to have regulators
that are committed to the objectives of regulation, and partner agencies that understand,
appreciate and help fulfil its role in the regulatory framework.
Increased understanding by the regulated entities of the regulatory objectives, and close
supervision by the regulatory agencies of the those entities will not only make
communication between the regulatory agency and regulated entities easier but also
help the latter to comply with regulation — this was one of the important requirements
that the reporting entity personnel interviewed for this thesis have said they have been
calling for. If this attribute (concord) is present, then it will help the regulatory agency
to determine the most effective power of enforcement to use in accordance with
seriousness of the reporting entity breach of the law or regulation.
3

The regulatory agency must avoid regulatory capture, and not draw away from its
responsibilities due to political pressure or economic problems:

It is very important for the regulator to avoid being captured by regulated entities and so
weaken its performance as a regulator and deter its full use of the enforcement
mechanism at its disposal. 303 It is also important for it to avoid being influenced by the
existence of economic difficulties when dealing with a non-compliant reporting entity
(such as during the Global Financial Crisis) and failing to impose sanctions that
otherwise would have been applied. The regulator must also avoid falling prey to any
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governmental political pressure and allowing such pressure to affect how it fulfils its
responsibilities and imposes its sanctions on non-compliant regulated entities. Scott
(2000) indicated that independence and wisdom are required for the regulatory agency
as it can be held accountable for insufficient exercise of its power.304
Ayogu (2007), for example, has discussed the effectiveness of the enforcement
mechanism of one South African regulatory agency and showed how political
influences can bring pressure to bear on the regulatory agency’s work and effectively
weaken its enforcement mechanism. In this instance, the regulatory authority was the
South African Independent Communications Authority (ICASA), 305 established in 2000
to regulate the telecommunication and broadcasting sectors. Pressure applied by the
deregulation and economic liberalisation policies of the South African government
(which also wanted greater telecommunications access distribution across the nation)
weakened the agency’s regulatory role. It spent more time and effort in facilitating the
expanding operations of the telecommunication and broadcasting industries than being
the sector’s effective regulatory agency. The government’s emphases are reflected by
the Minister of Communication, Dr Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri, who stated:306
In the past 10 years we have concentrated on reducing the disparity between the
rural and the urban areas of our country and eliminating the inequities of our
society inherited from the apartheid era. In doing so, we have worked at increasing
teledensity and growing the ICT sector of our economy through a process of
managed liberalization that we provided for in the Telecommunications Act.
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In his State of the Nation Address in May of this year, the President emphasized
the need to lower the cost of doing business in South Africa. He also charged us
with creating a globally competitive telecommunications sector address the
challenges of the 2nd economy.

In fact, restricting ICASA’s enforcement mechanism so as to maximise the value of the
business was an outcome clearly desired by South African government as expressed in
its policies. According to Ayogu (2007), insofar as ICASA was functioning as a
regulatory agency, it was in the role of a ‘fire alarm’ rather than that of a ‘police patrol’.
Even through ICASA had a wide range of powers that could be plumbed to revoke a
licence of a non-compliant entity, it could not then and would be reluctant now to
impose such a harsh sanction on a large regulated entity such as Telkom (one of the
largest and dominant South African telecommunication companies) for two reasons.
First, because the government’s policy calls for the encouragement of huge investment
in the country, and implementing such a policy would be made more difficult and
investors discouraged from investing by the presence of a regulator that appears ‘less
friendly’ to business. Second, Telekom is cautious and has no confidence in its dealings
with ICASA. In this instance, the position of business (and the importance accorded its
aims) appears stronger than the regulator’s. The pre-eminence of trade liberalisation and
economic development reinforce the company’s position. ‘Regulatory capture’ of
ICASA and its lack of ascendancy will remain actual rather than perceived as long as
Telkom is stronger than ICASA.307
The disproportionate power and position accorded the largest reporting entities renders
ICASA unable to impose harsh sanctions on the huge institutions that are providing
services in the strong telecommunications sector; but the authority remains able to
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impose such sanctions on small businesses that are providing broadcasting services in
the smaller broadcasting sector when they are in breach of some regulatory requirement.
Overall, ICASA has been found to be a rather lenient regulatory agency; it conducted
just 14 cases from the 2000 (the year of its establishment) to 2005, and all were rooted
in procedural issues. 308
In terms of avoiding regulatory capture through economic problems, the Global
Financial Crisis (GFC) provides salutary examples in this domain. The period 2007–
2009 brought economic difficulties for the entire world community, including
governments, their agencies and the industrial community. Its legacy stretched into
2010–2011 and possibly beyond. A number of specialists and economists have
estimated the GFC to be the worst financial crisis since the 1930s (the Great
Depression, which preceded World War II).309
The ‘weak regulatory environment’ in the US clearly contributed to the development of
the GFC. 310 In sum, it was initially generated when the US banking industry started to
face liquidity shortfalls. 311 As a result 312 a number of large financial institutions
collapsed and key businesses failed. Global stock markets slumped and countries put in
place relief plans for their banks and financial system. Some entities were considered

308

Ibid 9.
Reuters, Three Top Economists Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since Great Depression; Risks
Increase if Right Steps are Not Taken, 29 February 2009 <http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/
02/27/idUS193520+27-Feb-2009+BW20090227> at 16 June 2011.
310
Ibid 7.
311
Bob Ivry, Paulson Seeks Mortgage Value That Eluded Bear, Lehman (Update 1), 24 September 2008
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&refer=home&sid=aGT_xTYzbbQE> at 16
June 2011.
312
Martin Neil Baily and Douglas J Elliot, The Use Financial and Economic Crisis: Where Does it Stand
and Where Do We Go From Here? (2009) <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/
0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott/0615_economic_crisis_baily_elliott.pdf> at 16 June 2011, 2.
309

153

‘too big to fail’. 313 The market that free-market proponents say should function as the
‘alternative regulator’ in a lightly regulated environment was not permitted to do so in
all instances (see below), but the alternative appeared socially and politically
unthinkable. 314 Here again, size matters.
It had spread rapidly. From 2006, the easy credit and ‘no doc’ ‘no deposit’ ‘sub-prime’
US home loans began to collapse when borrowers/mortgagees were unable to pay. The
value of securities attached to US real estate pricing then fell (as did home values,
triggering more foreclosures). First subprime mortgage companies, then hedge funds
failed, then, as the instruments had been sold worldwide, financial institutions,
including banks, worldwide were affected to varying degrees. Some were propped up by
government, often with little guarantee of amended business practices; others folded. 315
A major decrease in economic movement led to a global economic recession in 2008.
The US and other stock markets fell, many dramatically. Unemployment spiralled, and
consumer wealth fell.
Credit availability contracted worldwide. Shareholder confidence in the financial
system, where securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 2009, was
destroyed. 316 The view that the GFC as a global phenomenon began in late 2008 and
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concluded mid-2009317 may be premature given recently emerging problems.
Investment mixes have altered and in some areas the move towards re-regulation
recognises the role its lack played.
The 2008 Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy of
G20318 shared the blame between credit rating institutions, shareholders and
management, who had failed to correctly manage and mitigate the risk involved in
mortgage-related financial products, and supervisors, regulators and policy makers, had
not amended their regulatory practices to deal with the changing financial markets.
During a period of strong global growth, growing capital flows, and prolonged
stability…, market participants sought higher yields without an adequate
appreciation of the risks and failed to exercise proper due diligence. … [W]eak
underwriting standards, unsound risk management practices, increasingly complex
and opaque financial products, and consequent excessive leverage combined to
create vulnerabilities in the system. Policy-makers, regulators and supervisors, in
some advanced countries, did not adequately appreciate and address the risks
building up in financial markets, keep pace with financial innovation, or take into
account the systemic ramifications of domestic regulatory actions.319

The US Senate came to a similar viewpoint when it highlighted the causes of the GFC
in the Levin–Coburn Report:
The crisis was not a natural disaster, but the result of high risk, complex financial
products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; and the failure of regulators, the credit
rating agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street. 320
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Complex financial products, products and practices that lacked transparency, the
prevalence of poor underwriting standards and risk management practices (often in
institutions such as banks, which people trusted almost inherently to guard their
interests), excessive leverage, undisclosed conflicts of interests led to failures that were
‘contagious’ in a globalised economy; and governmental regulatory failure. The era of a
free rein for the financial sector was drawing to an end; regulation was again seen by the
general population and governments as necessary.321 Issues revealed by the GFC must
be taken into consideration by governments, policy makers, financial institutions and
regulators including AUSTRAC (and that will be discussed later in this thesis).
4

There should be unquestioned (unambivalent) legislation and regulation essential
for a successful enforcement mechanism:

Clear, comprehensible legislation and regulations can help both regulator and regulated
entities to understand their roles in the regulatory system, particularly in regard to how
regulated entities are to comply with the rules. In contrast, contestable, controversial
legislation and regulations will push regulated entities to resist the rules and regulations
rather than comply with them and lead to questionable compliance.
Unambivalent legislation and regulation will enhance the regulated entities’ ability to
apply self-regulation as well as encourage a ‘culture of compliance’ where commitment
to regulatory aims is required.322
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It is also necessary to have a regulatory agency that understands the intricacies of
compliance and knows how to assess compliance, before it activates its enforcement
approach,323 especially as regulations are subject to change over time. As most
regulatory systems in the AML field currently follow an RBA approach, is essential that
the regulator be involved in the construction of the regulated entities’ self-evaluation
model so as to be able to evaluate it and respond to it effectively, utilising the most
effective enforcement power (if necessary) to ensure compliance. Companies cannot be
‘left alone’ to formulate and implement self-regulation. As Parker notes, such policy
requires ongoing corporate commitment, appropriate skills acquisition and effective
institutionalisation of compliance. This can only be achieved in an environment that
involves the regulator, with appropriate penalties for failure to have policies in place or
for their inadequate implementation. 324 This is easier if the legislation and regulation is
unquestioned, that is, not subject to dispute about its scope or nature and so forth.
Considering the four requirements and attributes (above), as manifested in international
and partner agencies’ efforts to enforce compliance, has several implications for
AUSTRAC. First, it will provide AUSTRAC with a wide range of information sources
on the successes in imposing a duty to activate or when to activate the enforcement
mechanism. Second, it may offer pioneering solutions to predictable or intractable
problems. Third, it may offer clues as to the future direction of AUSTRAC’s
enforcement mechanism.
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4. 3 International Practices in Enforcing Compliance Regarding Non-Compliance
with Reporting Obligations
Money launderers usually move their illicit funds by utilising discrepancies among
countries’ laws and regulations. In some more than others, criminals can successfully
launder their money as there are few restrictions; they also find gaps in the AML system
and legislation of some countries that are known for strong bank secrecy and privacy
laws which make law enforcement investigation difficult. 325
This thesis examines developed country regulators as international best practices in this
domain are better matched to the developed countries than to developing countries, as
the challenges of related regulatory compliance faced by developed and developing
countries, least developed or ‘third world’ countries are dissimilar to the developed
world326
4.3.1 United States
According to Reuter and Truman (2004), a successful enforcement mechanism relies on
the reports that the banks send to the regulatory agencies or law enforcement bodies. 327
The US long ago started combating organised crime and its most important legislative
achievement in the field of AML was the Bank Secrecy Act 1970,328 which enhanced the
investigative process for criminal activities, such as tax evasion and ML. Bank secrecy
rules have been exploited by criminals; but the reporting and record-keeping obligations
have been important instruments for investigating individuals suspected of involvement

325

Jeffrey Lowell Quillen, ‘The International Attack on Money Laundering: European Initiatives’ (1991)
Journal of Comparative and International Law 213, 213–14.
326
Nomzi Gwintsa, ‘Challenges of Establishing Financial Intelligence Units’ in Charles Goredema (ed),
Money Laundering Experiences: A Survey, ISS Monogrpah No 124 (2006) 51.
327
Reuter and Truman, above n 33, 33.
328
FinCEN, ‘Bank Secrecy Act’<http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/> at 25 January 2011. Note:
Bank Secrecy Act is also known as the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act.

158

in crimes involving illegal drugs in the US and elsewhere. 329 These US reporting
obligations rely on two types of reports, the first a rule-based report and the second a
discretionary report. All banks must report cash transactions where they exceed more
than USD10,000 per day, and are obliged to lodge a currency report when individuals
take more than USD5,000 in cash out of the country. These are important contributors
to the detection of illegal activity. 330
The rule-based Cash Transaction Reports (CTRs) involve less risk of error for both
private and government sectors in terms of failure to report because a clear parameter is
set for the sum of daily transactions for a person or entity (that is, USD10,000).
However, the risk of failing to detect ML increases when the sum of transactions
involved falls below USD10,000, for example USD9900.331 Such transactions can be
repeated over a number of days in a single account (avoiding the CTR reporting
requirement), or into a variety of accounts across a number of institutions, again failing
to trigger the reporting requirement. Such structuring of transactions is known as
‘smurfing’ (though it may lack the use of ‘smurfs’ or couriers). 332 This dilemma pushed
the US into creating a requirement for a ‘Suspicious Activity Report’ (SAR) (a
discretionary report) in 1996. SARs oblige banks and other reporting entities to report
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any activity they consider to be suspicious, whether it involves transactions over or
under the threshold amount.333
According to Unger and Waarden (2009), the US intentionally left the concept of
‘suspicious’ vague, in the belief that this uncertainty would force banks to keep alert
and ready to update their understanding of how ML activity could occur, while the
ambiguity would leave money launderers puzzled about the risk of proceeding with
their activity. 334 The use of SARs in the US has been reported as generally restricted to
transactions above USD5000.335 Patterns of deposits just under the level required to
trigger a CTR may prompt the submission of an SAR by alert personnel336 and/or
computer assisted transaction tracking.337
The Bank Secrecy Act was followed by the Money Laundering Control Act 1986,the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act 1988,the Annunzio-Wylie Money Laundering Act 1992, the
Suppression Act 1994, the Money Laundering and Financial Crimes Strategy Act 1998,
and the USA Patriot Act 2001, and finally the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act 2004.338
The Bank Secrecy Act also authorises the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations
and call for certain records or reports, where the Secretary determines these have
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a high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax or regulatory investigations or
proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence or counterintelligence activities,
including analysis, to protect against international terrorism. 339

The Act obliges a great number of financial institutions to adhere to its reporting and
record keeping obligations.
These include depository institutions (e.g., banks, credit unions and thrifts); brokers
or dealers in securities; insurance companies that issue or underwrite certain
products; money services businesses (e.g., money transmitters; issuers, redeemers
and sellers of money orders and travelers' checks; check cashers and currency
exchangers); casinos and card clubs; and dealers in precious metals, stones, or
jewels. 340

The primary focus was on combatting financial crime, particularly ML, so much so that
it was often referred to as the Anti-Money Laundering Act or even ‘BSA/AML’. 341
Financial intelligence was being collected via the reporting mechanisms, but it was
primarily related to financial crimes (such as tax evasion) and ML of the proceeds of
criminal activities (such as drug trafficking) 342 for use in establishing a financial trail for
proceeds from criminal activities that could lead to prosecution. 343 ML is ‘defined, in
part, with respect to the proceeds of specific unlawful “predicate” activities’. The list of
predicate activities (and of reporting entities) may continue to expand. 344
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Enacted in the wake of 9/11, the Patriot Act 2001 considers TF as a predicate crime
under that definition. Thus ML relates to national security. 345 This Act expanded the
scope of the Bank Secrecy Act increasing attention on TF and ML crimes.346Reflecting
the expanded responsibilities and changing emphasis, FinCEN became as a bureau
within the Treasury Department with its Director reporting to the Under-Secretary of
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence.
The Patriot Act introduces stricter SARs requirements, and FinCEN was given more
powers to issue rules to the reporting entities, including rules prohibiting them from
‘establishing, maintaining, administering or managing any correspondent account in the
United States for or on behalf of any foreign bank that is designated as a “primary
money laundering concern”’.347 Banks are required to identify suspicious activities and
submit reports on them. 348 If they are detected having failed to do so, they may be fined
and reported to relevant government agencies. 349 Countries that do not mandate and
implement strict SAR regulations will face countermeasures, including detailed
inspections of accounts that contain funds emanating from a non-compliant country, and
a decrease in mutual recognition and international aid programs. 350
Since FinCEN became the enforcement agency, the US government has moved towards
civil settlements instead of lawsuits.351 In fact, while scholars are looking to the US in
terms of general regulatory approach, one needs to know that the approach to dealing
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with regulatory failure in US is different from that found in Europe or Australia. The
American approach tends to opt for settlements involving tens of millions dollar in
penalties in exchange for decisions not to prosecute and often without the companies
having to admit criminal liability.
Takats (2009) cites such examples as a fine of USD25 million for Riggs Bank in
2004,352 USD50 million for AmSouth Bank in 2004, 353 USD24 million for Arab Bank in
2005,354 USD80 million for Abn-Amro Bank in 2005,355 USD12 million for Israel
Discount Bank in 2006, 356USD5 million for Doha Bank in 2009,357 and USD110 million
for Wachovia Bank in 2010. 358 Their failure to institute and implement adequate
detection regimes, or train and supervise staff for their correct operation so as to ensure
compliance and timely reporting of suspicious transactions proved costly. Large and
aggressive civil penalties for such failures or for false negatives, that is for not reporting
transactions which are later judged ‘suspicious’ or prosecuted as ML, 359 encourages
over-reporting. This is further encouraged by a failure to impose fines for ‘false
positives’, which are often computer generated alerts that are ‘false alarms’ that
needlessly add to regulator and regulated entity costs.360
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The availability of the ‘safe harbour’ provisions 361 — that is, the ability to make a report
knowing that if they do they will not be open to civil prosecution by the regulator
further encourages reporting. The view may be: better to report, than fail to do so and
risk prosecution. As far as vulnerability to civil suit from the transactor, ‘safe harbour’
provisions are in place to protect the reporting entity. Reporting entities will, therefore,
be more willing to report transactions as suspected or possible ML, resulting inevitably
in false positives, in order to eliminate their exposure to harsh penalties. 362 However,
safe harbour provisions help generate an increased number of reports, many of low
quality. FinCEN and law enforcement bodies and other regulators rely on the
intelligence supplied and must analyse the reports to see if they contain useful material.
Perhaps with little or no result in terms of securing a prosecution, yet as adding to
regulator and enforcement agency costs. It is worth recalling that FinCEN receives more
than 1,290,590 SARs per year (732,563 being for depository institutions and 537,761
being for money services businesses).363 Suspected BSA/structuring/ML accounts for 44
per cent of reported transactions for depository institutions. 364
The threat of harsh sanctions causes banks to implement costly monitoring and
reporting processes in order to avoid that possibility. 365 This monitoring and associated
training could vitally affect the reporting entities’ ability to comply.
The best outcomes occur, however, when action is taken not so much out of fear of the
imposition of harsh sanctions but when compliance is viewed as obligations that must
be met to achieve the best AML system. Therefore, reporting entities must fully
361
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appreciate their role in the field of AML and endeavour to fulfil it, as it is an important
pillar of a successful AML system.
In sum, FinCEN, an administrative model FIU, applies harsh penalties (including very
substantial fines) on non-compliant reporting entities. Entities report ‘less suspicious
reports’ rather than only those about which they are more sure, essentially ‘‘crying
wolf” (to use Takats’ expression), reporting what eventually are found to be false
positives. Over-reporting reduces the average value of reports as well as the overall
value of reports — with low value reports perhaps crowding out higher value reports as
all require the regulator’s attention.
Another disadvantage of an administrative model-based FIU, according to Forget and
Hočevar (2004), is that it is more subject to direction by political authorities. 366 This was
clear in the US experience. According to Takats (2009), fines have grown in the last 10
years, particularly after the 9/11 and the enactment of the Patriot Act in 2001. Over the
same period the number of the ML prosecutions has fallen, while the number of the
reports that have been submitted to FinCEN from the reporting entities since the disaster
of 9/11 has increased. 367
Yet were the harsh sanctions that have been applied by FinCEN the best solution in the
face of non-compliance with the reporting obligations or have they contributed to
increasing or perhaps changing the nature of the non-compliance? Reporting frequency
cannot replace the value of reporting quality. One wonders whether the overall value
has been diluted by the sheer number of reports, or that a non-compliant attitude
survives, in one way or another, where — through ignorance or intent — personnel ‘fill
366
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in the spaces’ on the relevant forms but little more. If so, this would be disappointing,
especially when one considers that report quality is an important element in any
effective AML system.
Difficult political circumstances in the wake of September 11 affected the US regulatory
culture in general and the US AML system and its reporting obligations in particular,
driving the enforcement mechanism of FinCEN enforcement mechanism to harsher
sanctions on non-compliant entities.
4.3.2 Netherlands
This country’s AML system is actually created to work in conjunction with the three
relevant EU directives which it takes into consideration 368 and FATF-influenced
policies. It has enacted the Act on Identification for Financial Services of 1993(WID), 369
and the Act on Reporting Unusual Transactions of 1993(MOT) (often referred to as the
Disclosure of Unusual Transactions Act)

370

in order to conform with the first EU

directive for ML of 1991. 371 Its AML system then became more comprehensive,
particularly after 2001 when the second EU directive on ML 372 was taken into
consideration. Those obliged lawyers, dealers in gold bullion, real estate agents, car
dealers and others in addition to the financial sector to report. By 2008, the Netherland’s
new Prevention of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism Act of 2008

368

See the European Directives on ML in Chapter 2 of the thesis.
Act on Identification for Financial Services 1993 (The Netherlands) [Wet
identificatiebijfinaciëledienstvertening (WID)].
370
Act on Reporting Unusual Transactions 1993 (The Netherlands) [Wet melding
ongebruikelijketransacties (MOT)] (often referred to as the ‘Disclosure of Unusual Transactions Act’)
(entry into force 1994).
371
Council Directive 91/308/EEC of 10 June 1991 on Prevention of the Use of the Financial System for
the Purpose of Money Laundering [1991] OJ L 166.
372
Directive 2001/97/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of the European Union of 4
December 2001 [2001] OJ L 344.
369

166

(WWFT)373had been issued to align legislation with the third EU directive on ML of
2005.374 This extended the ML definition to include TF.
The Financial Intelligence Unit Netherland (FIU-NL) was founded in 2006 and is
located within the Service for International Police Intelligence of the Netherlands
national police (Korpslandelijkepolitiediensten, KLPD).375 Formed by a merger of the
Office for the Disclosure of Unusual Transactions and the Office of the National Public
Prosecutor for Cases Involving Unusual Transactions, 376 the FIU-NL is a hybrid FIU
model which combines both the administrative and the law enforcement models. 377 A
Dutch Finance Ministry survey estimated that the total of money laundered in the
Netherlands jurisdiction is EUR18.5 billion, EUR17.7 billion of which comes from
crimes committed abroad, and EUR1.8 billion from domestic crimes. 378
The Netherland’s AML system refers to ‘unusual transactions’ (rather than ‘suspicious
transactions’). This is how the matter was addressed in the country’s first AML
legislation, the Disclosure of Unusual Transactions Act of 1991.379 As this system also
adopts the RBA, the concept of ‘unusual’ better suits this approach than the concept of
373
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‘suspicious’ transactions, the concept of ‘unusual’ being more extensive than that of
‘suspicious’ in the field of reporting obligations in Netherlands AML legislation.
However, the Netherland’s AML system has issued a list to describe the unusual
transactions. The list is constructed according to three core indicators (which have been
fairly stable since their last major revision in 2005):380
1

Blacklisted countries: greater vigilance is needed when dealing with transactions
involving entities of the countries designated by the Minister of Finance and
Minister of Justice as ‘an unacceptable risk’ for ML or TF.381 There is a very high
possibility of finding an unusual transaction where transactions are conducted
with a person or entity of such countries.

2

Crimes that are reported to police or other judicial authorities and are to be
prosecuted in regard to ML: ‘such crimes are usually linked to money laundering,
and include such crimes as drug trafficking, smuggling or fraud’. 382 ML is
criminalised under the Criminal Code.383

3

The type and the amount of transactions: Such that, for example, for financial,
credit or investment institutions or investment companies, this involves cash

380
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transactions of EUR15,000 or more.384 Where money transfers (deposits and so
on) are involved, a threshold of EUR2000 applies. 385
Variants on the above exist for credit card companies, casinos, traders in objects of high
value, life insurance companies and brokers, other traders, and independent professional
groups.386
The characteristics that the Netherlands’ AML system uses as indicators for unusual
transactions are those which most countries use to identify the nature of the
transactions, that is, to determine whether a transaction is suspicious or not. Thus the
concept of ‘unusual transactions’ appears in practice to have become over time very
similar if not identical to that of the ‘suspicious transaction’, especially as RBA applies
to both.
The intention of applying the RBA in Netherland’s AML system was to reduce overreporting, improve the quality of the information in the cases reported, and establish a
more effective reporting regime; but the reality is somewhat different. RBAs can differ,
for example in relation to threshold amounts that trigger a response. The Netherlands
system requires reporting entities to report every ‘unusual transaction’ (UTRs) without
focusing on the idea of the ‘suspicion’. The former term (‘unusual’) in common speech
is understood as far broader (and as a far more neutral descriptor) than the latter
(‘suspicious’) which carries a negative connotation. On the face of it, reporting entities
have the obligation to report every single ‘unusual’ transaction, even if it is not
‘suspicious’.
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The problem here is twofold: first, many unusual transaction reports will eventually
prove to be lawful;387 and secondly, because this instance involves reporting ‘unusual
transactions’ then there is no requirement to report it as what elsewhere would be
termed a ‘suspicious transaction’. Reporting a transaction as ‘unusual’ is deemed
sufficient. This will affect the ultimate value of the reports.
The regime uses a term that, from a language perspective alone, would tend to signify
the inclusion of transactions ranging from a more minor concern to a more major
concern. For example, a statistical anomaly with a logical explanation, such as two
highly trustworthy brothers, having sold their cars on two successive days just prior to
leaving for London to commence university, deposit amounts just under or over a given
threshold into their account, requiring the production of one if not two reports of an
‘unusual transaction’. Such reports will inevitably be found to have been unnecessary
(particularly in terms of ML prosecution) and having prompted unnecessary expense on
the part of both the reporting entity and the FIU. It could be expected that the lower the
threshold (physical or psychological), the greater the number of reports will be
submitted to the FIU as unusual transactions, and that is exactly what happened with the
Netherlands reporting experience, especially when it applied structural changes in
comparatively recent years.388
One of the important factors contributing to the high numbers of reports submitted was
the application of the RBA in the area of AML. Reporting entities (varying markedly in
size and the type of business and services provided) were obliged to manage and
mitigate their own risk; then report any UTRs to FIU-NL. The FIU then examines the
reports made and take into consideration any they deemed ‘suspicious’ and files the
387
388
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others. Another factor was obliging the two major money transfer institutions, Western
Union and MoneyGram to report UTRs. After 2005, the money transfer sector was the
largest contributor of UTRs. Thus the figures for UTRs overall and money transfer
UTRs (in brackets) for the period 2006–2009 are: 172,873 (130,992) in 2006, rising to
214,040 (146,158) in 2007,389 then to 388,842 (367,370) for 2008.390 However a
substantial fall did occur across the majority of sectors in 2009391 (a drop of 58 per cent
overall), 392 but this may be largely due to the GFC as UTRs may have fallen in line with
decreased numbers of transactions conducted.393
Figures overall for suspicious transactions (as determined by the FIU-NL from the
UTRs) also rose with money transfers featuring significantly in the period 2006–2009
(money transfer sector figures in brackets): from 34,531 (28,994) for 2006 to 45,656
(40,893) for 2007, then 54,605 (50,803) in 2008 before they too fell 41 per cent in 2009
to 32,100 (28,647),394 the figures somewhat in line with the UTR pattern. 395
The total funds involved, however, in suspicious transactions rose between 2008 and
2009. Money transfers, though statistically frequent, usually involve small amounts, so
while they accounted for 98 per cent of the drop in the number of UTRs, their total
389
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value was more than offset by a larger number of transactions deemed suspicious by the
FIU-NL that involved large amounts and comprised 48 per cent of the total amount
involved.396 These two sets of figures illustrate the impact that adding these categories
made in terms of volume of UTRs.
The Netherlands regime differs in its approach to reporting entity failure to report. FIUNL is regarded as lenient in its enforcement mechanism, having adopted a more
conciliatory and inclusive approach by encouraging a high degree of self-regulation. 397
How does it supervise such entities so as to detect their failure to report, and punish
those that failed to report unusual transactions? How can it compel compliance?
Here the FIU-NL has been found wanting. The Netherlands Court of Audits in its 2008
report commented critically on a number of issues which related to the Netherland’s
AML system. These included a lack of information sharing between the Ministries of
Finance, Justice and Interior, the lack of use of its powers to seize assets, as well as the
‘limited financial crime expertise and capacity within law enforcement, and inadequate
supervision of notaries, lawyers, and accountants’. 398 This last was addressed in the
most recent (2008) Act which brought these entities as well as a number of others into
the ambit of the Netherlands AML system. 399
In relation to deprivation of criminal assets, a threshold of EUR100,000 in proceeds of
crime applies before a prosecution is launched by the Prosecution Service Criminal
Assets Deprivation Bureau (BOOM), an agency specialising in complex cases where it
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is expected that substantial assets will be seized. 400 A cooperation agreement between
the FIU-NL and BOOM exists but, as the FIU-NL admits, it ‘has yet [to] produce the
desired result’.401
The need for greater coordination and coherency of process between the FIU-NL and its
partner agencies was also highlighted in its 2009 annual report as was the need to
encourage criminal investigation agencies to use the information collected by the FIUNL ‘more frequently and effectively’. 402
Emphasis remains on increased education of or guidance for reporting entities who
remain ‘gatekeepers’ for AML law.
In the event of non-compliance, the FIU-NL has the ability to impose fines of up to
EUR150,000. However, FIU-NL has taken relatively few enforcement actions against
non-compliant reporting entities. Where such action does occur, few involve a fine at
the highest levels. According to Unger and Waarden (2009):
Between 2002 and 2007, 371 cases of non-reporting were passed on to the public
prosecutor. This is on average 75 offences per year. In three quarters of the cases
the prosecutor himself set a fine between 175 Euro and 11,250 Euro. The rest of
the cases were forwarded to a judge, who imposed sanctions between 150 Euro and
150,000 Euro.403

Therefore, in the Netherlands the style of enforcement is a more consensual style that
leaves sanctions ‘in the background’ of the regulatory system.
The Netherlands, however, will not impose a harsh regime like that of the US. Nor
would its softer regime work, one suspects, in Australia — a country with a different
culture, a different pre-existing legal institutional framework, and financial system to
400
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that of the Netherlands. This can be demonstrated by an examination of the experiences
of different Australian agencies that are working to regulate the Australian financial
system in different areas.
4. 4 Local Practices of a Number of Partner Agencies in Enforcing Compliance in
the Face of Non-compliance
It was an important milestone when Australia decided to restructure its own regulatory
framework. A number of factors played a vital role in the movement for change,
including the desire to control the development and vitality of financial institutions, the
high number of Australian citizens active in these markets, the risks for investors,
depositors and creditors, and the government’s promotion of the superannuation. 404
Therefore, the federal government of Australia in 1996 announced an inquiry to revise
the regulation of the financial services. Mr Stan Wallis was the chairman of the
committee that took responsibility for reviewing the development of the financial
system, its regulation and regulatory agencies. After due consideration, and lengthy
consultation, the Wallis Committee issued its report in March 1997, making a
considerable number of recommendations to improve the regulatory framework as well
as to protect the stability and safety of the Australian financial system.405
Among the recommendations was the restructure of the regulatory framework of the
financial sector and a shift to a more flexible regulatory framework — namely a
functional approach to regulation — for the agencies that supervise prudential
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regulation and marketplace regulation.406 The goal was to reduce regulatory costs, that
could otherwise affect economic sector growth, and result in the imposition of higher
taxes, and poor services to the community. 407
4.4.1 An Overview of the Australian Model for Corporate Regulators
According to the Wallis Report, the Australian regulatory structure should rely on three
main agencies, who would undertake the various functions: 408
1

ASIC: the Australian Securities and Commission, whose role is to protect
consumers in their financial dealings with banks and other deposits taking
institutions, superannuation institutions, securities, and general insurance and life
insurance institutions. Subsequently created in 1998, ASIC combines the roles of
the old Australian Securities Commission (ASC), the Australian Payments System
Council (APSC), and the Insurance and Superannuation Commission (ISC). The
government also granted more powers to ASIC in regard to consumer protection.

2

APRA: the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, which undertakes
prudential

regulation of

banks

and

other

deposit

taking

institutions,

superannuation institutions, and general and life insurance institutions.
3

The Reserve Bank of Australia, which continues its role in regard to supervising
the stability of the financial system, policy and the payments scheme.

406
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Therefore, the new structure for the Australian regulatory framework was built on a
‘Twin Peak’ framework comprising ASIC (the corporate, market and financial services
regulator)409 and APRA (as regulator of prudential institutions – deposit takers,
insurance companies and superannuation funds). 410 The model is designed to keep the
regulation of the wholesale market separate from that of the retail market, because of
the increasing consolidations of firms in the same line of business, the move towards
conglomeration, the emergence of new financial instruments, and increased cross border
transactions.411
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), created in 1995 when
the Trade Practice Commission (TPC) and the Prices Surveillance Authority (PSA)
combined, shares their duty to regulate the Australian corporate system. 412
The 2005 FATF Mutual Evaluation Report indicated that Australia had succeeded in
creating an improved financial system following the Wallis Report. The regulatory
agencies were working under a well-regulated financial system with a solid risk
management culture to achieve a responsive, efficient, flexible and competitive
financial regime. 413 Nevertheless, in addition to addressing the recommendations of the
Wallis Report, these regulatory agencies also were responsible for supervising and
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implementing the recommendations of the Royal Commission (2001) that investigated
the collapse of the HIH Insurance Group of companies.414
The HIH Insurance Group of companies collapsed in 2001 and its demise challenged
the efficacy of the Wallis regulatory framework. Economic professionals considered its
collapse the worst corporate failure that Australia has ever had.
ASIC had been investigating the HIH case and issued a notice suspending trading in
HIH shares because it believed that the market lacked adequate information about the
company’s financial position. However, HIH went into provisional liquidation without
seeking to re-list its financial position, with losses estimated to be in the billions when it
finally collapsed.415
Much of the debate at the time questioned the performance of the regulatory agencies:
on one hand, the effectiveness of the twin peaks model of Wallis Report, and, on the
other, questioning APRA’s role in prudential regulation, openly critical of APRA’s role
and expressing a belief that the regulator should have reacted quickly to the HIH
situation. As a result of HIH’s collapse, a number of significant changes in the
insurance industry have occurred, including on matters related to solvency and capital
adequacy. A number of changes are due to the recommendations of a Royal
Commission that was established to examine the collapse of the HIH institution and
evaluate the regulators performance.
The head of the Royal Commission, Justice Owen, concentrated on a number of issues,
including the need to have trained regulated entities, actions available, well-resourced
regulators with a clear mandate and an adequate enforcement mechanism, efficient
414
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information sharing, and regulators clearly independent of any political pressure. 416 The
recommendations of the Royal Commission match the requirements and attributes
earlier discussed in this Chapter. They guarantee the most effective enforcement
mechanism in place for any Australian regulatory agency, including AUSTRAC, and
these regulatory agencies should be aware of this.
4.4.2 The Main Partner Agencies and the AML system
The Wallis Report gave two main reasons for deciding that two separate regulatory
agencies (ASIC and APRA) were preferable to one:
1

The existence of the two separate regulatory authorities would decrease the risk of
the retail market regulator being infected by its wholesale counterpart and vice
versa.

2

Their existence would decrease the enormous management burden that is
obligatory on a solo regulator.

However, the AUSTRAC Supervisory Framework notes:
The regulators have quite distinct roles and responsibilities, although some
regulated entities have expressed the concern that the activity of the regulators has
overlapped and caused a repetition of work or/and conflicting requirements.
AUSTRAC acknowledges that it is part of Australia’s overall regulatory
framework and does not intend to work in isolation from other regulators. 417

Even when using the twin peaks model, overlap is one of the challenges that
AUSTRAC could face in its work with regulated entities and with partner agencies in
the regulatory system in the AML field.
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On the other hand, a minimal level of cooperation and coordination between the partner
agencies and AUSTRAC in the AML system adds greater difficulty in relation to
obtaining a more effective regulatory framework. An ASIC employee in an informal
conversation indicated that he does not see ASIC within the AML system, and no
success for ASIC in this domain can be attributed to it as a partner agency except that it
provides AUSTRAC on-line access to its data and vice versa. 418
AUSTRAC has signed a number of Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with
regulators and law enforcement bodies — including ASIC, 419 APRA (2007), 420 and
ACCC (2007)421 for information sharing and to provide each other with the cooperation
required in regulation, enforcement and compliance, as well as enhance the
opportunities for mutual development through training programs. 422 But it seems these
arrangements need enormous work to be effective, especially after the FATF Mutual
Evaluation Report on Australia (2005) revealed:
APRA and ASIC have wide-ranging powers to remedy breaches of their relevant
legislation, which apply to entities as well as their directors and officers (e.g. senior
management). Powers include the ability to compel specific remedial actions,
disqualify persons for management or directorship functions, and revoke a licence
or authorisation to operate. Australia notes that these powers would apply for noncompliance with the FTR Act if the breach created risks or breaches relevant to
APRA’s and ASIC’s legislation. However, it was unclear to the evaluation team
how these would be applied in practice, as there are no express powers to remove
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management or revoke a licence for a breach of AML/CFT requirements. No
sanctions have yet been applied by APRA or ASIC for AML/CFT failings. 423

Indeed the first remedial direction for non-compliance was only issued by AUSTRAC
on 5 November 2009 (some four years after the above report was made), and its second
on 9 February 2011.424 Both directions were issued under subsection 191(2) of the AML
Act 2006.
According to FATF, AUSTRAC’s main partner agencies (ASIC, APRA and the ACCC)
have actively applied their enforcement mechanisms, using a wide range of powers and
applying sanctions on non-compliant financial institutions, but not for the purpose of
AML activities. These agencies were able to apply their enforcement mechanism using
a variety of soft and harsh sanctions on non-compliance but AUSTRAC could not or did
not appear to have the same ability to apply such a wide range of sanctions although
these exist in its enforcement policy. Is this an indicator of almost universal compliance,
a lack of detection of non-compliance, or a reluctance to file or a failure to do so
promptly? The upcoming chapters will explore this area.
4.4.3 Partner Agencies’ Enforcement Mechanisms
The nature of an agency is a significant factor affecting its enforcement mechanisms. In
this regard, some agencies, such as the ACCC and ASIC, are mainly enforcement
agencies. Their role is to act against non-compliance to guarantee fairness, competition
and transparency in the financial system. 425
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Both agencies have legislation that calls for corrective action in the face of noncompliance. Under their respective Acts, they have also the right to inform consumers,
institutions, and shareholder of their rights and duties under the relevant legislation. As
prosecutors, ASIC and the ACCC rely on announcing planned and successful
prosecutions not only to stimulate public confidence in their functions, but also to deter
non-compliance. In this regard their role is more like that of ‘naming and shaming’
agencies; AUSTRAC shares this approach with these partner agencies. ASIC and the
ACCC will have failed if companies increase their power and build their reputation in
the marketplace while confusing clients or harming their interests. 426
In contrast, APRA is mainly an administrative agency working to protect depositors;
consequently its role relies on monitoring financial institutions. APRA also evaluates
the risks that companies could face and the impact of their failure or collapse on the
market and the whole financial system. Therefore, APRA failure is linked to company
failure: if a company fails then APRA has also failed; if the company succeeds, APRA
has also succeeded. However, APRA essentially avoids exposure, not only because of
its secrecy obligations, but also because publicising institutions’ financial intricacies
would normally undermine the Authority’s prudential aims. 427
The different compliance strategies of the partner agencies affect the way that these
agencies deal with non-compliance. However, the ultimate goal of the regulators is the
same: calling for and working towards the protection of the financial system, its
efficiency, maintaining the reputation of both the regulated and the regulator. In order to
achieve that, their enforcement mechanisms need to be used when non-compliance
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occurs, especially when their regulatory culture has been built on actively enforcing a
compliance culture as these agencies’ has.
4.4.4 Case Study: Civil Penalties as an Enforcement Power that could be applied
by ASIC and ACCC on Non-Compliance
The importance of civil penalties comes from the role they play. Civil penalties are the
solution that legislation and regulations have used to counter some actions that are not
subject to criminal sanction. 428
Civil penalties are sanctioned by the regulatory agency when it approaches a civil court
to secure a penalty to be applied for entity non-compliance. They are invoked by the
authority of the state, and enforced by civil proceedings that follow the measures and
rules of evidence in civil cases. The nature of the civil penalty provision is that it merely
involves the application of a financial penalty and does not impose any criminal
conviction. 429
Current policies and practices concerning the use of civil penalties are a response to a
major analysis of civil penalties by the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC)
through its report Principled Regulation: Federal Civil and Administrative Penalties in
Australia (ALRC Report 95/2003). This report discussed federal regulatory and penalty
schemes and the use of civil and administrative penalties. It sought to achieve greater
clarity, transparency and consistency in the application of such types of penalties.
In the arena of civil penalties, the ALRC report found that civil penalties serve a number
of purposes including retribution, condemnation, specific or general deterrence,
428
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compensation, and/or protection.430 This type of penalty could be sought more quickly
by the regulatory agency to respond to non compliant entities than a criminal
prosecution:431
Criminal prosecutions necessarily take longer than imposing administrative (and
perhaps civil) penalties, but it has been argued that systemic problems with the
court system should not prevent the prosecution of criminal behaviour. Officers of
the DPP have argued that prosecutions remain a ‘huge deterrent’, and
administrative penalties like banning orders can still be imposed before or after a
criminal prosecution.

The ALRC report indicated that regulators generally refer suspected criminal breaches
to the DPP, which then decides whether to pursue criminal charges. Therefore, the
decision to pursue a criminal, civil or administrative penalty is often influenced by the
role of the DPP.
However, it was clear from the outset that government regulation, and the penalt y
schemes used to reinforce it, cannot be generated from a single mould but must be
adapted to meet the particular demands and communities which each scheme seeks to
regulate. Therefore, regulators have developed Memorandums of Understanding
(MoUs) with the DPP to detail the use of criminal and civil penalties and their
relationship with referrals to the DPP. These MoUs can summarise how liaison is to
occur between a regulator and the DPP and provide mechanisms for resolving any
conflict between the regulator and the DPP in applying criminal or civil penalties on
non compliant entities.
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Thus, a number of regulatory agencies have experience under their law in applying civil
penalties on non compliant entities:432
Unlike the ATO, ACCC and ASIC other regulatory agencies have not been given
comparable powers to conduct their own criminal prosecutions. One reason for this
is the risk that regulators could become too involved in the investigation and overprosecute. However, agencies such as ASIC, the ACCC and the Australian
Customs Service (ACS) already undertake both investigation and litigation of civil
penalty proceedings.

Following its extensive review of the regulatory application of the existing civil
penalties scheme in 2003, the ALRC concluded that:433
The key recommendation is the enactment of a Regulatory Contraventions Statute
of general application to cover various aspects of the law and procedure governing
non-criminal contraventions of federal law. The Regulatory Contraventions Statute
is not intended to be a comprehensive code but rather should be expressed:
1. To contain certain principles of responsibility that apply to any noncriminal breach of any law of the Commonwealth; and
2. To prevail over any inconsistent Commonwealth law to the extent of that
inconsistency unless that other law expressly excludes or modifies the
operation of the Regulatory Contraventions Statute by express reference to
that statute (or the portion of it, the operation of which is to be excluded).
Other recommendations described the principles to be set out in the proposed
Regulatory Contraventions Statute in the absence of any clear, express statutory
statement to the contrary. These included:






Contraventions for which a civil penalty may be imposed may contain fault
elements as defined under the Criminal Code or as specified in a law that
creates a particular contravention. If no fault element is specified, a
contravention for which a civil penalty may be imposed does not contain a
fault element. (ie, carries strict or absolute liability).
Any legislation that deems an individual to be personally liable for the
contravening conduct of a corporation should include a fault element that
the individual knew that, or was reckless or negligent as to whether, the
contravening conduct would occur.
When the same physical elements can attract both a civil penalty and
criminal liability, the physical and fault elements of both the contravention
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Australian Government, Australian Law Reform Commission, Federal Civil and Administrative
Penalties (2003) <http://www.alrc.gov.au/inquiries/federal-civil-and-administrative-penalties> at 8 July
2012.
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attracting a civil penalty and the criminal offence should be clearly
distinguished in the legislation.
In civil penalty schemes, an infringement notice scheme should apply only
to minor contraventions in which no proof of a fault element or state of
mind is required. Infringement notice schemes should follow the model to
be set out in the proposed statute.
All persons directly adversely affected by a regulator's decision to impose
a quasi-penalty (such as the revocation or qualification of a licence, or a
social security penalty) must be afforded procedural fairness.
The same protections for individuals afforded by the privilege against selfincrimination in criminal matters apply in relation to actions seeking a civil
or administrative penalty.
All penalty schemes should provide avenues of internal review, external
merits review and judicial review, unless one or more of these is clearly
inappropriate in the circumstances.
A court may impose a non-monetary penalty in addition to, or in
substitution for, a monetary penalty for an offence or contravention. The
introduction of non-monetary penalties into regulatory schemes is
encouraged.
Guidance should be provided for courts setting civil penalties, particularly
when considering non-mandatory penalties.

The report has been in the basis for a number of amendments of different government
documents. As a result, some legislation was amended and it influenced a number of
guidance reports as well as a number of court and tribunal decisions. 434 For example,
The Guide to Framing Commonwealth Offences, Civil Penalties and Enforcement
Powers (2004) states:
A civil penalty provision should make appropriate provision for proof of fault. The
principles applicable to the choice between requiring fault and imposing strict or
absolute liability to an offence should be taken into account. However, the use of
strict or absolute liability is more easily justified for a higher civil penalty
provision than a higher penalty criminal offence, particularly where the civil
penalty provision:
1 - applies only to corporate or white collar wrongdoing; and
2 - it is reasonable to expect those subject to the civil penalty to take steps to guard
against any inadvertent contravention. 435
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Another example is AUSTRAC’s Regulatory Guide 2006 when it reflects the ALRC
report and its recommendation in regards to the application of the civil penalties scheme
in the Policy (Civil Penalty Orders) Principles 2006. The Guide provides that:436
During the period set out in subsection (2) for a civil penalty provision, the
AUSTRAC CEO may apply for a civil penalty order against a reporting entity for a
contravention of the provision only if the AUSTRAC CEO is satisfied that the
reporting entity has failed to take reasonable steps to comply with the provision.

However, AUSTRAC practices do not reflect the recommendations of the ALRC report
in applying such penalties through its enforcement mechanism and ignore this remedy
which could be an effective enforcement power at its disposal.
4.4.4.1 Civil Penalties as an Enforcement Power for ASIC
ASIC’s annual report for 2002–03 referred to enforcement as a basic feature of its work
in dealing with non-compliance, and indicated that the active use of the enforcement
mechanism is required to achieve the best regulatory results. Enforcement is highlighted
as ‘an essential part of effective regulation’. 437 The 2005 FATF Mutual Evaluation
Report recognises that civil penalties is among ASIC’s wide range of sanction and
enforcement powers.
The Australian federal parliament introduced a civil penalty scheme in the Corporations
Act 1993 (and as amended in 2001) as an active enforcement power against noncompliance. 438 Part 9.4B ‘Civil Consequences of Contravening Civil Penalty Provisions’
(sections 1317DA to 1317S) imposes a civil penalty which is allowed to stand prior to
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criminal prosecution, thus effectively providing a ‘hybrid’. Civil prosecution cannot
generally occur for essentially the same behaviour after a successful criminal
prosecution — they are mutually exclusive in many instances. Tomasic (1993) adopted
and clarified the term, but observes that ‘sometimes the dividing line between criminal
and civil provisions may not be very clear or precise’ 439. He notes that
In the Corporations Law, ‘provision is made for both civil and criminal actions to
be undertaken [for] … the same conduct’. Substantial fines may be imposed under
the criminal law provisions. Indeed, … civil penalty orders which may involve the
imposition of heavy fines which parallel fines which may be imposed for a breach
of a corporate criminal law provision. … under the Corporations Law … a civil
penalty of up to $200,000 may be imposed under s 1317EA for a breach, such as
… of the directors’ duties provisions. However, the court may impose such a civil
penalty order where the case has been proved only to satisfy the civil and not the
criminal standard of proof, that is, where the case is proved on the balance of
probabilities and not beyond reasonable doubt.440

Schedule 3 of the Corporations Act includes a full list of actions which can incur either
a fine or imprisonment (for example, in reference to section 184, use of position /
information). The Criminal Code can be brought to bear for certain offences under the
Corporations Act.441
From a legal perspective, the Corporations Act has created an enforcement mechanism
that could be understood similarly to Braithwaite’s regulatory enforcement pyramid,
particularly if one considers a variant model specifically suggested for the Australian
Corporations Act by Gilligan, Bird and Ramsay (1999) (see Figure 8 below).
At the base of the pyramid are those who comply with the law and the regulations,
where ASIC provides education and gentle persuasion to assist them to maintain their
439
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compliance. The mid-group of enforcement powers includes negotiation, settlement,
investigations, inspections, examinations, notices, letters of warning and fines. These
powers are in place to discipline those who are showing attempts at non-compliance in
the initial and mid stages.
Civil penalties are one of the sanctions included in the upper levels of Braithwaite’s
regulatory enforcement pyramid. In the variant model, remedial civil penalties are
distinguished from incapacitative civil penalties, with remedial civil penalties being
located in the second to highest level of the ASIC enforcement pyramid, and
‘incapacitative criminal or civil penalties’ or banning orders (for example, loss of
opportunity to practice an occupation and so forth) at the apex. 442 The apex’s lesser
volume indicates the relative few that ‘progress’ to this stage (generally having passed
through the preliminary stages). This level boasts full enforcement strength sanctions
for persistent and/or egregious non-compliance.443 (See Figure 8 below.)
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Figure 8: The Enforcement Pyramid According to the Corporations Law
Adapted from George Gilligan, Helen Bird and Ian Ramsay, ‘The Efficacy of Civil
Penalty Sanctions under the Australian Corporations Law’.444
From a regulatory perspective, ASIC’s most important objective is having a successful
outcome in the shortest achievable timeframe. Civil penalties are one of the powers that
have been applied by ASIC on non-compliance.
Nevertheless, Gilligan, Bird and Ramsay (1999) noted that the civil penalties were not
frequently applied in the six years to 1999, with just 14 instances in that period. They
also indicated that the figure is low because ASIC viewed the civil penalty regime as
serving a limited enforcement purpose,445 and does not indicate that this power is

444
445
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effective in terms of discouraging non-compliance, especially given the number of
factors that play a role in narrowing the scope for using civil penalties. These include: 446
1

Challenges that could hamper the functioning of ASIC — for example, initially a
number of the people who worked in the enforcement section of ASIC came from
a criminal law environment and consequently they were more familiar with
criminal sanctions than civil penalties. However, this has changed over time with
the employment of a significant number of lawyers from civil litigation
practices.447

2

ASIC’s relationships with other regulatory agencies — for example, the
relationship between ASIC and the Office of the Commonwealth Director of
Public Prosecutions (CDPP) requires ASIC to liaise with the CDPP over
important enforcement matters, which affects the use of civil penalties. While the
role of the CDPP is to act against criminal breaches of the law, ASIC has broader
obligations which include using civil remedies. These different obligations can
limit the probability of civil penalties being used.

3

The availability of alternative sanctions, including management banning orders
and injunctions. For example, section 600 of the Corporations Act permits ASIC
to enforce a management banning order on a person in specific circumstances.

4

ASIC’s desire to not only accomplish its enforcement objectives but also to be
widely seen as doing so, which makes it difficult for ASIC to undertake
enforcement activities that are more complex in nature and time-consuming and
involve sanctions like civil penalties.

446
447

Ibid 5.
An informal discussion with X an ASIC employee and CPA member, above n 418.
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5

Concerns about the limited usefulness of civil penalties at ASIC’s disposal.
Contributing factors range from unclear drafting and lack of certainty about the
meaning of some provisions to civil penalties’ perceived low public profile (and
hence lower deterrent value).448 The uncertain nature of the civil penalty system in
the Corporations Act and regulatory practices have added doubt about the use of
these sanctions.449 Their sheer complexity make them time consuming and costly
— clashing with resource constraints and making them less attractive to
enforcement bodies and the public alike when compared to the ‘swift, decisive
and obvious’ effects of alternative enforcement sanctions (such as management
banning orders).450

In terms of deterrence, fines of up to AUD200,000 may be imposed under Part 9.4B of
the Corporations Act 451 as either a civil or a criminal penalty.
The maximum penalty for a criminal contravention is $200 000 or five years
imprisonment or both, and a person found guilty is prohibited from managing a
corporation for five years unless the leave of the court is obtained, provides for two
types of penal consequences: civil penalties and criminal penalties. Two kinds of
civil penalties are prescribed: a pecuniary penalty of up to $200 000 and/or an
order banning a person from managing a corporation for an unspecified period.
Criminal penalties comprise a fine of up to $200 000 or five years imprisonment or
both. Criminal penalties are only imposed where a person contravenes a civil
penalty provision knowingly, intentionally or recklessly and the person:
• was dishonest and intended to gain an advantage for the contravener or any
other person; or
• intended to deceive or defraud someone. 452
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Thus, the civil and criminal penalty systems function as alternate systems, determined
by separate proceedings. Both types of penalties occupy the same level of the ‘pyramid’
because they are commonly exclusive sanctions; using one would be a bar to the use of
the other, so it is a hybrid sanction.453
The enforcement pyramid theory will not work as originally envisaged (that is, relying
on separating civil penalties and criminal sanctions, with criminal above civil and
banning orders even further above (see figure 4 above)). Placing certain civil penalties
with the criminal sanctions in the upper level of the variant model pyramid does not
quite match the Braithwaite model, especially as in some cases these sanctions are
actually combined. This challenges Braithwaite’s theory.
Another concern that exists regarding the placement of penalties, whether civil or
criminal, is their size. Although able to apply a fine of up to AUD200,000, the penalties
imposed until 1999 were commonly range between AUD1000 and AUD40,000. 454 The
imposition of low civil penalties could not fairly be considered a sanction that belongs
to the upper levels of the enforcement pyramid.
The enforcement pyramid theory is not comprehensive. There are some difficulties
facing regulatory agencies and their enforcement mechanisms. This does not mean that
the theory has failed in trying to ensure the best enforcement mechanism practices to
obtain higher levels of compliance; rather it is not totally comprehensive , nor is its
application in practice necessarily always in accordance with the classical or even
variant model.
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In conclusion, ASIC has the right to impose civil penalties on non-compliance. It is
clear that it imposed civil penalties on very few occasions, especially in its early years,
with civil penalties applied just 14 times in the 6 years to 1999. Yet this type of sanction
needs to be reasonably applied where required in order to enforce compliance and
provide deterrence.
In more recent years, however, including 2009455 and 2010, ASIC has imposed 30 civil
applications for civil penalties and obtained more than AUD287 million in recoveries,
fines and costs.456
In contrast, AUSTRAC has applied none since its establishment, even after its role was
expanded with the entry into force of the AML Act. According to the retired CEO of
AUSTRAC, Neil Jensen as recently 2009, ‘AUSTRAC has not enforced civil
penalties’. 457 Again the question is, ‘Why?’ Again the upcoming chapters of this thesis
will attempt to answer this question as well.
4.4.4.2 Civil Penalties as an Enforcement Power for ACCC
The ACCC has an important role in managing competition and consumer protection law
in Australia. It has also deals with competition matters and enforces the Trade and
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Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA), later the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)
(CCA).458
In order to operate an effective enforcement mechanism, ACCC requires a variety of
enforcement actions and sanctions to apply in the even to non-compliance. Under the
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA), the ACCC cannot apply any civil
penalties on non-compliance. The range of the sanctions which are available under the
Act are limited to corrective advertising, reimbursement for losses incurred, injunctions,
and community service. The ACCC and CDPP share the role of investigating and
prosecuting criminal contraventions. Each authority works according to its enforcement
action hierarchy and will decide whether it is more appropriate to pursue a case
criminally or civilly. 459
The ACCC emphasises the enforcement of compliance and the application of the
consumer protection laws. Where breaches do occur, the ACCC strongly pursues those
in breach, sometimes assisting those injured by the breaches to attempt to access the
required redress.
Effective prevention requires an enforcement mechanism with a wide range of actions
available, including administrative resolutions and criminal sanctions. Sometimes an
effective deterrent (such as the threat of damaging the business’s reputation) does not
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On 1 January 2011 the Trade Practices Act 1974 was renamed the Competition and Consumer Act
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also need a criminal sanction. The regulatory agency could make a balanced reaction
based on the circumstances of each case. 460
However, the range of civil remedies that the ACCC could have at its disposal and the
lack of civil penalties under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 creates a shortfall
in its enforcement mechanism, and it cannot achieve all of its enforcement aims. This
deficit in the federal consumer protection regime needs to be remedied.
Braithwaite’s regulatory enforcement pyramid theory aims to create the most effective
enforcement system, where a regulator has a variety of sanctions available. On this
view, a regulatory agency with a wide range of sanctions at its disposal will be more
effective more than one with limited sanctions in place. In this regard, the imagined
ACCC ‘pyramid’ would resemble the following:
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Figure 9: The Enforcement Pyramid According to the Competition and Consumer
Law
Adapted from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC),
‘Civil Penalties for Australia’s Consumer Protection Provisions’ Submission to
Discussion Paper Issued by Ministerial Council on Consumer Affairs (2005).461
The ACCC enforcement mechanism begins with voluntary compliance and
administrative resolutions for a company that has contravened the Act. The company
must move rapidly to recompense affected customers. Enforceable undertakings follow,
then civil remedies (including statements that the Competition and Consumer Act has
been breached, community service orders and so on).
Wherever the party is guilty, yet the offence is not worthy of a criminal sanction, a civil
penalty may be the most appropriate sanction. However, to ensure the higher level of
compliance, some behaviours need to be deterred by criminal sanctions. Criminal
sanctions are more likely to be sought where the offence contains ‘fraud’ (such as mass-

461
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marketed scams),462 blatant misconduct, and serious or repeated illegal activity. These
actions deserve the highest level of sanctions, namely the criminal sanction. For
example, in the case of the ACCC v Chubb Security Australia Pty Ltd, the defendant’s
earlier civil breaches were taken into consideration as an aggravating factor in
sentencing for a subsequent criminal breach, and on 30 December 2004 the Federal
Court in Sydney imposed a fine of AUD1.51 million against Chubb for criminal
breaches of the Competition and Consumer Act (then the Trade Practices Act).463
Nevertheless, criminal prosecutions are not always the best option to enforce
compliance, because sometimes an effective and proportionate response requires a
flexible range of remedies and not a criminal sanction. Criminal sanctions must only be
applied to any illegal activity where the nature of that activity demands the harsher
sanction that is associated with a criminal deterrent. Therefore the need for civil
penalties should be addressed and this sanction activated at an appropriate level for a
more effective ACCC enforcement mechanism.
Both partner agencies’ enforcement mechanisms have been more effectively and
properly used than AUSTRAC’s. The following gives an idea of the task facing the
regulator. In 2009–10 alone AUSTRAC received over 21.5 million transaction reports
(almost 10 per cent up on the previous year) , these generated over 43,000 SUSTRS and
SMRs and almost 1,400 financial intelligence assessments for relevant partner agencies
462
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who make further evaluations.464 As regulators of the Australian financial system, ASIC,
the ACCC and APRA take enforcement actions seriously and are working to use their
enforcement mechanisms when needed. In terms of referrals to partner agencies, the
following table shows some of partner agency enforcement actions for the years 2001 to
2004:465

Agency

2001–02

2002–03

2003–04

ACCC

Cases commenced: 60
Cases before courts: 74

Cases commenced: 39
Cases before courts: 71

Cases commenced: 22
Cases before courts: 43

ASIC

Criminal cases: 19
Civil Proceedings: 81
Litigations concluded:
205

Criminal cases: 29
Civil proceedings: 67
Litigations concluded:
222

Criminal cases: 28
Civil proceedings: 51
Litigations concluded:
220

APRA

Superannuation industry:
107
Other enforcement
actions:
92

Superannuation industry:
261
Other enforcement
actions:
127

Superannuation industry:
277
Other enforcement
actions:
114

Table 3: The Enforcement Actions of ACCC, ASIC and APRA from 2001 to 2004.
Adapted from: Richard Grant, ‘Australia’s Corporate Regulators - The ACCC,
ASIC and APRA’ (Politics and Public Administration Section, Parliamentary
Library, Parliament of Australia, 2005).
4. 5 Conclusion
The most effective enforcement mechanism is crucial for countries establishing
enforcement mechanisms for any regulatory agency, especially one related to
combatting ML crimes. Regulatory capture and political pressures should be kept at bay
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by the regulatory agency so that these influences cannot affect its enforcement
decisions.
However, a country’s pre-existing regulatory culture and legal institutional framework
for regulatory agencies play a vital role in determining the type of enforcement
mechanism adopted. Thus, the US system, especially after September 11, has become
more serious in supervising the level of compliance and taking action against noncompliance. FinCEN has been noticeably using harsher civil penalties and sanctions and
imposing higher fines on non-compliant reporting entities, due to its regulatory culture
and the pressures created by 9/11.
In contrast, the Netherlands has followed the EU directives and has a system that relies
on the trust that the government bodies and regulatory agencies have built up between
themselves and the reporting entities. Its AML system has a noticeably soft enforcement
mechanism and powers accorded the FIU-NL.
Neither of these two countries’ AML system is fully comprehensive; both enforcement
mechanisms have shortcomings. The harsh US enforcement mechanism with its
combination of severe sanctions for failing to notify and ‘safe harbor’ provisions (where
reporting entities are statutorily protected from legal action from the party reported)
generates huge numbers of reports (of both low and high suspicious transactions, and
thus lesser and greater value) for FinCEN evaluation. Reporting entities are effectively
‘crying wolf’, producing a high number of low value and not useful reports.
The Netherlands’ AML system, on the other hand, had a pre-existing legal institutional
framework that dealt softly with non-compliance. Building its AML system similarly
has produced some difficulties for the FIU-NL in fulfilling its duties and imposing
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sanctions on entities that fail to report unusual transactions. Yet time is wasted
concentrating on the UTRs (many of which prove lawful) that could otherwise have
been spent on higher value suspicious transaction reports emanating from higher value
UTRs. The current UTR reporting scheme produces of a large number of reports with a
low value that the FIU-NL must eliminate.
Consequently, it is not a case of being a ‘harsher’ or ‘softer’ FIU, but of being a
regulator with most effective sanctions that can used in the event of non-compliance,
especially where a country has a pre-existing culture of enforcing compliance and
applying harsh sanctions when required. Australia’s government has created a number
of regulatory agencies to address a spectrum of regulatory responsibilities involving a
multiplicity of reporting entities in its financial system. Differing mechanisms with
various powers have been developed.
ASIC and ACCC have actively utilised soft and harsh sanctions in enforcing
compliance. Because the regulatory culture in Australia is flexible, the reaction of a
regulatory agency will be specified according to the level of the damage that could
occur (or has occurred) due to the breaching activity.
Therefore, civil penalties were taken as a case study, to reflect this flexibility and to
show their role in circumstances where criminal sanctions were not the best option for
the regulatory agency to impose on non-compliant entities.
ASIC has civil penalties among its enforcement powers (according to the Corporations
Law 1993). Initially these were used sparingly (14 instances 1993–1999), but more
recently they have been applied more frequently (30 instances 2009–2010).
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The ACCC lacks the ability to impose civil penalties (Competition and Consumer Act
2010). Studies have shown that the Act requires amendment to give the ACCC the
ability to impose civil penalties in the event of non-compliance. This would enhance the
effectiveness of its enforcement mechanism.
In the Australian regulatory system, ASIC, the ACCC and AUSTRAC are regulatory
enforcement agencies. They work to ensure the financial system’s integrity and
guarantee the highest level of compliance, at the same time being able to respond
quickly and react appropriately to any non-compliance when this occurs. Their goals
include: to further improve surveillance and strengthen enforcement.
AUSTRAC has a wide range of adequate sanctions in accordance with its enforcement
policy and the relevant legislation. Sanctions include issuing notices for AML
assessment, undertaking external audits and compliance monitoring, utilising persuasion
and education, issuing infringement notices and remedial directions, seeking
injunctions, accepting enforceable undertakings, imposing civil penalties and
prosecuting criminal offences.
AUSTRAC shares the same regulatory culture as ASIC and ACCC. Its culture is not
harsh like FinCEN’s, which often applies very severe sanctions in a manner that could
harm the Australian system; nor is it generally lenient like the Netherlands with its
regime of very soft sanctions for non-compliant reporting entities. However,
AUSTRAC appears never to have used any of its harshest sanctions. The harshest
sanctions that could be found were accepting a very small number of enforceable
undertakings; cases involving civil penalties or criminal sanctions have yet to occur.
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Any suggestion that the level of compliance of the reporting entities is working so well
as to make AUSTRAC’s consistent use of soft sanctions justifiable is countered by the
knowledge that there is estimated to be a ML volume worth $4.5 billion passing in and
through Australia every single year.466 Operating in the same environment as ASIC and
the ACCC, the question must then be asked as to why, given that figure, AUSTRAC
appears to be so lenient a regulatory agency when compared to other partner agencies?
If one look at the nature of the regulatory activities of ASIC, ACCC and AUSTRAC,
we see that all deal with the same kind of businesses and indeed, often, the same
businesses but they deal with them in demonstrably different ways. AUSTRAC has
always been softer and far less intrusive in its regulatory responses, while ACCC and
ASIC have applied more active enforcement mechanism on non compliant entities.
The problem that AUSTRAC does not seem able to deal with efficiently is that it
regulates a significant number of businesses with a wide variety of business types with
the same apparent mind set: whether it be a one person remitter or one of the major
banks in the country. To be a regulatory agency with consistent regulation does not
mean that it needs to deal with regulated entities in the same way, consistency is not
about treating all of these entities in identical ways, it is about being able to recognise
that different circumstances require different responses and be able to demonstrate why
there are differences in regulatory responses. It is about saying a small fine to a one
person operation is a significant sanction while a hundred million dollar fine for a large
bank is not necessarily an effective sanction. It is not the volume of the sanction, it is
about how it relates to the nature of the business, how it will be seen within the entity
and by customers and stakeholders and whether it will secure compliance.

466

Walker and Stamp, above n 193, 5.
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One of the problems with AUSTRAC is that it fundamentally failed to build its
enforcement approach around a realistic assessment of the nature of the reporting
entities it regulates and the commercial environment in which they operate. Large
financial institutions are machines designed to produce profits in any way they can and
AUSTRAC needs to consider this fact. Assumptions that banks and other financial
institutions will always behave as good corporate citizens with high levels of voluntary
compliance have been shown through the GFC to be no longer valid, if they ever were.
One of the challenges for AUSTRAC is to deal with a financial sector, which has over
the last 5 years shown that it is prepared to ignore or break regulatory structures across
the globe. While the most notable examples have been in Europe and US, Australian
companies have not been immune. There are many examples of illegal or unlawful
behaviour during the GFC and unless one understands that is the environment in which
AUSTRAC is operating then the determination of the appropriate regulatory model for
AUSTRAC will remain flawed.
It is essential to remember that the reason for the need for stronger and effective
regulation is the different nature of the reporting entities.
In addition to those matters and returning to the requirements and the attributes needed
to achieve the most effective enforcement mechanism, new questions will be raised:
1

Are the current AUSTRAC’s strategies and policies effectively targeting all
reporting entities?

2

Does AUSTRAC actively engage with the reporting entities, and is it involved in
a productive relationship with them?
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3

Has AUSTRAC protected itself from being affected by regulatory capture? How
did AUSTRAC deal with non-compliance during the GFC and after it? And why?

The two upcoming Chapters address all of these questions.
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5 DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN ‘WHAT AUSTRAC SAYS’ AND ‘WHAT IT
DOES’ IN REGARD TO NON-COMPLIANCE WITH REPORTING
OBLIGATIONS
5. 1 Introduction
AUSTRAC has undertaken the dual role of being the Australian FIU and the regulator
for the Australian AML system, putting into practice the new legislation and regulatory
structure. After five years, AUSTRAC has been found to be an active agency
(especially during the last two years) in terms of issuing policies, providing reporting
entity education and initiating (and in some instances completing) a number of
enforcement actions.467
However, as AUSTRAC’s role has expanded, the challenge of meeting its obligations
as an effective AML regulator and FIU has become increasingly difficult, primarily due
to two facts:
1

Experience: The new Australian AML system needs an experienced FIU as well
as regulator with a ‘full set of tools’ to analyse, investigate and enforce
compliance when needed, especially when considering the fact that the
responsibilities under the role of the FIU differ from those under the role of
regulator in the field of AML. As AUSTRAC CEO, John Schmidt, indicated:
As the AML/CFT regulator, we are responsible for ensuring that Australian
businesses understand and comply with their obligations under AML/CTF
legislation. These obligations are designed to protect businesses, and the wider
Australian community, from the harmful effects of money laundering, terrorism
financing and other serious crime. By working together to ensure compliance with
AML/CTF laws, AUSTRAC and industry present a united front against criminals
attempting to exploit weaknesses in our financial systems.

467

See, eg, Table 3: ‘AUSTRAC Activities Summary 2009–10’, Appendix A of AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC
Supervision Strategy 2010-11, 10 <http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/supervision.pdf> at 11 April 2011.
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As Australia’s FIU, AUSTRAC analyses and disseminates financial intelligence to
domestic partner agencies and international counterparts. In doing so, AUSTRAC
supports these agencies to uncover and investigate financial crimes, and to prosecute
criminals. AUSTRAC information has assisted Australian law enforcement agencies
and other government authorities to trace those involved in the importation and
trafficking of illegal drugs, tax evasion, superannuation fraud, credit card fraud, people
smuggling and other serious crimes.468
2

Comprehension: The new Australian AML system needs a comprehensive FIU,
whose directions and operations are also easily understood and followed for high
quality data to be received from reporting entities, as well as a regulator sensitive
to differences in the regulated entities sector, including the risk and size of the
reporting entities and the type of services that they provide.

The records of the last five years reveal AUSTRAC’s difficulties in those areas, despite
a number of actions that the regulator has taken to strengthen its performance. In its
specific strategy documents that have been published for 2010–11, AUSTRAC points to
a number of those actions, such as increasing its supervision of the fulfilment of
reporting obligations, their provision of the necessary intelligence for AUSTRAC, and
ensuring enforcement of compliance. 469 Other AUSTRAC publications, such as annual
reports,470 AUSTRAC’s survey series (2010),471 and typologies and case study reports

468

AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Overview2009, 3<http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/overview_brchr.pdf> at 11
April 2011.
469
AUSTRAC, ‘Strategies’ (26 October 2010) <http://www.austrac.gov.au/strategies.html> at 12 March
2011. For mention of AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Supervision Strategy 2009–10 (released 1 July 2009), see
AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Supervision Strategy 2010–11, 2, 10 <http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/
supervision.pdf> at 11 April 2011.
470
For AUSTRAC annual reports since 1998–99, but particularly those since its role incorporated that of
the FIU, namely from the 2005/06 Annual Report, see AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Annual Reports
<http://www.austrac.gov.au/annual_report.html> at 11 April 2011.
471
AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Survey Series<http://www.austrac.gov.au/survey_series.html> at 11 April
2011.
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(issued annually from 2007),472 among others, have also contributed to the information
available for reporting entities and researchers. 473
However, a number of interviewed reporting entities questioned AUSTRAC’s ability to
apply these policies and strategies ‘in real life,’ and whether the regulatory body was
able to achieve its ultimate goal, namely reducing ML activities as well as detecting the
proceeds of crime.
As stated in Chapter 1, this thesis examines the responses of nine interviewees from
nine reporting entities that differed in the type of work and services provided to
customers as well as in size. They comprised five compliance managers or officers for
five financial institutions, one real estate agent and three accountants, who discussed the
strengths and the weaknesses of AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism regarding noncompliance with reporting obligations. The overall response was:
1

Only one compliance manager was very satisfied with the AUSTRAC
enforcement mechanism and indicated that there were no weaknesses to be
mentioned in relation to AUSTRAC operations.

2

Two compliance officers were partly satisfied with AUSTRAC’s enforcement
mechanism and pointed to a number of strengths and also a number of weaknesses
in AUSTRAC’s operations.

3

Three accountants and the one real estate agent interviewed were partly
dissatisfied with AUSTRAC enforcement mechanism and pointed to a small
number of strengths and larger number of weaknesses in AUSTRAC operations.

472

For typologies and case study reports available for the years 2007–10, see, AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC
Typologies and Case Studies Reports’ <http://www.austrac.gov.au/typologies.html> at 11 April 2011.
473
For a more detailed list, see AUSTRAC, ‘Publications’ <http://www.austrac.gov.au/publications.html>
11 April 2011.
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4

Two compliance managers were not satisfied with AUSTRAC enforcement
mechanism and pointed to a large number of weaknesses and very limited
strengths in AUSTRAC’s operations.

Thus, when looking at the interviewee responses in terms of satisfaction with
AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism, satisfaction is arguably low. If one views
responses as divided in two between positive (that is, ‘very satisfied/partly satisfied’)
and negative (that is, ‘partly not satisfied/unsatisfied’), the positive to negative ratio is
3:6. Contributing to the qualitative value of their responses, reporting entity
interviewees made significant comments about the current AML system scenario,
AUSTRAC’s strengths and weaknesses in terms of enforcing compliance, and their
entities’ level of compliance with the reporting obligations. Interviewees discussed in
some detail the contrast between ‘what AUSTRAC says’ and ‘what it actually does’ in
relation to its enforcing compliance obligations.
This Chapter will compare some of AUSTRAC’s main publications with the
interviewees’ responses to the first question of those listed at the conclusion of Chapter
4, namely whether the current AUSTRAC strategies and policies target all reporting
entities and whether they do so sufficiently effectively or not.
In addition, this Chapter will try to determine whether AUSTRAC has produced
achievable strategies that would to demonstrate its effectiveness, and if not, what are the
contributing factors?
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5. 2 Statement of AUSTRAC’s Strategies
From its inception AUSTRAC has issued information in various documents regarding
strategies adopted by the body in the course of fulfilling its mandate.474 These
documents have sought to clarify its policies, address main concerns and areas of its
interest, and attempt to provide industry with sufficient information to prompt effective
compliance. More recently, AUSTRAC has issued successive ‘Strategies’, specific
strategy documents in three areas outlining to stakeholders how it proposes to direct its
efforts over the ensuing year and beyond, and providing insight into the organisation’s
operations. AUSTRAC’s Strategies comprise a supervision strategy, an intelligence
strategy, and an enforcement strategy. 475
5.2.1 Supervision Strategy
AUSTRAC issued its Supervision Strategy for 2010–11 to accompany its previous
enforcement policy. It also reflects its endeavours to evaluate compliance behaviour
against its 2009–10 Supervision Strategy and outlines the strategy adopted. This
strategy embodies a regulatory enforcement pyramid that starts at a broad base level that
supervises and enhances the level of compliance through a number of engagement
activities, including mail outs, e-newsletters, and distribution of guidance material. If
the use of ‘engagement activities’ fails, AUSTRAC will move to the use of ‘heightened
activities’, such as desk reviews, themed assessment, transaction monitoring, and
behavioural assessment, with the aim of securing compliance. If that also fails,
AUSTRAC will move up to the level of ‘escalated activities’, including on-site

474

See, eg, the Advice on an AUSTRAC On-Site Inspection Strategy (2007) (Doc 07/335) and an AntiCorruption Strategy (2006) Doc 22786: AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC File List 1st January 2007 – 30th June
2007 <http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/senate_file_lists_jan2007_june2007.pdf> at 11 April 2011; its
annual reports See, eg, mention of AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Supervision Strategy 2009–10, released 1 July
2009: AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Supervision Strategy 2010–11, above n 469, 2, 10.
475
AUSTRAC, ‘Strategies’, above n 469.
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assessment, information gathering notices and consideration of enforcement. Finally,
AUSTRAC will use its enforcement mechanism476 if all of these lower level approaches
do not work. The following regulatory pyramid (Figure 10) reflects the supervisory
activities of AUSTRAC outlined above.

Figure 10: AUSTRAC Supervision Activities.477
According to AUSTRAC’s executive summary of its 2010–11 Supervision Strategy, the
body’s approach transitioned from ‘start-up activities’ to ‘business as usual’ during the
course of 2009–10, following the cessation in March 2010 of the application of the
Policy (Civil Penalty Orders) Principles 2006, which had until that date ‘provided
reporting entities with a period of assisted compliance after the phasing in of obligations

476

In the classic Braithwaite enforcement pyramid, what AUSTRAC refers to as ‘enforcement’ are the
upper levels of the model; what AUSTRAC sees as ‘supervision’ would be regarded by Braithwaite as the
lower levels of its enforcement pyramid.
477
For ‘AUSTRAC Supervision Activities’, see AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Supervision Strategy 2010–11,
above n 469, 6.
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under the AML/CTF Act’.478 Consolidation of this ‘business as usual’ approach to its
supervisory activities is to continue in 2010–11, but with a change of emphasis.
A key focus for AUSTRAC over 2009–10 was to increase coverage across the
regulated sector by matching different supervisory tools and techniques to different
industry sectors. In 2010–11 the focus on improved coverage continues with
greater emphasis on targeting our supervisory activities towards those entities
where improvements in regulatory compliance are likely to yield the highest
impact on achieving our key goals.479

AUSTRAC has a number of priorities and issues to be targeted through its supervision
strategy. These include: 480
1

Supervising non-reporting, under reporting and the quality of reports,

2

Presenting education, guidance and training to small and less-resourced reporting
entities, and

3

Evaluating AML programs and compliance with Know Your Customer
obligations for reporting entities.

5.2.2 Intelligence Strategy
In its Intelligence Strategy for 2010–12, AUSTRAC has tried to illustrate the
multifaceted and energetic way in which it functions. It mentions a number of key
strategic factors that could influence its intelligence operations, including the priorities
of its main partner agencies, global and national AML/CTF frameworks, and
enhancements to information technology systems. 481

478

For the relevant executive summary’, see ibid 1.
Ibid.
480
For AUSTRAC’s ‘Priorities for 2010–2011’ in regard to its Supervision Strategy, see AUSTRAC,
AUSTRAC Supervision Strategy 2010–11, above n 469,4.
481
For the relevant executive summary, see AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Intelligence Strategy2010–12, 1
<http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/intelligence.pdf> at 12 March 2011.
479
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The intelligence strategy takes into consideration the Australian Government’s 2008
National Security Statement which encourages the development of information sharing
and cooperation between all agencies that are working within the Australian
jurisdiction. It has played a vital role in shaping the intelligence strategy’s objectives,
including aligning them with ‘whole of government priorities’, such as combatting
organised crime and terrorism, maintaining national security, securing border
management, and enforcing international sanctions.482
The AUSTRAC intelligence strategy aims to support the priorities of AUSTRAC’s
main partner agencies, such as the Australian Crime Commission (ACC), the Australian
Taxation Office (ATO), the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service
(ACBPS) and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). 483
In order to achieve all the above, AUSTRAC has established priorities when applying
its intelligence strategy, including:
1

Further developing the process of information sharing between AUSTRAC and
partner agencies,

2

Enhancing analysis and monitoring systems,

3

Updating AUSTRAC’s research tools and strengthening its strategic research and
macro-analysis,

4

Enhancing AUSTRAC’s organisational capacity for carrying out its AML
activities, and

482
483

Ibid.
For a list of partner agencies, see ibid 2.
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5

Sharing AUSTRAC’s experience in combating ML activities with the
international community of AML agencies and regulators.484

5.2.3 Enforcement Strategy
AUSTRAC issued its Enforcement Strategy for 2010–11 to communicate with
stakeholders regarding its role as the FIU and the AML/CTF regulator and record
enforcement decisions. It uses an evidence-based decision making approach to decide
appropriate cases for use of enforcement powers, and measures its enforcement
effectiveness.485 Enforcement activities are ‘designed to achieve remedial compliance at
both an individual reporting entity … and industry level, through selective, targeted
action’ as well as act as a ‘deterrent to non-compliance’, and thus ensure a ‘level
playing field’ for all industry participants by ensuring compliance. 486 As shown in its
Supervision Strategy pyramid, AUSTRAC will use its enforcement as a last option if a
reporting entity remains non-compliant.
In its 2010–11 Enforcement Strategy, AUSTRAC again emphasised the benefits offered
by judicious enforcement.
Decisive, measured and proportionate enforcement action benefits both regulated
industry participants and the wider community by contributing to the integrity of,
and promoting public confidence in, a competitive, sound and fair financial system
and to the administration of justice. 487

484

For further detail, see ibid 2, 8–11.
For the relevant executive summary, see AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Enforcement Strategy 2010–11, 1.
See also at 2 <http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/enforcement.pdf> at 13 March 2011.
486
Ibid.
487
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AUSTRAC’s enforcement team’s strategies priorities are expressed as managing ‘a
selection of entities: through to compliance using persuasive means and AUSTRAC’s
formal enforcement powers’,488 involving:
1

Using persuasion and education with a select group of non-compliant entities
before any formal enforcement action;

2

Working with supervisory teams to select ‘suitable candidates’ for enforcement
action; and

3

Working closely with the supervisory team to identify non-compliant designated
remittance services that would be likely to be subject to deregistration should their
non-compliance continue.489

Necessarily limited funding for operations means that AUSTRAC will attempt to target
appropriate entities, and select and utilise its enforcement actions in a manner it believes
will achieve maximum impact.490 AUSTRAC says it selects its enforcement powers on
the basis of a number of factors:491
1

Whether a reporting entity breach of the AML Act and system is of a nature (in
terms of its extent and impact) that necessitates enforcement action;

2

Whether the reporting entity remains unwilling to comply with the Act and
AML/CTF Rules (as shown by a poor compliance history, for example);

3

Whether the breach has, or has a potentially high risk of having, a detrimental
impact on the overall integrity of the Australian financial system (for example,

488

Ibid 2.
Ibid.
490
Ibid 4.
491
See ‘How Matters are Referred to Enforcement’: ibid.
489
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when an entity’s non-compliance renders it highly vulnerable to ML and TF
activity); and
4

Whether the exercise of the enforcement power is likely to have a deterrent effect
on other entities in the same sector – that is, whether enforcement will affect not
only the culture of non-compliant entity but also that of a whole industry group.

AUSTRAC’s enforcement strategy has selected targets, but what of AUSTRAC’s
overall targets that have been identified through its Supervisory, Intelligence, and
Enforcement Strategies?
5.2.4 AUSTRAC’s Strategies Overall Targets
Utilising these strategies, AUSTRAC has indicated a number of targets to be achieved
in 2010–11 and beyond. These include:
1

Improving AUSTRAC’s system to regulate the various reporting entities, and
improving the guidance that it provides to these entities by making it clear and
sufficiently comprehensive.

2

Strengthening the AML framework and regulation by consolidating AUSTRAC’s
compliance and enforcement powers and its measured use of its enforcement
mechanism.

3

Enhancing information sharing between AUSTRAC and partner agencies to
achieve best practice in the area of supervision and intelligence.

4

Providing advice to the Attorney-General’s Department on improving the AML
framework.
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5

Applying harsher measures to regulate alternative remittance dealers within the
Australian jurisdiction.

6

Implementing new intelligence tools and systems to cover the new methods that
are being adopted by those engaged in tax evasion or other criminal activities, so
as to enhance the detection and analysis skills of AUSTRAC.

7

Providing the required assistance to a number of international FIUs (in Asia,
Africa and the Pacific) and sharing information with other FIUs with the aim of
developing Australia’s AML framework to meet international standards.

8

Continuing to build the AUSTRAC enforcement team’s partnerships with the
reporting entities community and partner regulatory agencies.

9

Protecting the integrity of the Australian economy and the financial sector by
preventing dangerous activities by organised crime, such as TF and ML.

10

Focusing its efforts on securing the benefits of the AML improvements.

It is worth noting that none of the ten targets, however, actually states that AUSTRAC
will take enforcement action as required. Indeed, AUSTRAC needs to evaluate its
achievements in relation to the above targets utilising the current policies and activities,
draw its conclusions about the level of AML system compliance with the AML
obligations, and respond accordingly.
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5.2.5 AUSTRAC’s Strategies for Measuring Agency Effectiveness
In all the three strategies, AUSTRAC states it wishes to measure the effectiveness of its
operations. 492
Overall indicators that AUSTRAC is relying on to measure its effectiveness through
these three strategies are:
1

AUSTRAC’s contribution to revenues raised.

2

The intensity of the compliance behaviour, that is, the quality and volume of that
compliant behaviour (reflecting the regulated entity’s attitude).

3

Number of intelligence products disseminated annually and partner agencies
feedback on their quality, relevance and usefulness.

4

Value of public money saved and proceeds seized.

5

The number of fruitful enforcement outcomes from successful cooperation
between the AUSTRAC enforcement team and its frontline Supervisory team.

Again, it is obvious that AUSTRAC is assuming compliance and does not want to
confront the problem of non compliance which requires action on its part.
AUSTRAC has, however, indicated that strategy outcomes will be available in its
annual reports.493 Hence, AUSTRAC’s annual reports, particularly in relation to strategy
outcomes and any major weaknesses revealed will be considered in this thesis.

492
493

Ibid 2: AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Intelligence Strategy2010–12, above n466, 11.
See ‘Measuring Effectiveness’: AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Enforcement Strategy 2010–11, above n 485,

2.
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5. 3 AUSTRAC’s Annual Reports, Reporting Obligations and Operational
Effectiveness
Section 226 of the AML Act 2006 requires the AUSTRAC CEO to prepare an annual
report as soon as practicable after 30 June each year. 494 The annual report generally
contains information on the statistics of the financial transaction reporting, domestic and
international trends, future priorities, and performance summaries on a financial year
basis.495
The AML Act 2006 obliges reporting entities to report suspicious activities. Every
reporting entity which has a ‘reasonable ground’ for suspicion about any matter that
may be related to investigative or prosecutory processes is required to submit a report to
AUSTRAC.
These ‘suspicious activity reports’ (SARs) may take the form of a ‘suspicious matter
report’ (SMR) or a ‘suspect transaction report’ (SUSTR) and are an important source of
intelligence. Both often provide data that may not be obtained in other reports to
AUSTRAC, such as threshold transaction reports (TTRs) and international funds
transfer instructions (IFTIs). Thus the reports are very important. Both can greatly assist
trace the ‘footprints’ (or trail) of unlawful monetary transactions, and so help combat
ML activities.
Given that these reports are an important measure of effectiveness, a number of relevant
indicators will be examined — namely volume received and quality as reflected in
number of reports disseminated to partner agencies — as reflected in the 2009/10
Annual Report.

494
495

See the Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing Act 2006 (Cth) s 226, above n 78.
AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Annual Reports’, above n 470.

218

5.3.1 Number of SARs Indicator
Since the introduction of the AML Act in 2006, the number of SARs lodged by reporting
entities has increased. According to AUSTRAC, it received 17,373 SUSTRs and 30,013
SMRs in 2009–10, combined total of 47,386 SARs representing an increase of 46 per
cent over 2008–09.’496

Year

SUSTRs

SMRs

SARs
(SUSTRs plus
SMRs)

2009–10

17,373

30,013

47,386

Percentage
change in
SARs over
previous year
(2008–09)
+46%

Table 4: Number of SARs 2009–10
Each report made under the AML Act must include a description of the suspected
offence (‘offence type’) as well as a statement of the grounds which led to the formation
of the suspicion (‘reasons for suspicion’) which generated the issuing of the report. 497
The number of the SMRs significantly increased in 2009–10, with ‘large increases’
recorded across many categories. 498 Categories of reasons for suspicion include (in
decreasing order of frequency of citing for suspicion) ‘avoiding reporting obligations’,
‘unusual account activity’, ‘unusually large cash transaction’, ‘suspicious behavior’, and
transaction ‘inconsistent with the customer’s profile’.499 Reports were also lodged
because of suspicion arising from ‘country of interest’, ‘industry/occupation of interest’,
‘advanced fee frauds/scams’, ‘superannuation-related issues’ and the ‘refusal by

496

AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Annual Report 2009–10, above n 189, 52.
Ibid 58-9. This was particularly the case in regard to: money laundering; offences against
Commonwealth, State or Territory law; and person/agent not being whom they claim to be.
498
Ibid 58–9.
499
Ibid.
497
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customer to show identification/complete transaction reports’. 500 AUSTRAC analysis
revealed ‘significant increases’ in reports in these categories of suspect activity type in
2009–10.501
Increasing volumes place additional load on the regulator. AUSTRAC supervises
submissions, examines them, and encourages high quality, accuracy as well as
timeliness of the data provided. The sheer volumes and diverse entity sources entities
and activities must impede follow-up -and make effectiveness measurement difficult.
Effectiveness measurement is not only about the number of reports forwarded to partner
agencies or about the number received; it is also about their quality, accuracy, and
timeliness, a point clearly acknowledged by the body itself:
AUSTRAC continued to actively monitor the quality and integrity of financial
transaction reports it received from industry using a range of tools. Working with
its regulated entities, it addressed more than 5000 quality and data integrity-related
reporting issues in 2009–2010.502

However, a number of reporting entity interviewees argued that although AUSTRAC
assists in relation to different issues, including provision of feedback about report
quality by answering phone calls and e-mails, it often does not give sufficient help as it
fails to answer the questions posed. In other words, its assistance is very limited. As one
interviewee states:
I was basically seeking some form of confirmation that is it worth my [firm’s] …
time and effort to put in an application seeking relief for a particular requirement.
… I got 4 hyperlinks back, To add insult to injury it was referring to material that I
had …[put] in my email to demonstrate what I was trying to get at …

500

Australian Taxation Office (ATO), Targeting Tax Crime: A Whole-of- Government Approach (2011)
<http://www.ato.gov.au/print.asp?doc=/content/00271327.htm> at 14 March 2011.
501
AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Annual Report 2009–10, above n 189, 56–7.
502
Ibid 25.
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Do they assist? The answer is yes, because they pick up the phone and they
respond to emails. Does it help? ... The answer is no. 503

Another compliance manager argued that AUSTRAC makes limited efforts to assure
the integrity of the reporting system as well as the quality of the reports. The
compliance manager complained that the guides issued had a minimum of useful
information:
ASIC is a master at improving practice — they issue guides; they issue them about
improving industry; about how they want to see things; [but] … they are not bound
by it, which is really poor.504

The compliance manager compares AUSTRAC unfavourably with ASIC, which he
describes as
Probably the best regulator I have ever seen. They have a very streamlined method
for applying for relief, it is done within a certain timeframe, [and] you have got a
pretty clear idea about how soon they will respond, [and] that is just for class form
of relief from the legislation, and everyone has visibility for that relief and we can
all see what everyone else has got.505

Their written guidance materials — and the processes adopted for their construction —
are also considered eminently superior.
…when they [ASIC] issue guides, so they have got one for increasing capital for
responsible entities, they issue that out to the industry, they … make people run
them through what they are proposing so they are getting the best feedback
possible to make that the best policy possible, and when they have got all of it, they
will finalise it internally and then issue it. 506

The interviewee was highly critical of AUSTRAC, however:
A lot of their regulatory practices are poor ... Basically this is a guide but you
cannot rely on it ... you are … looking at it, going ‘Well; that is wrong’ ... [They]
have not had any feedback from anybody.
503

Interview with Compliance Manager D, a financial institution (telephone) (Melbourne, 9 September
2010).
504
Interview with a Compliance Manager A, a financial institution (Sydney, 21 October 2010).
505
Ibid.
506
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Again, ASIC’s processes were more positively viewed:
Some of the small ones [might be] might update[d] without feedback but they
probably had feedback on it in different ways but they have got to know the
content before they do that, and that is a very good regulatory approach because it
actually engages everyone in the process, and it gives a regulator a much wider
view around these topics because there are a lot of things they don’t know, and it is
their mechanism to learn as well not just to regulate, it is more than a one way
street in this regard.507

Thus the increase in the number of SARs alone is not a solid indicator as to
AUSTRAC’s effectiveness in the AML field or to possible avenues of increased
efficiency. Report quality is the key to securing the best reporting outcomes.
AUSTRAC’s Annual Report 2009–10, spoke generally about report quality in terms of
the number of reports disseminated by AUSTRAC to partner agencies (see below) but
did not indicate what feedback they had given about the quality of the information
supplied. 508 As the annual report appears to provide no specific information in this
regard, it is difficult to make any finding; other than perhaps this ‘one way’ journey of
reports reflects on the relationship between AUSTRAC and partner agencies or a
possible lack of transparency on the part of the regulator if more is known. If the
statistics involved are too complex (see further below) to manage to produce meaningful
data, this should be admitted. These matters need addressing in the interest of report
quality.
5.3.2 Number of Reports Disseminated to Partner Agencies Indicator
The number of reports submitted is not directly related to the number of reports
disseminated to partner agencies for investigation. A number of factors may be
involved.

507
508
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AUSTRAC disseminated a total of 58,242 SUSTRs/SMRs to partner agencies in 2009–
10, including both proactive disseminations and responses to requests from partner
agencies. This represented a 34 per cent increase on the previous year’s figures.
Complexities abound. First, the number of disseminations exceeds the number of
SUSTRs/SMRs received, as a single SAR may generate reports to multiple agencies.
Disseminations may also include reports received in previous years that relate to current
partner agency investigations.509
Alternatively, the quantity may be disproportionately low if there are many low quality
or low impact reports that fail to prompt further investigation. Preliminary
investigations of high volumes of low level reports may occupy a disproportionate
amount of AUSTRAC team members’ time and ‘crowd out’ or delay the investigation
of more important matters. Or these factors may simply cancel each other out.
However, returning to the figures that have been published in AUSTRAC’s annual
reports since its Annual Report 2005–06 up until its Annual Report 2009–10, the figures
show that the partner agencies that have benefited most from the SUSTRS
dissemination process are the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), the Australian Federal
Police (AFP) and the Australian Customs and Border Protection Service (ACBPS). 510 A
number of other partner agencies receive small quantities. Table 5 (below) shows the
number of the SUSTRs that have been disseminated to the first three partner
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Australian Customs and Broader Protection Service (ACBPS), About Custom and Border Protection
<http://www.customs.gov.au/site/page4222.asp> at 15 March 2011.Formerly the Australian Customs
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agencies. 511Table 6 (further below) shows the number of SUSTRs and SMRs
disseminated to the first four partner agencies.

Partner
Agency

2005–06

2006–07

2007–08

Total of
24,276
SUSTRs

Total of
24,440
SUSTRs

Total of
29,089
SUSTRs512

Rank as a beneficial
partner agency of
the dissemination
process

ATO

24,468

23,740

27,730

1

AFP

2,963

2,279

3,072

2

973

891

1,468

3

ACBPS

Table 5: AUSTRAC dissemination of SUSTRs to ATO, AFP, ACBPS

Partner Agency

2008–09

2009–10

Total of

Total of

43,564
SUSTRs/SMRs

58,242
SUSTRs/SMRs

Rank as a beneficial
partner agency of
the dissemination
process

ATO

32,850

46,962

1

AFP

3,096

2,422

2

ACBPS

1,403

1,724

3

Table 6: AUSTRAC dissemination of SUSTRs/SMRs to ATO, AFP, ACBPS
It is clear from the above tables that the greater part of reported data is disseminated to
the ATO, then the AFP and then the ACBPS. Thus, the ATO is the partner agency that
has most benefited from the process of the dissemination.

511

Note: the figures show disseminations of SUSTRs to partner agencies and include SUSTRs received in
the previous year of each annual report but disseminated in the annual report concerned. Reports may be
disseminated to more than one agency.
512
As the AML system prior to December (2008) required the submission of SUSTRs, the statistics
record only this type of reports and does not include SMRs until changes came into effect after December
(2008), when the statistics started to take SMRs as well as SUSTRs into consideration, as it is obvious in
Table 5.
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In fact, the main modern reason for AUSTRAC to exist is that the information about the
transactions can be looked up by ATO.
The relationship between AUSRAC and other partner agencies including ATO has
grown since AUSTRAC’s inception in 1988. Over time, AUSTRAC has established
with its partner agencies a double level of interaction. For this purpose, AUSTRAC has
located a number of its staff as designated staff at other partner agencies offices
including the ATO, and the other partner agencies did the same by locating a number of
their staff at AUSTRAC as designated staff as well. It is a fruitful way of interaction
between these agencies as this system helps the information to flow within a legal
limitation on what agencies can do with this information.
Certainly these days the major user of AUSTRAC general information tends to be the
ATO. Thus, AUSTRAC notes in its Annual Report of 2009–10, explaining that:
Under the AML/CTF Act, the Tax Office is entitled to access AUSTRAC
information for any purpose relating to the facilitation of the administration or
enforcement of a taxation law, and AUSTRAC automatically disseminates to the
Tax Office most SUSTRs/SMRs received by AUSTRAC in 2009–2010.513

Government sees the ATO use of AUSTRAC information as important. One example of
this information flow is through the Wickenby project.514 The importance of
AUSTRAC as source of information for tax evasion investigations is shown by the
emphasis placed on Project Wickenby and the specific funding provided for this Project.
The Government expects it will receive increased tax collections as a result of this
513

AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Annual Report 2009–10, above n 189, 52.
Project Wickenby is an ongoing joint taskforce involving the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), the
Australian Federal Police (AFP), the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC), the
Australian Crime Commission (ACC), the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP), the
Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). It has a purpose to protect the integrity
of Australian financial and regulatory systems by preventing people from promoting or participating in
any of tax evasion activities, crime and avoidance: Australian Taxation Office (ATO), Project Wickenby
above n 419.
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cooperation but the effectiveness of AUSTRAC data depends on its accuracy and
timeliness. In fact, if AUSTRAC can improve the quality of information coming to it,
the effectiveness of AUSTRAC will be improved.
Thus, it is essential for AUSTRAC to improve the quality of the material it passes to
other agencies, and if the ATO is the major user, then the ATO will achieve more
benefit if AUSTRAC regulates better.
However, since 2006 to the time of writing of this thesis, most data and information
received in SUSTRs and SMRs that were submitted by reporting entities because of a
suspicion of AML activities appeared to be of limited benefit, given the number that
actually may result in a prosecution. This is a figure that is difficult to relate to annual
data report submission as a number of SARs may relate to a single party, just as a single
SAR may be later referred to several agencies.
The vast majority of the disseminated reports go to the ATO for investigation in relation
to tax evasion rather than for prosecution for ML offences in and of themselves. This
renders AUSTRAC essentially an intelligence unit working for the ATO for tax evasion
detection purposes rather than being the FIU and the regulator for AML purposes. It
should be recalled, however, that ML as a process includes ‘laundering’ funds only
available due to tax evasion (including in relation to otherwise legitimate earnings),
which ‘white collar’ crime is considered along with drug-trafficking and so forth as
‘serious crime to be reported and prevented’, under the EU Second Directive, 515 the US
Bank Secrecy Act 516 and Australia’s FTR Act 517 and AML Act.518
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From the above figures it can also be seen that the AFP is dealing with disseminated
information for the purpose of combating organised crime, including drug trafficking,
rather than for AML purposes, perhaps reflecting AFP priorities.
Therefore, correctly evaluating AUSTRAC’s effectiveness in terms of fulfilling its
obligations as an FIU and the AML regulator is not simply about the increase in the
number of the disseminated reports from AUSTRAC to partner agencies. It is also about
how useful are these reports for combating ML offences.
5.3.3 Number of SMR Submissions by Reporting Entities Indicator
Anyone looking at AUSTRAC’s annual reports, and particularly those for 2008–09 and
2009–10, will find AUSTRAC claims that the increase of the SUSTRs and SMRs from
different reporting entities sectors to AUSTRAC is a sign of the effectiveness of
AUSTRAC’s operations and the whole AML system.
In its 2008–09 Annual Report, AUSTRAC indicated that the number of SMRs had
increased noticeably for a variety of reporting entities sectors. Superannuation funds,
managed investment scheme trustees, and gold bullion dealers were among those
sectors whose SMRs more than doubled, while those for the pubs and clubs sector
increased by more than 500 per cent.519 In the same period, SMR volumes related to the
alternative remittance dealer sector increased by 56 per cent.520 This indicates the reason
for AUSTRAC targeting alternative remittance dealers and suggested the threat of
applying harsher measures to regulate them.
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AML Magazine, ‘Positive Changes in the Reporting of Suspicious Activity to AUSTRAC’ Anti Money
Laundering Magazine (December 2010) 31.
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However, the banking sector (which has ceased reporting under the FTR Act and now
reports under the AML Act) has reported a lower increase in SMRs, with a rate of only
10 per cent across the sector during 2008–09.521 However, while the lower rate of
growth may be seen as a sign of regulatory success as there are fewer suspicious
transactions to report in the sector, it can also be seen as evidence of a possible failure to
report or of a shift in ML activity to other sectors or better ML strategies within the
sector. These remain matters of conjecture. However, in this sector even a small
percentage increase represents a large number of reports to be evaluated.
It is argued that the targeting of alternative remittance dealers reveals that AUSTRAC’s
strategies represent an effort to concentrate on the regulation of small business,
including alternative remittance dealers, while making a minimum level of effort in
terms of ongoing supervision of big reporting entities, including the larger banks and
other big financial institutions in Australia.
During 2009–10, AUSTRAC received more than 21 million transaction reports, 2
million more than in 2008–09. 522 This represented a nine per cent increase, including
almost 50 per cent rise in SMRs. The growth in SMR volume recorded seems high
when compared to that recorded in annual reports from 2005–06 until 2007–08, but that
is only due to the continuing rise in IFTIs, 523 and the inclusion of the SMRs with the
previously listed SUSTRs only after 2007–08.524
Thus, the growth in SMRs from reporting entities (see Figure 11 below) does not
indicate any improvement to the nature of the reporting obligations or the extent of
521
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reporting entity compliance or demonstrate the actual effectiveness of the combined
work undertaken by the industry and AUSTRAC.

Figure 11: AUSTRAC SUSTRs/SMRs Reporting Volumes 2005–06 to 2009–10525
AUSTRAC’s strategy goals include improving the reporting system. To improve the
system of reporting obligations, it needs effective tools. A better measure of
AUSTRAC’s effectiveness may be the volume of useful reports and information, the
intensity of the compliance behaviour and the level of the quality and volume of that
compliant behaviour within the regulated entities. This would also reflect a cooperative
attitude between regulator and regulated entities required if AUSTRAC wishes to
achieve its goal. More and better communications with the reporting entities to increase
its understanding of the market that it is dealing with as FIU and regulator would assist.
As one of the reporting entity interviewees said:
I think AUSTRAC has a problem in the way … it deals with the reporting entities
community. It is because they [the regulators] come from a different background:
they are suspicious of everybody, so suddenly they are dealing with organisations
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… it [has] changed over time but certainly a level of suspicion around the
organisations they are dealing with ….526

Suspiciousness is not the only flaw, there are reports of a lack of cooperation from
AUSTRAC:
I cannot see that they help us so we can do better, so we can detect stuff that helps
them. Most organisations are spending the money to implement these programs;
they want to implement [them] … as efficiently as possible … there is a lot of
frustrations in dealing with AUSTRAC …things that just need to be dealt with, [it]
would not.527

Overall, it seems clear that AUSTRAC is paying more attention in its annual reports to
the quantity of the reports it receives and disseminates and very limited attention to their
quality. The quality issue is crucial to the success of the AML system. And for quality,
accurate knowledge on the part of those reporting is required, which is facilitated by a
positive relationship.
Yet the difficulty highlighted by the interviewees above, namely unresponsive
personnel and incomprehensible or inadequate materials, are echoed in a survey that
AUSTRAC itself conducted.
5. 4 AML/CTF Compliance Officers in Australia Survey and the Effectiveness of
AUSTRAC
In late 2009 AUSTRAC published the AML/CTF Compliance Officers in Australia
Survey. This directly reflected on the actual scenario of the AML system and
AUSTRAC’s functions in this domain, as well as in regard to the level of AUSTRAC
effectiveness in terms of supervising the reporting entity obligations.
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One hundred and fifty528 compliance officers529 completed this survey, which presented
a number of issues in the field of AML that are important for compliance officers and
their reporting entities. 530
5.4.1 AUSTRAC Survey: Major Positive Findings
The AUSTRAC survey of AML/CTF compliance officers contained a number of
positive findings.
1

The reporting entities systems are successful; there is no systemic failure to
comply with the obligation to designate an AML/CTF compliance officer ‘at the
management level’.

2

A large number of compliance officers (98 per cent) were in senior level positions
and ready to identify major deficiencies in their AML obligations and to effect
change where required.

3

95 per cent had three or more years in compliance or risk management (and more
than 33 per cent had over a decade of such experience) 531

4

86 per cent had tertiary educational qualifications, including bachelor degrees,
graduate certificates and diplomas. 532

528

From an email to 420 reporting entities (in regard to whom 64 ‘undeliverable’ email reports were
received). Of those successfully contacted 356, 150 supplied respondents: this represents a response rate
of just over 42%: AUSTRAC, AML/CTF Compliance Officers in Australia, above n 245, 8.
529
The agreed definition of the ‘Compliance Officers’, according to AUSTRAC, is those employees who
are working in a senior level and responsible for review and oversight of the AML systems, establishing
ML risk assessment, approving processes for new products and designated services, providing a central
contact for AML matters and carrying the role of completion and submission of the compliance reports to
AUSTRAC.
530
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5

A number (over half) were undertaking assurance activities to evaluate their
entity’s compliance with the AML obligations.

6

A large number were found to report directly to the Board or to another executive
position or committee.533

Overall the officers that responded to this survey represented a highly-experienced,
well-educated, group of professionals well placed ready to effect change where required
and fulfill their reporting obligations under the AML Act and AML/CTF Rules. The
Survey, however, made a number of less positive observations.
5.4.2 AUSTRAC Survey: Major Negative Findings
The Survey also revealed a number of issues that give rise to concern
1

A lack of reporting of AML issues to the Board, then (as a result) to AUSTRAC,
within some reporting entities. Some 72 per cent of compliance officers reported
one or more AML matters to the board but 28 per cent of respondents did not
report a single matter.534

2

Compliance officers were having difficulties following up on the updates on
AUSTRAC publications, the AML Act and the AML/CTF Rules.

3

67 of the 150 were spending 10 per cent or less of their actual work time on AML
issues: including one bank, 17 credit unions, 24 superannuation, 12 managed
investment schemes, 6 securities/derivatives dealer or trader, 2 casino and 4
finance/lending.

533
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4

40 of the 150 were spending between 25 per cent and 10 per cent of their actual
work time on AML issues: including 3 banks, 16 credit unions, 8 superannuation,
7 managed investment schemes, 1 securities/derivatives dealer or trader, 1 casino
and 3 finance/lending.

5

4 of the 150 had no idea about AUSTRAC’s Guidance Notes.

6

7 of the 150 had no idea about AUSTRA’s Regulatory Guide.

7

16 of the 150 had no idea about AUSTRAC’s Information Circulars.

8

19 of the 150 had no idea about AUSTRAC’s e-learning courses.

9

23 of the 150 had no idea about AUSTRAC’S Public Legal Interpretation series.

10

25 of the 150 did not know that AUSTRAC’s Typology Reports existed.

11

30 of the 150 did not know that AUSTRAC’s monthly newsletter existed.535

This cannot but be a source of concern for AUSTRAC, as it appears that the additional
educational materials and opportunities provided to assist compliance officers in
fulfilling their duties are either unknown to many of them or ignored by them.
5.4.3 In the Wake of the AUSTRAC Survey
AUSTRAC has tried through its survey to assist AML reporting entities and their
officers to realise the extent of their role and comply correctly with the AML system.
The questions used made compliance officers consider a number of important issues in
relation to their work, including time devoted to AML issues, reviewing and making
variations to AML programs, establishing and reviewing ML risk assessment
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methodologies involved in approval process for taking on high risk customers and new
products/designated services, conducting ML risk awareness training for staff and
employee due diligence, record keeping, KYC policies and procedures, transaction
monitoring systems and SMRs, TTRs, ITFIs and compliance reports.
Overall, it was a considerable achievement and enhanced the understanding of
compliance officers regarding AML-related issues. It also served to focus on the
system’s strengths and the weaknesses.
In order to be effective, reporting entities and their staff, including compliance
managers and officers, should seriously consider the findings.
One weakness in the approach, however, is that AUSTRAC itself was examining its
effectiveness, and on its own terms. A number of weaknesses in its functions and
reactions to non-compliance with reporting obligations and other AML matters are
observed:
1

In terms of the lack of reporting: AUSTRAC took too soft an approach in
encouraging the enhancement of reporting systems (and greater compliance) by
reporting entities, especially those who had not reported a single AML matter to
their Board (or equivalent designated senior executive) and then subsequently to
AUSTRAC (as part of the reporting process). It only indicated that:
AUSTRAC urges entities to review the criteria of reporting AML/CTF matters to
their board (or equivalent executive body) to ensure [that] appropriate oversight
arrangements are in place. 536

No action by AUSTRAC has been found to have been taken in this domain since
this survey was undertaken in late 2009537 until the time of writing this thesis, and
536
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thus no major change in the policy of AUSTRAC in regard to following up on this
outcome.
2

In terms of the limited time devoted to AML matters, AUSTRAC again took too
soft an approach, simply encouraging reporting entities and their compliance
officers to allocate the time required.
AUSTRAC urges entities to review the amount of time they spend on AML/CTF
matters, especially as entities implement policies and procedures for ongoing
customer due diligence and reporting under AML/CTF Act. 538

Given the above, what measurable change, if any, was effected in this regard?
One wonders whether AUSTRAC followed up on this issue.
3

AUSTRAC has indicated that most respondents are experienced, educated
professionals, aware of their AML obligations and ready to effect change where
required, and well placed to do so. Yet many of these same people have not heard
about one or more of AUSTRAC’s publications, despite these relating directly to
their work.
While the reporting entities and their compliance officers are responsible for
following up AUSTRAC updates, it does not acknowledge its own role in this
apparent discrepancy between educated, willing, well-placed officers and their
ignorance of AUSTRAC publications. Either their education ill-prepares them for
the role they are to play or they are less willing than their responses to the survey
would appear to indicate. Nevertheless, there is still a lack of training for them on
how to deal with their AML role effectively. While AUSTRAC must bear some
responsibility in educating the relevant personnel in the reporting entities and in
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following up on their level of compliance by utilising enforcement when required.
AUSTRAC needs to also be aware that part of the ongoing problem may stem not
just from the lack of available materials, a lack of awareness of available materials
but also the quality of those materials. During this period covered by the survey, it
initiated long-term plans for providing education to the reporting entities
community. This survey results show that the available educational opportunities
are underutilised. Furthermore, when material was accessed, a number of
reporting entities found it inadequate.
The above shortcomings reflect weaknesses in AUSTRAC’s processes of persuasion
and education, which also serve to weaken the AUSTRAC enforcement mechanism.
AUSTRAC and the reporting entities must share the responsibility for that. AUSTRAC
also needs to follow up on the outcomes of such surveys, especially the negative
outcomes.
A number of variables (over and above AUSTRAC’s selection of recipients), such as
the degree of self-selection of respondents in this survey, may have tilted the sample
composition towards the more diligent, highly educated respondent, influencing
responses accordingly. Such surveys, therefore, should be seen as very valuable but to
some extent limited.
The annual reports too can reveal some facts, but not all. It would be beneficial if
AUSTRAC would follow-up on what it has started to add more value to the issues that
have been raised in these surveys series.
If the reporting entities are always asking for feedback to make things easier and clearer
to them, then AUSTRAC as a regulator needs to understand the nature of business that
its regulated entities do and learn from its experience with them and certainly try not to
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give them any excuse for not being compliant. Ensuring the legislation and the
regulations are unquestioned (that is, not subject to dispute about its scope or nature and
so forth) is one of the attributes and recommendations discussed earlier (Chapter 4). If
AUSTRAC does not follow up on its survey series’ findings then it fails to make the
regulation unquestioned. Clear comprehensive feedback is important not only for the
reporting entities but also for AUSTRAC itself and its staff so that they are able to learn
from their experience.
5. 5 Typology and Case Studies Reports and the Effectiveness of AUSTRAC
Since 2007, AUSTRAC has provided annual typologies and case study reports to
support reporting entities, to enable them to have a clear idea of their obligations under
the AML Act and to comply appropriately. Those reports include several case studies
that reveal a range of techniques that criminals frequently use to disguise reality and the
source of the illegal funds and their movement inside and outside Australia. 539
The AUSTRAC Typologies and Case Studies Report issued in June 2010 followed the
regulator’s efforts in the four previous reports and provided needed feedback to
reporting entities for AML purposes. The following section will discuss the extent to
which these reports helped and whether this reflects upon AUSTRAC’s effectiveness.
5.5.1 What AUSTRAC Said about its Typologies and Case Studies Reports
A close examination of AUSTRAC’s Typologies and Case Studies Reports from 2007
to 2010 reveals a number of statistics and indicators helpful in assessing the value of
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these reports. The number of case studies totals 174 and, according to AUSTRAC, they
broadly reflect ML activities in Australia. 540
AUSTRAC has relied on a number of criteria to choose the cases for discussion and
analysis in these reports, including: 541
1

Where the use of data from financial transaction reports contributed to a
successful investigation by authorities.

2

Where a SUSTR or SMR triggered a law enforcement investigation.

3

Where AUSTRAC and partner agencies pooled resources to advance an
investigation.

4

Where analysis of information from financial transaction reports identified ML or
TF activities.

Thus, AUSTRAC has selected for cases built on useful reports from reporting entities,
and used them to prevent ML crimes.
AUSTRAC has categorised these case studies according to three main key trends (note
that here ‘trend’ refers to a distribution or frequency of incidence not the difference in
distribution or incidence over time). The three ‘trends’ are offence types, use of
designated services for ML and TF affected industries. See Tables 7, 8 and 9, below: 542
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Offence type

Percentage of Cases in Typologies
Reports

Fraud and ML

52%

Drug importation

13%

Drug trafficking

8%

Structuring financial transactions

8%

Tax evasion

6%

Table 7: Offence Types Recorded in AUSTRAC Case Studies 2007–10543

Designated Service

Percentage of Cases in Typologies
Reports

Account and deposit-taking services

39%

Remittance services

14%

Electronic funds transfers

12%

Table 8: Use of Designated Services for Money Laundering as Recorded in
AUSTRAC Case Studies 2007–10544

Industry

Percentage of Cases in Typologies
Reports

Banking industry

45%

Remittance services

18%

Gambling services

9%

Professional services

13%

Table 9: Industries Involved: AUSTRAC Case Studies 2007–10545
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5.5.2 AUSTRAC’s Typologies and Case Studies Reports; Positive Outcomes
The coverage of different new methods of ML in AUSTRAC’s reports was one of their
important achievements, particularly in its Typologies and Case Studies Report for
2010, where AUSTRAC pointed to a number of current and emerging criminal threats
that are becoming more important. For example:
1

Bulk cash smuggling: One of the most popular and dangerous methods that
money launderers could use when laundering illicit funds. Australian law
enforcement agencies indicated that a number of criminals were smuggling sums
of cash out of Australia to avoid the cross-border reporting obligation. 546 Are
porting entity accountant interviewed pointed out that lawyers usually deal with
cash, which will put this category of reporting entities at a high level of risk,
because of their vulnerability to conducting deals with smuggled funds. The
interviewee, as a former officer of a state legal professional association, indicated
that:
….I came across a number of instances where cash was stolen … I became aware
that ...lawyers’ compliance with AML requirements was non-existent — maybe
something like 26 per year in 2005/2006 of lawyers reporting. 547

Due to a lack of available materials at the time, the interviewee then launched an
education campaign in publications on their website trying to increase solicitors’
awareness of their reporting requirements. However the interviewee remains
pessimistic:
I would suspect it is still the same because it does not seem there is much
improvement, and solicitors have a lot of cash. They do receive huge amounts of
cash and they deal with cash as well.548
546
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Thus, it is highly recommended that the second tranche of the AML Act be
implemented as soon as possible to oblige lawyers to report suspicious
transactions, but up to the time of writing of this thesis, the decision remains in
the policy makers’ hands.
2

Trade-based ML: This involves trade transactions designed to hide and move the
proceeds of crime with the aim of making the source of the funds appear
legitimate, through misrepresentation of price, quantity or quality of imports or
exports.549
AUSTRAC indicated this as one of the emerging criminal threats in a number of
typology reports, including the 2008 report (Case number 12 ‘Tax Evaded through
Exporting Goods’),550 and its 2010 report.
However, it remains an area with a certain level of ambiguity. For example, FATF
issued a paper in 2006 to discuss the trade-based ML (Trade Based Money
Laundering 2006). Some two years later, FATF issued its Best Practices Paper on
Trade-Based Money Laundering 2008 with the goal of trade-based ML being
considered a high risk area, although the Wolfsberg Group indicates that it ‘does
not …believe that … there is sufficient evidence to support an assessment of this
area as high risk for AML/Sanctions purposes’. 551
While there is no obligation in the FATF Recommendations for countries to deal
with trade-based ML (as FATF generally does not deal with specific type of ML
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offences but the generic issues), it is still commendable that AUSTRAC
highlighted it in its typologies as a threat that reporting entities should care about.
3

Mules and third parties: AUSTRAC has pointed to the ‘mules’ (people who,
unrelated to the initial criminal activity, are used to unwittingly transfer funds to
criminals overseas),552 and to the third parties who have no criminal record being
involved in ML activities. This can include family members of money launderers,
students or unemployed persons who are looking for work. Money launderers
could try to approach this category of people and use them to launder their illicit
funds. 553

5.5.3 What do the Typologies and Case Studies Reports Reveal of AUSTRAC
Effectiveness?
A number of outcomes affecting AUSTRAC’s strategies to achieve operational
effectiveness can be discussed from the Typologies and Case Studies, especially those
related to reporting obligations of the reporting entities and AUSTRAC’s role in
supervision, intelligence and enforcement actions.
1

AUSTRAC’s Typologies and Case Studies Reports for 2007–10 provided the
reporting entity community with information regarding the latest criminal threats
and methods, in order to strengthen the AML system, particularly these entities’
reporting obligations.
A number of questions remain, such as how can these reports achieve their goals
without trust between AUSTRAC and its reporting entities, and how can that trust
be achieved?
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A number of reporting entity interviewees indicated that reporting entities are
undertaking their reporting obligations because they want to stay ‘on the safe
side’; they report as much as they can. This reflects a lack of trust on both sides:
AUSTRAC does not trust reporting entities’ RBAs so encourages them to report
as much as they can, and reporting entities do not trust AUSTRAC in its
compliance role and fear its reaction when non-compliant regarding reporting
obligations, so they report ‘self-protectively’ without great concern for report
quality. This will persist as long as the feedback from AUSTRAC about these
reports (generally through annual reports, typologies reports and other
publications) does not provide clear feedback to those entities. According to one
interviewee:
We will always report the suspicious matter, even if it has been reported already. If
the activity continues, there will be always reporting obligations as per the
requirements. We are working to make sure we are reporting as much as we can to
AUSTRAC to be on the safe side.554

Another compliance officer indicated that feedback is actively sought:
We use the AUSTRAC online portal which is prescriptive and gives us the
information we must to comply with, including the mandatory fields that need to be
completed. We are also aware of the required information as outlined in the
AML/CTF Rules. We also encourage feedback from AUSTRAC on a regular basis
about the quality of our submissions to as to enhance the existing controls. 555

AUSTRAC regards feedback to the reporting entities in matters like SMRs
analyses as confidential and uses confidential bilateral discussions with the
reporting entity concerned.556 However, a number of reporting entities (as shown
previously), regard AUSTRAC’s annual reports and typologies reports as
554
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insufficient feedback and argue that AUSTRAC is not very informative in the
confidential discussions, as this agency lacks the solid experience and the capacity
to do so.
2

Because AUSTRAC has ostensibly relied on the factors listed earlier to choose
the cases for in depth analysis in its reports, these should present instances of the
most serious threats that are then shared with reporting entities. However, while
AUSTRAC seems to say that its typology reports are based on an assessment of
high risk cases, and that it is publishing these because it wants to alert the industry
to areas of greatest ML activity and concern, this is clearly not the case.
AUSTRAC simply publishes typologies on cases where it can be seen to be more
effective, that is, where it can appear to have taken effective action (such as in its
clamp down on remitters). This is not the correct — nor a particularly helpful —
approach to take. For example, tax evasion represents only 6 per cent of the cases
that have been analysed, while fraud and ML together account for the largest
percentage, representing a total of 52 per cent of the cases.(See Table 7 above:
from Typology Report 2009–10). Corporate and technology-based fraud is of
specific concern, frequently involving huge sums and numerous victims. 557
However, as shown previously (Tables 5 and 6 above), AUSTRAC has
disseminated a far larger number of SUSTRs/SMRs to the ATO in 2007–10 —
almost 107,542 reports for the period. 558 Thus, most data and information
provided in SUSTRs and SMRs submitted by reporting entities because of their
suspicions about ML activities are going to the ATO for tax evasion purposes
rather than ML.
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AUSTRAC says it has a strategic plan to achieve high quality reports and
strengthen the reporting system; however, indications are otherwise — the
weaknesses in this domain remain. In other words, it is a case of showing that this
agency is picking ‘easy targets’ to represent in its reports rather than the more
difficult ones that it should be focusing on. AUSTRAC would be better off really
focusing on all major risk areas. Typology reports would then benefit reporting
entities far more.
3

A breakdown of statistics for AUSTRAC’s case typologies revealed that account
and deposit-taking services and the banking industry comprise the largest
percentage of cases in the typologies reports for the period 2007–10. Account and
deposit-taking services account for the largest single service area in the ‘Use of
Designated Services for ML’ (39 per cent of cases analysed) (Table 8 above).In
terms of ‘Industries Involved’, the banking industry was the most frequently
represented in the typologies (45 per cent of cases) (Table 9 above), with,
remittance services the second highest recorded in both the Use of Designated
Services (14 per cent of cases) and in ‘Industries Involved’ (18 per cent of cases).
Again, the frequency of cases simply reflects AUSTRAC’s selection of cases.
Banks could, however, be expected to comprise the largest number, given the
structure of the industry and the way it operates in Australia.
ML is more likely to occur in the banking industry than in the remittance sector
(in terms of overall frequency, that is, in terms of percentage of reports to the
regulator) and this could be reflected in the allocation of typology reports. (But
again, given that the typology reports simply reflect cases selected by AUSTRAC
for analysis — ostensibly but not demonstrably — on the basis of risk posed, it is
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difficult to reflect upon with confidence). A higher ML level in banking may
reflect the relatively greater amount of funds going through the banking sector
which is far greater than the total for the remittance sector. The difference in terms
of risk within each sector may differ in terms of risk expressed as a percentage of
the volume of transactions. Again, if risk is evaluated in terms of percentage of
total funds involved rather than as a percentage of transactions, the figure would
again vary. The difference between the sectors in terms of risk posed may alter
substantially if the relative amounts of funds going through each system were
taken into consideration when estimating the sectors’ relative level of risk.
AUSTRAC should include this when strengthening its supervisory framework.
The typology statistics for Use of Designated Services reveal that the banking
sector is more frequently represented than the remittance sector by some 25
percentage points, and in Industry Trend by some 27 percentage points. Thus, if
the proportional representation in typology reports is to be taken at face value as
reflecting risk, the banking and deposit-taking services sector would be facing at
least the same level of risk as the remittance services sector, if not somewhat
higher. However, AUSTRAC has built into its strategies’ goals, the possibility of
applying harsher regulatory measures for non-compliant alternative remittance
dealers within the Australian jurisdiction, specifically referring to that sector
rather than to applying these measures effectively to both sectors.
The question is why has AUSTRAC put so much of its efforts towards regulating
the alternative remittance dealers and left the banking sector to a more ‘normal’
level of supervision and enforcement? The vast majority of businesses in
alternative remittance dealer category are small — such is the nature of
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establishing these businesses that they do not require a large number of people
and can be operated by a single individual to provide limited services; while the
majority of banking sector businesses are large due to high capital establishment
costs the greater number of employees required and the varied services provided.
The banking sector also represents higher risk (according to both the level of
representation in the typology reports and the relative volume of funds going
through the sector), and yet it appears that alternative remittance dealers are
attracting disproportionate attention. The reasons are explained below.
5.5.4 Alternative Remittance Dealers
The Australian Minister for Home Affairs announced new AML Rules (effective 16
April 2010) that granted the AUSTRAC Chief Executive Officer (CEO) the authority to
deregister remittance dealers (remitters) whose activities represent a significant ML risk
and thus require commensurate action. 559Aiming to strengthen the remittance system, he
also issued a discussion paper on 23 April 2010 entitled ‘Enhanced Regulation of
Alternative Remittance’, followed three months later by the release of specific proposals
for an improved AML registration system, and consultations on impacts of the
proposals. The goals were to give the Government a solid understanding as to how
reforms could affect remittance service businesses and help to guarantee an effective
result.560
These efforts to strengthen the AML activities in the remittance sector (including large
institutions with international reputations, such as MoneyGram, and small, simply
559

Minister for Home Affairs, ‘Laws Amended to Prevent Abuse of Money Transfer System’, Media
Release, 16 April 2010 <http://www.ministerhomeaffairs.gov.au/www/ministers/oconnor.nsf/Page/Media
Releases_2010_SecondQuarter_16April2010-LawsAmendedtoPreventAbuseofMoneyTransferSystem>.
560
Attorney General’s Department, Regulation Impact Statement- Enhanced AML/CTF Regulation of the
Alternative Remittance Sector, 11<http://ris.finance.gov.au/files/2011/03/04_Remittance_Dealers_
RIS.pdf> at 24 March 2011.

247

structured institutions, such as Thi Kim Hong Tran Company) stemmed from the
detection of abuse by criminals of this sector’s services, including for ML activities. 561
Criminals could use this system to send illegal funds inside or outside Australia, using
cash, cheques or other type of payments to another person.
Before 16 April 2010, the Australian AML Act 2006 obliged remitters to register their
businesses with AUSTRAC before providing services. (They also had to create an AML
Program and identify their customers and transfer actions). However, the Discussion
Paper revealed deficiencies that prompted the Rules’ amendment, among them that:
1

There were no conditions on remitter registration for either a person or a business.

2

AUSTRAC had no authority to reject an application for registration or to
deregister an existing remitter (the latter deficiency eliminated from 16 April
2010).

3

Only limited sanctions were available for remitter non-compliance.

4

Remitters were not obliged to update their details or identify businesses
associates.562

Amendments have since changed the Rules to include (since 16 April 2010): 563
1

The AUSTRAC CEO can cancel, reject, suspend, apply conditions on registration
and deregister any non-compliant remitters.
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2

Applicants are required to disclose beneficial owner of the business, and control
matters, and issues related to character, including history of regulatory noncompliance or criminal convictions.

3

AUSTRAC can publish a remitter registers and a list of deregistered remitters.

4

Reporting entities are obliged to submit an SMR to AUSTRAC when they suspect
they are dealing with unregistered remittance services businesses.

The new AML Rules greatly improve AUSTRAC’s ability to enforce compliance of the
AML non-compliant remitters. AUSTRAC’s role also is extended as the improved
Rules require new efforts to secure higher levels of compliance, including educating the
reporting entities community and getting closer to those entities in order to discuss and
clarify their new obligations. AUSTRAC began this in 2010 and should continue
through 2011.
AUSTRAC has tried through its Typologies and Case Studies Report 2010 and Annual
Report 2009–10 to highlight the importance of the new AML Rules in terms of
strengthening the supervision process for remitters. It is clear from these publications,
and especially the annual report, that AUSTRAC is concentrating its efforts on
regulating small businesses in general (more specifically small remitters) because of
higher risks that these could pose in relation to the level of the compliance. AUSTRAC
‘recognises that some smaller regulated entities have experienced difficulties complying
with their obligation to implement risk-based AML/CTF programs’. 564
AUSTRAC says that its new targeted approaches are working:
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We engaged with the major remittance service network providers in an effort to
identify the smaller remittance businesses which have proved difficult to contact in
the past. This resulted in a marked increase in the number of remittance businesses
who were registered under the AML/CTF Act. 565

While strengthening the regulatory process for smaller businesses is laudable, large
businesses in general and, more specifically, large remittance businesses (which could
engage in money transfer services with those small remitters) and other money services
businesses could also benefit from similar attention. In other words, AUSTRAC said
remitters were a problem because it was reacting to this sector of the market. That is,
AUSTRAC was saying it was addressing a real problem. It may have been a small
problem but as AUSTRAC could do something it did so, rather than take on major
players.
In its Annual Report 2009–10, AUSTRAC revealed that the Money Services Businesses
category includes more than 7000 reporting entities and included: 566
1

remittance services providers,

2

cash carriers, and

3

currency exchange dealers.

These entities varied in size, and according to AUSTRAC the larger entities tended to
be well-resourced and accustomed to regulation and risk management, while the smaller
entities were found to be less prepared to carry their AML obligations. 567
However, one wonders if it is sound policy to neglect to ensure regulatory attention and
supervision because larger bodies ‘tend’ towards greater compliance. If the response is
565
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guided by the AUSTRAC typologies reports (particularly that of 2010) then this
approach is the opposite of that suggested by the relationship observed between
compliance and size in those reports. AUSTRAC’s concentration on banking in its
typologies reports indicates that the banking sector is a more risky sector in terms of
non-compliance with the AML system than others (according to the relative amounts of
funds going through the banking sector given the structure of the industry and the way it
operates in Australia) (see Table 9 above).
One also wonders about the position of other types of money services businesses, such
as currency exchange dealers for example.
It is unreasonable for AUSTRAC to make major efforts in regards to small remitters
and give relatively low levels of attention to the other large and small businesses, where
the lack of attention will be disproportionate to the risk posed. For example, currency
exchange businesses could pose a risk similar to that of remittance service providers
when their services are abused by criminals. However, AUSTRAC has made a clear
distinction between the two when it discusses supervision, compliance and registration.
Other money service businesses appear to have been given a privileged status in
contrast to the supervision and enforcement of compliance of remitters:
AUSTRAC undertook a dedicated remitter registration campaign to increase the
number of remittance service providers registering with AUSTRAC. Remitters are
an important segment of this industry sector, and as at June 2010, 94 per cent of the
estimated remittance population had registered with AUSTRAC.568

Is it about the number of the registered businesses or about the level of the compliance
of those entities? And why did AUSTRAC not take other types of money services
businesses into consideration when strengthening the regulation of this sector?

568
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A personal experience with a Sydney currency exchange business may prove
informative:
A friend of the researcher wanted to exchange AUD10,000 into USD. In order to
observe how currency exchange businesses deal with a large amount of money where a
customer has insufficient ID, the researcher asked his permission to attempt the
transaction for him.
In March 2011 the researcher conducted an indirectly case study at one of the currency
exchange businesses in Sydney. The researcher first asked about the exchange rate for
exchanging AUD10,000 into USD, and for that the employee indicated the exchange
rate. The researcher accepted the exchange rate and handed the money to the currency
exchange employee. As he was obliged, the employee asked for an official ID from the
researcher. The researcher, as an overseas student, does not have an Australian ID.
Therefore, the employee asked for the researcher passport. After thinking the researcher
answered that he left his passport at home and the only ID he had was his overseas
driving licence issued 10 years ago, with a photo that didn’t resemble the researcher
because it had been taken about 15 years earlier, sometime before its use on the driving
licence. The employee hesitated: From a financial viewpoint the transaction offered a
healthy profit, but the AML Act and Rules obliges such businesses to obtain sufficient
customer identification. The employee called his employer by phone and asked if he
was supposed to do the deal given this suspicious identification — and the employer
after about 30 seconds conversation decided to let the employee do so subject to
photocopying the driving licence and asking usual questions about name and phone
number.
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Yet the driving licence could easily have been a fake. This business is probably not
alone in its lack of understanding of their AML obligations. AUSTRAC needs to
strengthen the system in regard to these businesses too.
In fact, the poor adherence to rules by the currency exchange business reflects poor
supervision and either poor knowledge of the rules and a lack of industry education or
deliberate preparedness to break the rules. This outcome did not come from nowhere, it
arose due to three factors:
1

AUSTRAC is struggling both with applying RBA to regulated entities and the
AML training issue.

2

AUSTRAC’s enforcement powers are not sufficiently mature and have
shortcomings affecting their influence on enforcing compliance.

3

AUSTRAC is facing a shortfall in effectively achieving its Guiding Principles,
which makes it appear to be subject to influence during the GFC.

These factors were revealed by comparing what AUSTRAC says with what it does;
those conclusions that have been reached by interviewing a number of compliance
officers from Australian reporting entities. The factors are the area discussed in the next
chapter.
5. 6 Conclusion
What AUSTRAC says in general is useful but there are shortfalls in terms of its
functioning. AUSTRAC has tried through its publications to illustrate its success on
different issues, and highlight its strategies as a considerable achievement that it will be
used to measure and describe its effectiveness. However, it has been clear that
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AUSTRAC has fallen short in the way it performs its obligations under the AML Act
and in terms of its own Rules. While AUSTRAC released strategies that would affect
positively its policies, its own publications such as annual reports, typologies and case
studies reports, and its surveys series have in many places reflected the contrast between
‘what AUSTRAC says’ and ‘what it does’. This, together with accounts of how
reporting entities see AUSTRAC, has served to reveal weaknesses in AUSTRAC’s
performance regarding non-compliance with reporting obligations and other obligations.
AUSTRAC is relying on a number of indicators to measure its effectiveness. However,
analysis has shown that it is not satisfactorily reaching these indicators and
strengthening its level of effectiveness
1

On the basis of measuring its effectiveness by looking at indicators related to the
intensity of the compliance behaviour and its quality and volume (first indicator),
AUSTRAC’s annual reports show that it is still receiving low value reports, and
that AUSTRAC itself is still having problems differentiating between high and
low quality reports, especially when it is observed to have disseminated large
numbers of reports in 2009–10 with limited benefit to partner agencies, including
the ATO, AFP and ACBPS.
The 2009 AUSTRAC compliance officers survey also revealed problems in the
compliance behaviour and the quality of the work of the reporting entities and
their staff, when it noted a significant lack of reporting of AML issues by some
reporting entity compliance officers to their boards and, as a result, to AUSTRAC.
More than one in four respondents did not report a single matter, while more than
4 in 10 spend 10 per cent or less of their actual work time on AML issues. Just
under 30 per cent spend more than 25 per cent of their work time on AML issues.
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The above indicates a disconnection between reporting entities and the AML
system, and not only calls into question AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism but
also AUSTRAC’s educative strategy for reporting entities community.
Compliance officers also report inadequate feedback on their reports, with a
number of them saying that they repeatedly asked for feedback on report quality
but received nothing. Again, this does not encourage cooperation and compliance,
crucial to the effectiveness of the AML system (and AUSTRAC’s operations).
2

On the basis of looking at the number of reports disseminated annually and
partner agencies’ feedback on their quality, relevance and usefulness (third
indicator), the findings showed that it is not the number of the disseminated
reports that could reflect the effectiveness of AUSTRAC’s operations, but rather
their usefulness to different partner agencies, and not only in terms of being useful
to combat tax evasion and drug trafficking but in achieving the ultimate goal of
AUSTRAC’s operations as the AML regulator, which is combating ML crimes.
(In addition, the large number of disseminated reports noted in the AUSTRAC
Annual Report 2009–10 may not reflect any substantial improvement in the
quality in these reports because of a number of statistical anomalies.)

3

The fourth and fifth indicators are looking at the value of the savings of public
money and of proceeds seized, and the number of fruitful enforcement outcomes
that have been found to have occurred after successful cooperation between the
AUSTRAC enforcement team and its frontline supervisory team. In relation to
those indicators, AUSTRAC will not be able to substantially increase public
monies saved and proceeds seized unless it has outcomes that reflect fruitful
cooperation between the Enforcement teams and Supervisory team, and especially
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between reporting entities and AUSTRAC. Thus far AUSTRAC is hampered by
an enforcement mechanism that is limited in a number of respects. Its use is
‘immature’ (that is, not all aspects are used when and as required) which obstructs
AUSTRAC maximising the savings of public money and seizure of proceeds.
In existence prior to the release of the Strategies, these problems persist, as was
confirmed by the reporting entity interviewees. To strengthen its performance,
AUSTRAC needs to surmount its inadequacies.
The analysis of AUSTRAC’s Strategies and whether they are able to evaluate
AUSTRAC’s effectiveness found that the answer to the question ‘Are the current
AUSTRAC strategies and policies targeting all reporting entities and doing so
sufficiently effectively’ (the first question at the conclusion of Chapter 4) is ‘No, they
are not’. AUSTRAC has yet to strengthen its performance in terms of its enforcement
mechanism in regard to reporting obligation non-compliance, and a number of issues
will continue to impede its strategies and limit its effectiveness unless AUSTRAC takes
quick positive action to find solutions.
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6 FACTORS AFFECTING AUSTRAC’S ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM
FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH REPORTING OBLIGATIONS
6. 1 Introduction
The new Act passed in 2006 changed the basis on which the law tests compliance. The
AML Act has moved from an Act that imposed compliance obligations on entities
because of the general nature of their businesses to one which imposes obligations on
anyone who provides defined services. In addition, the AML compliance system
depends on an RBA. This means compliance is not a ‘black and white’ issue, and to
have a high-quality AML system requires the active regulator and the FIU to measure
compliance in such a regulatory environment.
The AML Act enlarged the community of reporting entities to all those entities providing
the services defined, who were then required to submit a number of particular types of
reports to AUSTRAC, including SMRs, SUSTRs, TTRs, IFTIs, reports related to
physical currency and those related to bearer negotiable instruments, as well as annual
compliance reports. The interview data collection methodology adopted by this thesis
was trying to obtain responses from different types of businesses under the first tranche
of the Act, which has already been implemented, and which covers reporting entities
that provide the ‘designated services’. These entities include the financial sector,
gambling sector, and the trustee and superannuation sectors. These types of reporting
entities now face tougher obligations regarding CDD, reporting requirements, and
record-keeping obligations than those required under the FTR Act 1988. The data
collection process also tried to obtain responses from those who will be obliged under
the second tranche to provide different types of reports (with such entities including
accountants and real estate agents) in order to access their understanding of the AML
system and their role in the near future.
257

Chapter 5 discussed reporting entities’ experience of the Australian AML and revealed a
number of major problems with the application of AUSTRAC’s enforcement
mechanism regarding reporting entity non-compliance. Although many respondents
deem the AML Act and Rules as crucial in improving Australia’s AML regime, an
analysis of AUSTRAC publications and the outcomes of reporting entities’ interviews
demonstrated that reporting entity low quality reports perpetuated by AUSTRAC’s
minimal feedback level to those entities are negatively influencing AUSTRAC’s work
in general and the enforcement mechanism for reporting obligations non-compliance in
particular.
AUSTRAC’s intention is to get closer to the reporting entities in order to understand
businesses and their use of RBA, so as to know how better to deal with these entities
and influence these entities’ staff in regard to the design of more systematic training
both internally for the entities and by and of AUSTRAC staff. This is essential to
enhance the quality of reporting. Other important aspects are the importance of
providing reporting entities with better feedback and of achieving transparency in
AUSTRAC’s work. Many Australian institutions (partner agencies and reporting
entities) should collaborate more effectively with AUSTRAC in detecting and defeating
ML activities.
However, a number of thesis findings do not quite fit the above scenario and have
adversely affected AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism regarding non-compliance
with reporting obligations. These will be discussed in this chapter.
6. 2 Results
The financial institutions interviewed (including major banks, trustees and executor
services institutions, investment and superannuation institutions and bookmaker and
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betting institutions) were obliged under the AML Act 2006 to be reporting entities.
These institutions indicated in their responses that they believed that they are all
familiar with the AML system and its obligations (especially as they already familiar
with risk management even before the creation of the AML model, and had
subsequently become more familiar with — and now long observed —its general
practices, including identifying customers, record keeping, and customer due diligence).
However, they nevertheless indicated that they were experiencing difficulties in
providing useful reports and complained about a lack of guidance needed to adequately
fulfill their obligations. This clearly indicates that reporting entities in Australia should
become even more familiar with AML practices. Nevertheless, the compliance
managers and officers supplied valuable data in the current AML scenario in Australia.
They also supplied valuable data on that scenario to the researcher, material that
indicated that their reporting practices could be improved and better serve the AML
system and contribute to AUSTRAC’s effectiveness.
By way of contrast, neither the real estate agents nor accountants interviewed believe
themselves well-versed at any level or aware of AUSTRAC’s role regarding gathering
and examining financial transactions because they are not yet obliged under the AML
Act and Rules to be reporting entities, and so it is hardly surprising that these types of
businesses are inexperienced with the AML Act 2006. Nevertheless, given that the
government has officially indicated that they will be required to act as reporting entities
under the second tranche, it appears somewhat remiss of AUSTRAC to not to have at
least begun some preliminary education of the sectors involved.
Whilst the size of the sample is far too small to draw statistically reliable conclusions,
data is nevertheless perhaps indicative. The essentially preliminary data comprised
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responses to a small number of formal interviews with real estate agents and
accountants as well as a number of informal interviews with real estate agents and
accountants through the CPA Australia/Forensic Group Discussion). The responses
indicated that both types of businesses (real estate agents more so than accountants) are
almost totally unaware of their reporting obligations when offering specific financial
services to their customers or clients. Even lawyers (who may deal with trust monies
and so forth, as well as their own accounts) appear to be falling short of expectations. In
terms of the lawyers sector, one of the accountants interviewed spoke from the
perspective of having been a former officer of a state legal professional association, and
observed (somewhat damningly) that although this sector relies on cash dealings,
lawyers in the sector rarely comply with reporting obligations. 569
A number of the respondents were of the opinion that the AML system needs to
eliminate its shortcomings regarding non-designated services businesses, especially
those who are dealing with cash more than with banking transactions. This sector
includes lawyers, accountants and real estate agents, among others. Members of the
sector may prove resistant to some aspects.
In terms of lawyers reporting, there was not any requirement to have a designated
officer. The accountants are quite comfortable with complying ... So we will just
wait and see what it will look like when the second tranche comes into effect. 570

Thus, those interviewed in regard to this type of businesses (non designated services)
have not yet been provided with an adequate set of reporting guidelines nor sourced this
information for themselves. Having never visited AUSTRAC’s website, contacted
AUSTRAC’s assistance line or read its publications, they were found to be lacking
knowledge and information about AUSTRAC’s role in preventing ML crimes or even
569
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knowing that they will soon be obliged (under the second tranche of the AML Act) to
meet AML requirements and obligations as institutions that provide designated services
are already required to do.
Lawyers and solicitors, who are already required (since the amendment of the FTR Act
1988 in 1997) to report threshold transactions of AUD10,000 or more in currency or
foreign currency equivalent ‘when entering into by, or on behalf of, the lawyer in a
practice’, shared a lack of knowledge of their obligations under the AML Act or
AUSTRAC’s role with other non-designated services providers mentioned above.
However, all respondents indicated that AML Act and Rules are essential to combat ML
crimes. Respondents (representing major banks, trustees and executor services
institutions, investment and superannuation institutions and bookmaker and betting
institutions) indicated that they are familiar with AML practices and policies and their
obligations under the AML system, including identifying customers and undertaking
OCDD. Universal awareness was assumed: ‘For the purposes of this legislation there
are standard requirements and everybody [is] familiar with it anyway.’ 571
All respondents advanced the case that their relevant institutions were trying to achieve
high levels of compliance. Some tried to show that there is limited ML penetration by
ML of their institutions. Real estate agents, accountants, trustees and executor services
institutions, investment and superannuation institutions complained because they do not
accept cash payments from customers — all monies received by go directly to their
bank accounts). Thus, the role of banks in suspect ML is more effective due to their
functions (which involve more frequent handling of cash transactions) than that of the
non-designated services providers. This is a dangerous misunderstanding of the role of
571
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the reporting entities in the AML system, because these institutions share responsibility
with the banks and are vulnerable to ML risk, as are banks and other financial
institutions that are in a ‘face to face’ relationship with customers. This is especially so
given the increase in identity crime that has flourished with the vast availability of
personal information through internet websites such as ‘Facebook’. According to the
Australian Crime Commission (ACC):
Australia’s high take-up of communications technology also facilitates identity
crime. This global phenomenon has become a hallmark of serious and organised
crime and has significant social and financial ramifications. The large volume of
personal information on social networking sites such as Facebook provides an
opportunity for organised crime groups to obtain data and create identification
documents for criminal purposes. Criminals have access to a range of options
through information and communications technology systems to obtain or produce
high-quality and low-cost fraudulent identity documents.572

In addition, the ACC considered self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs) (a
business that is not in a ‘face to face’ relationship with customers) to be at high level of
ML activity risk. The total amounts of superannuation located in these funds are
substantial. At the end of 2009, there were 416,145 SMSFs, ‘accounting for 30.9 per
cent of assets across various fund types and 99 per cent of the total number of super
funds’. A further 2,500 are being added to that number each month. 573They are also in
danger of abuse due to a number of factors:
While all fund trustees have a responsibility to detect or prevent fraud, in the case
of self-managed superannuation funds the responsibility is placed on trustees who
may be inexperienced, poorly trained and unqualified to perform the role and,
sometimes, complicit in the fraud, making these funds particularly vulnerable to
exploitation by negligent or disreputable trustees or professional service
providers.574
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Although, one real estate agent did not see the need for the inclusion of his entity
category in AML, believing that was the banking sector’s role. He explains:
When we … sell a property, … the buyers are required to give us 0.25 per cent
deposit of the sell price … — on average 15,000 dollars … around 20,000 dollars
— , we do accept that in cash. However, after 5 days they have to pay the 10 per
cent deposit — the 10 per cent deposit from 500,000 is 50,000 dollars.
If somebody com[es] to me with 50,000 in cash, I will refuse it. … send them to
the bank [for] … a bank cheque ...the buyer can send it through the post office or
deposit the money directly into our account ...
So we trust the bank as a financial institution [that] has a policy in place to
determine if it is legal or illegal money. I do not see why us — real estate agents —
should we take that further step in the AML scheme; rather … it should be more
focusing on the large financial institutions, such as banks for example.

Another respondent representing the trustees and executor services institutions indicated
that their type of work makes it hard to detect suspect ML activity and report it to
AUSTRAC. They mainly rely on managing non face-to-face investment schemes and
the money obtained is generated in the system through bank accounts, therefore banks
carry the big load or undertake the major task in this relationship.
We are a diverse financial services firm. It’s rather different from a bank: we don’t
generally see the clients face to face ... usually the funds are given to the firm
electronically ... Or via a cheque, which means you have to have an existing
relationship with a bank in order to [obtain it]. The bank … perform[s] the
customer identification procedure required.
So … if you’re looking at money laundering at the various stages … [at] placement
stage that’s not an issue, for managed investment schemes, generally ... Where it
becomes more of a challenge …is where it starts to get to the more sophisticated
layering and, of course, [in the] integration stages.
[T]o be perfectly honest, it is really [a] very difficult sort of thing to say quite
independently, “Oh that looks suspicious, therefore that could be money
laundering.” … But to actually sort of prospectively say: “This is money
laundering”, it’s a very difficult proposition with managed investment schemes. 575

These respondents clearly reflect in their responses that even while reporting entities are
trying to demonstrate their control of their systems, and compliance with their AML,
they still are not confident of whether or not they are efficiently and effectively
fulfilling their responsibilities under the AML system. Comparing these responses with
575
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material recorded in AUSTRAC’s publications (including the compliance officers
survey), it is clear that one reason for such ongoing difficulty could be that compliance
officers are not spending sufficient time on AML matters. Moreover, those spending
little time on their AML responsibilities believe that their time spent can be better spent,
as only limited AML achievements could be anticipated in their sectors. This calls into
question their understanding as to their risk when relying on RBA. It also calls into
question the effectiveness of AML training systems for both reporting entities and
AUSTRAC.
Their responses show the relative lack of sophistication of many of reporting entities.
These entities think that if money has been through a bank, it must be ‘legal’ money.
Such beliefs facilitate ML as everyone just wants the banks to be the AML frontline
with no one else having any responsibility.
6.2.1 AUSTRAC’s Struggle to Apply the Risk-Based Approach on Regulated
Entities and AML Training
The thesis found a major problem in this area. It extends to include the monitoring of
transactions and reportable transactions area and the application of RBA and the
necessity for strategic training. AUSTRAC has been found simply unable to explain the
nature of RBA to reporting entities. In fact, this may say more about the lack of
commercial understanding of AUSTRAC staff and their inability to communicate
effectively with those in industry, than about the nature of RBA itself.
Thus, after years of activity and almost ten years since the RBA approach was adopted
in 2003, AUSTRAC still is predicting the need to further evolve its policies and to
develop its regulatory role in the AML legislative environment, which surely includes
applying RBA in dealing with its reporting entities:
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AUSTRAC's policies will evolve … over time to reflect the growing experience of
reporting entities and the regulator with the new legislative environment. In all
cases AUSTRAC aims to create an environment of continuous voluntary
compliance with the legislation it administers and to build cooperative relationships
with its reporting entities. 576

In fact, the actual scenario so far reveals that AUSTRAC does not deal with reporting
entities equally and professionally, that is, in accordance with their level of risk, because
AUSTRAC is thrashing about trying to apply RBA for a number of reasons:
inexperience, unpreparedness, disengagement, and inadequacy in the response to the
FATF guidance on RBA (detailed coverage below).
6.2.1.1 AUSTRAC’s Lack of Experience and Capacity
AUSTRAC is still grappling with the nature of the diverse reporting entities’
communities. This is reflected in AUSTRAC’s uneven spread of policies and actions.
AUSTRAC is not covering businesses that could pose a similar risk to an equal extent.
According to one remitter’s compliance manager, it is a matter of business entity size
and power:
Basically, I believe AUSTRAC is concentrating on us (small remittance
businesses) because they simply cannot go to one of the large financial institutions
and say “Look, you are not complying”, simply because they are weaker [when]
taking an action against these businesses. 577

However, another compliance officer interviewed, from a major Australian bank, was
happy with the current situation regarding AUSTRAC‘s dealings with the reporting
entities. She pointed out that AUSTRAC should not be under more pressure to change
and improve itself because that would not give the desired result. She expressed a belief
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that AUSTRAC needs time to do so as did the US FIU, FinCEN, and the UK’s
SOCA. 578
However, AUSTRAC has been the FIU and regulator for about 25 years, and even if it
lacked the necessary governmental resources to undertake that task effectively, it has
been exercising regulatory responsibilities in the financial sector for that period. No one
can predict to when AUSTRAC will overcome this difficulty, because it depends on
AUSTRAC’s efforts to get the required experience and capacity to ‘think out of the
box’ when it find the balance between its role as the regulator and the FIU for the
benefit for the AML system.
AUSTRAC has not got communicating the requirements for the superior
implementation of the RBA principle under control. A senior manager in the Major
Reporters team within AUSTRAC’s Frontline Supervision area, in her presentation to
the ACAMS group discussion 2010, spoke of the difficulties that reporting entities are
having trying to understand the meaning of the RBA and how they should implement it
in their work, despite having actively lobbied for it, and the difficulties that AUSTRAC
faces in dealing with this issue. 579 The AUSTRAC representative, four years after the
promulgation of the AML legislation and a similar period of applying the RBA, was
wondering ‘whether lobbying for a RBA provided the outcome that the industry may
have initially thought it would or if in hindsight it may have chosen more
prescription?’.580 This might also show a problem with the policy development process
as Government did not really know what it was agreeing to either.
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RBA remains a problem for both AUSTRAC and reporting entities, if the volume of
quality (as compared to low quality) reports is to be taken as any indication. Where it
appears to have begun to consider reports as being of high quality, the actual scenario is
proving the opposite. The analysis of AUSTRAC publications revealed that it continues
to receive significant volumes of low quality reports. Moreover, a response from one of
AUSTRAC’s Supervision Directors on the question of the quality of the reports
received indicated a degree of variation in reports received in the basis of entity and
report type. The Director responded that
[The short answer is] generally the quality is quite good. The longer answer is that,
as you expect, we are regulating thousands of reporting entities and [that varies] …
a lot. With IFTIs and TTRs they are generally automated. When we do find errors
in those sorts of reports, we would know that there is some sort of things changed
or happened to the systems of the reporting entities which are so much complex
businesses, and to my experience they are pretty active in fixing these problems. In
terms of the SMRs, they are quite valuable and typically you find it high quality
because the staff of the reporting entities were trained on that. 581

While another AUSTRAC Director pointed to the issue of low quality, she said that
AUSTRAC is not the one who should follow up this matter. She noted that it is
intelligence material that could help the enforcement bodies to achieve the investigation
even with its low quality. 582 This reflects a situation where the quality issue is not
regarded as a priority in AUSTRAC’s work. She suggested that law enforcement bodies
were the appropriate bodies to follow up with reporting entities in the event of a lack in
the competence in the analysis by the reporting entities in specific reports to ensure that
they obtain the additional information required to cover any shortfall in these reports:
From [an] intelligence perspective, it is also important to talk to law enforcement
and say these reports it can use only for intelligence and there is a lack in the
quality and they should not rely on it … [I]f they really want to use it for
581
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evidentiary purposes they should go back to the banks or whoever to get the
information [for] the brief of evidence, because if there is a data quality issue and
they [are] relying on that financial intelligence there could be … big trouble. … [I]t
is only intelligence. Data quality is an issue and law enforcement bodies need to
use it as an avenue to know where to go to get further information. 583

This is a strange admission, as this Director believes that the law enforcement bodies
should not have to follow up on the overall matter of low quality reports because this is
the FIU’s task to ensure quality reporting as it collects and analyses the information
before disseminated reports to the law enforcement bodies. Indeed AUSTRAC has put a
great deal of effort into data quality but to them this is simply a matter of the accuracy
of the reported facts. (This effort has been referred to in its annual reports.)
Continuing questions from reporting entities on RBA boundaries/interpretation and
AUSTRAC’s lack of adequate response indicate a persistent deficiency in AUSTRAC’s
experience and perhaps the methodology adopted by the regulator and its reporting
entities in their operations. If RBA has failed to achieve the regulatory goals set for it
and more prescriptive amendments are required to clarify its operations, this would
confirm this observation.
6.2.1.2 Australia’s AML System was not ready for the Risk-Based Approach
As shown in Chapter 3, RBA is clearly FATFs’ preferred approach; however its choice
is a discretionary decision for countries. The FATF Recommendations, and particularly
Recommendations 5, 6, 8, 20, 23 and 24 from a regulatory and industry perspective, and
Recommendations 9 and 15 from a risk management perspective, 584 have left the door
open to countries to choose the way that best suits their system to regulate the process
of combatting ML crimes. Countries can choose their own regulatory framework,
whether from the regulator (‘Rule Based Approach’) or from the regulated (‘RBA’).
583
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Although FATF does issue Guidance Documents to assist those governments who do
choose to adopt an RBA, again these are not prescriptive. It remains a country’s
decision as to how its RBA is implemented.585
Australia took the decision to build its AML system on the RBA through the AML Act
2006. It was one of the leading countries in applying this approach, which was to be
followed by both reporting entities and the regulator.
However, the application of the RBA in the Australian jurisdiction has experienced
many difficulties in its application even after 5 years. This has revealed that the decision
to adopt the RBA has been poorly thought out. It was a result of industry lobbying when
they did not like the prescriptive approach in the early drafts of the post FATF 2003
Recommendations. AUSTRAC would clearly have preferred the adoption of a Rule
Based Approach, as did the Attorney Generals Department.586This was demonstrated by
the way the original draft of the Australian AML Act 2006 was turned around. 587 The
RBA approach was effectively foisted upon it, and then the entity has to effectively run
with a less desirable (from their viewpoint) option. Thus, both parties required a
preparatory period to fully understand their obligations under this approach and to
understand each other more before applying it. It cannot therefore be a surprise that they
encounter difficulties in administering a scheme that was not their own first choice. The
difficulties may reflect the reasons for their own initial recommendation of a Rule
Based Approach.
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For Reporting Entities
Reporting entities faced a big challenge when the AML Act required them to move to the
RBA, because they had to more closely scrutinise financial transactions to verify the
potential risks, and also fund their compliance costs. The new system gives reporting
entities greater room for flexibility as to how they achieve the above goals. Thus a
number of reporting entities indicated that they were applying less resources to the
lower risk transactions; and conversely, the more resources to the transactions identified
as posing greater the risks within their AML program.
One of the reporting entities interviewed stated that she believed that RBA is a far better
approach. While the value of RBA may be ‘less certain … it also produces high
standards over time’. 588She explained:
[T]he rule based approach will be the ‘best rule for today’ and everyone has a rule
for today. … [RBA] is the best practice. If you look into the compliance framework
20 years ago and set rules around what it should look like [as compared] to what
they look like today, it is ... very different[ly] based.
[I]f you take a very prescriptive approach to rules, what you will … get [is] a
minimum approach to compliance because this is what it specifically says, whereas
[in RBA it] is always on the organisation to ensure it is [an] appropriately based
system; … there ... [are] systems and processes, …always [having] to change and
improve, their [RBA] will have to improve too ….
I think the outcomes approach of Australian regulation is far more effective than
prescription.589

However, the new system places greater burdens on regulated entities. FATF itself
concedes that ‘a properly applied risk-based approach does not necessarily mean a
reduced burden, though it should result in a more cost effective use of resources’. 590 The
burden is not always financial. According to a number of reporting entities interviewed,
RBA continually presents a dilemma in that they always need an explanation, especially
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as they have to apply it to both customers and their transactions. One compliance
manager interviewed stated:
Transactions and the customers are quite distinct sets. …[I]n managed investments,
looking at the transactions it is quite a challenge … unique to managed investment
schemes.
In respect of dealing with the customers, well basically it is just legislative
common sense. Once upon a time you would perform [CDD] … because you
wanted to know who you were dealing with. So it is really fairly old business
practices that were reasonably common business practices. So looking at the type
of client that you are dealing with… that is not so much of an issue.
The issue then comes around looking at the transactional activity, … [T]hey’re
quite different beasts, they’re related but different. 591

The monitoring and the reporting systems adopted by reporting entities will be affected
by their attempts to address RBA and the concept of high quality reports to which
AUSTRAC needs these entities to commit. Reporting entities must also understand their
own risk and their customers via an OCDD process, remembering that they can only
look at the transaction in the context of the customer.
AUSTRAC not only has to follow up and supervise the application of this obligation
with the reporting entities — especially as the RBA is not that dissimilar from their
actual risk assessment that these reporting entities carry out generally to face the risk of
a product, customer, jurisdiction and delivery —it an obligation to improve its own
performance, examine its shortcomings and find correct solutions.
For AUSTRAC
Following the implementation of the AML Act in 2006, AUSTRAC had a year to
implement the role developed under the new system. However, the enhanced
responsibilities of AUSTRAC have created challenges despite, or perhaps because of,
the strengthening of its function. AUSTRAC made huge changes when it received

591

Interview with Compliance Manager D, above n 503.

271

specific resources in order to adapt to the new situation. It considered modifications at
managerial level, created a centre for additional new staff, and increased the number of
AUSTRAC executive staff and employees to handle this new era, 592 but it could not
strike a balance between its two main roles: that of an FIU and that of regulator. The
problem seems to persist, again reflecting its lack of experience. For example, it sets
unrealistic expectations regarding response times to documents issued for comment and
their frequency. According to one reporting entity interviewed:
It is a constant frustration, … [At] least they issue the rules out for commentary,
but often not a lot of time … often every two weeks, but one,… they issue[d] it on
Christmas evening and then left. … this [is] going to change the whole banking
system because basically it was bringing into the clearing system every superfund,
— …I said, “I do not think they put this through” ... And …they have issued it;
then it was …due …when everyone was still on leave! 593

In this regard, a number of respondents made a comparison between regulator
effectiveness of AUSTRAC and ASIC, in which ASIC is regarded as having a better
understanding of regulated entities. ASIC is noted as having a better feedback
mechanism, which some said is why it has more enforcement power than AUSTRAC
regarding compliance. A compliance manager stated:
So basically we’re starting to increasingly act more like ASIC, but we’re not really
getting the regulatory guide material in quite the same way from AUSTRAC as
ASIC puts out. I mean ASIC is quite categoric[al]: “This is how we interpret the
law”, whereas AUSTRAC is guidance and “this is how” and “well, we don’t want
to tell you how to think about it because well that’s your business”. 594

It appears that this is because no one in AUSTRAC is prepared to commit themselves to
a view which the courts might not accept. It also reflects the regulated entities’
preference for greater direction, more rules, and particularly, more and higher quality
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feedback delivered in a timely manner. Another compliance manager pointed out that
AUSTRAC needs to ‘learn to do this better’. She stated:
[T]here are regulators around that do it well … I think there is going to be an
element of trust that we want to do the right thing ... [and] comply with law, … [I]f
the regulation is efficient, we get good feedback, we can implement it
efficiently…595

Dialogue is a key ingredient, she maintains.
We need that dialogue, you still get the same outcome, and it works much better
because … our processes operate this way, and that is why ASIC is very good
because they can see what you are getting to is nearly the same position and that
you do not need to [be] hardcore in this way, and that is why dialogue with the
regulator is very important, it actually produces more efficiently … 596

But she also points to examples of what she viewed as unviable demands:
[A]nd if you cannot implement it then people just do not! ...[S]ome recent
legislation that the government has issued that is in … not implementable! … [I]t
just assumed that all superfunds are identically … but they are not. It is sort of [the
case] that the regulator must be more flexible in that listening and dialogue. 597

One more difficulty that AUSTRAC has faced is the large amount of data that it
received and is still receiving from reporting entities in the fulfillment of their
obligations.
If AUSTRAC wants to achieve its three new strategies, then it should take into
consideration all of the above issues, because:
a)

To be an effective FIU: In order to achieve the aims embodied in its intelligence
and enforcement strategies, AUSTRAC needs better intelligence skills and an
enforcement mechanism whose various sanctions are actively used against non-
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compliant reporting entities, no matter what their size, the power of these
businesses or the type of services provided.
b)

To be an effective regulator: It must have a close relationship with the reporting
entities industries, understand them, interact with them on an equal basis, and be
alongside them with rigorous supervision in order to achieve the aims of the
supervision strategy.

But if the current situation persists, then these strategies will not achieve their targets.
They will be considered as AUSTRAC publications rather than effective strategies.
The adoption of a RBA is a great achievement; however, to move to the adoption of
RBA, both reporting entities and regulator needed to be well-prepared. Both were not
sufficiently prepared, which makes it difficult for AUSTRAC to improve its
performance easily and sometimes forces AUSTRAC to take some less effective
regulatory decisions, and for the reporting entities to continue to struggle with AML
issues, especially the reporting obligations.
Regulating alternative remitters is important; however, other businesses (including the
large ones) should not be forgotten. AUSTRAC RBA has to be more accurate and take
into consideration the real risk from every side.
This leads this thesis to expose the existence of disengagement between the reporting
entities and AUSTRAC in terms of the AML system in general and RBA in particular.
6.2.1.3 Disengagement in the Relationship between AML Parties and the RBA
The thesis found disengagement between AML parties regarding the AML system
which is an obstacle to improving the system and the RBA.
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1

As shown in Chapter 3, the FATF recommendations which are used as a
benchmark for regulating systems for AML purposes, have a number of question
marks regarding the way in which a system is planned and functions on the basis
of a rule based approach rather than an RBA. It has been clear that reporting
entities are still having difficulties with different aspects, including the beneficial
owner aspect in regard to its definition. The ‘one size fits all’ regime with which
FATF followed in its recommendations adds burdens on both levels; the
regulatory level (including AUSTRAC) and reporting entities’ level. This leads to
disengagement between these parties.

2

Reporting entities interviewed still do not agree on a single aim as undergirding
their compliance with the AML regime, rather they have two different aims
undergirding their level of compliance, namely threat reduction and avoiding
regulatory sanctions. The overall tenor of most responses indicates that threat
reduction (such as reducing instances of systems compromise, fraud and so forth)
on one’s own organisation (rather than system-wide) is an outcome that reporting
entities are taking into consideration when complying with the Act. Avoiding
sanctions (such as fines) is not major goal when they consider the AML
compliance issue, and reflects AUSTRAC’s weak enforcement mechanism and
problems with RBA.
RBA should give the reporting entities the flexibility to deal with risk. Thus, — in
a healthy risk based system — it could play a vital role in achieving the desired
level of compliance; but if the goal of threat reduction is regarded as more
important (more likely among some entities than others) than the goal of avoiding
regulatory sanction, then this reflects a disconnection in understanding the RBA
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and its outcomes. If AUSTRAC understood the reason for the level of reporting
entity compliance, this could prompt change and make this system more effective.
Nevertheless, it seems that AUSTRAC does not use its enforcement powers
(perhaps unsurprising, considering all the difficulties that it faces in imposing
such sanctions) to try to build the Australian financial system on the basis of a
goal of threat reduction. However, it does not work this way, because the
reporting entities community is still trying to create a healthy risk-based system.
3

This disengagement could emerge also through the different interests that AML
parties have when regulating for AML. As shown previously in this thesis, AML
parties have different interests when it comes to the AML system. An AFP officer
notes:
AFP is mainly an investigative Commonwealth agency … one of many
Commonwealth agencies in partnership with AUSTRAC in utilising AML reports
for intelligence purposes — …an incredible intelligence database.
AFP is not involved in AML compliance issues; however, we do come across cases
that evidence non-compliance. Some of the more serious cases are reported to
AUSTRAC.598

However, one of AUSTRAC’s Directors indicated that:
[In their] investigations role through reporting entities, [law enforcement bodies]
…can draw [conclude] that … reporting entities do not report to AUSTRAC or do
not comply [as] they should … [T]his is what law enforcement … [refer] to us, but
it still early days …I am sure there is a lot more than what the law enforcement
people can cover.599

The ACC in its 2011 Report ‘Organised Crime in Australia’ indicated the need for
collaboration between all parties.
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While this report cannot provide the same level of detail as the classified version, it
still clearly presents the disparate activities that make up the picture of organised
crime in Australia. … it illustrates why an effective response to organised crime
increasingly requires collaboration between many stakeholders — all levels of
government, law enforcement agencies, public and private sector agencies,
academic institutions and the public600...
Collaboration will help develop better response strategies that combine the
strengths of operational law enforcement activity, regulatory and legislative change
and community involvement. Partnerships between law enforcement, industry
specialists and governments will offer Australian law enforcement the skills and
tools it needs to further improve crime fighting capabilities. 601

This applies to AML activities. Any disengagement and lack of trust between
these parties will impede their AML efforts and AML system goals.
6.2.1.4 Inadequacies in the Response to the FATF Guidance on the RBA for
AML/CTF
In June 2007, FATF issued its Guidance on the Risk-Based Approach to Combating
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing, followed in 2008 and 2009 by a set of
guidance documents for a number of non-financial designated businesses and
professions (as detailed in Chapter 3).602
FATF’s 2007 Guidance Document put in place six important rules for countries for the
adoption of RBA:
1

Financial institutions and regulators should have access to ‘reliable and actionable
information about the threats’.

2

Cooperative arrangements among the policy makers, law enforcement, regulators,
and the private sector must be emphasised.
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3

Authorities should publicly recognise that RBA will not eradicate all elements of
risk.

4

Authorities have a responsibility to establish an environment in which financial
institutions need not fear regulatory sanctions where they have ‘acted responsibly
and implemented adequate internal systems and controls’.

5

Regulators’ supervisory staff must be well-trained in RBA, as applied by both
supervisors and financial institutions.

6

Requirements and supervisory oversight at the national level should be consistent
among similar industries. 603

When one takes the FATF rules and use them to reflect on the analysis (above) of the
Australian AML scenario with its RBA, the results are disappointing:
1

The regulators (including AUSTRAC) are focusing on reducing the harmful
influences of ML activities and supporting the reporting entities in reducing such
damage. Regulated entities are focusing on controlling regulatory risk related to
their AML system where failure to do so may result in regulatory sanctions.
As the first two FATF Guidance rules (above) encourage both regulator and
regulated to have the ability to access useful (‘reliable and actionable’)
information about threats (Rule 1) and to have cooperative arrangements among
policy-makers, law enforcement, regulators, and the private sector (Rule 2) in
order to achieve the best practice for the principle of RBA, and consequently the
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best outcomes, it is necessary for all those parties in the AML regime to share a
common purpose.
However, this thesis showed that the current scenario reflects a situation where
the AML parties lack a common purpose or approach for regulating the system in
the manner it should be regulated.
Reporting entities see themselves as having a limited role in the regulatory system
with a minimum (or just slightly above) level of AML risk awareness within their
own businesses, though there are some exceptions:
In most cases, we go above the minimum legal requirements so as to have a
consistent global minimum standard. Our program was developed in Australia
through close consultation with the industry. 604

On the other hand, partner agencies (as shown previously) see themselves as
separate from the AML system. For them, AML is not a major aim or purpose.
Their desire is more to achieve a higher level of compliant behaviour in their areas
of interest. In addition, AUSTRAC is working away from, or a largely
independently of, the reporting entities and not fulfilling the role of an effective
regulator but rather assuming the mantel of a tough FIU. As one interviewee
commented:
I think it is because they came from a different background. They [AUSTRAC] are
suspicious of everybody … you get a sense … that changed over time but … a
level of suspicion around the organisations they are dealing with [persists]I … [I]t
is almost [as if] I [a reporting entity] cannot see that they [AUSTRAC] help us so
we can do better so we can detect stuff that helps them. 605

Therefore, a common purpose is hampered by a lack of trust between AUSTRAC,
its partner agencies and reporting entities.
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2

Rule number 5 encourages the regulator to have a well-trained staff in terms of
AML and the RBA as practised both by the regulator’s supervisors and by
reporting entities. However, this thesis has found that there is a lack of staff
training in both AUSTRAC and the reporting entities. Regulatory staff training
and knowledge of RBA processes is asserted as part of an all-embracing
perception of the ML risks faced by regulated entities. AUSTRAC cannot achieve
the goal of a well-trained staff until it better understands ML, the nature of
reporting entities and their risks. Without regulatory staff well-versed in the
practices of these entities, the reporting entity staff will also suffer from a lack of
awareness of their AML role, the threat or risks faced, as their search for guidance
and knowledge of optimum practices is hindered and whose practices are,
therefore, hampered or inconsistent even across industry sector.
AUSTRAC has tried to provide an online training program to the reporting
entities — an e-learning facility606 to provide these entities with sufficient training
to deal with ML risks.
Nevertheless, the responses on this matter were diverse and ranged from those
who see this as a comprehensive source of adequate material to train reporting
entity staff and find the cost of the training programs acceptable (when free), to
those who sees it as providing material which merely adds greater ambiguity to
the RBA and the AML system, and find the cost of additional training contributes
to the difficulty. One reporting entity commented:
Every employee within the probation period (the first three months) is required to
complete the basic AML training, which is available … at AUSTRAC website
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See AUSTRAC e-learning website <http://www.austrac.gov.au/elearning/index.html> at 7 June 2011.
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(AUSTRAC e-learning) facility … We are quite happy with it (training costs).
Actually it is not a … burden for us, and our institution can handle it easily. 607

A number of those entities who were supportive of the AUSTRAC e-learning
model were found to be under ongoing and external compliance assessment from
AUSTRAC, which means that such entities do need more training and preparation
for compliance than other entities. The entities under an external compliance
assessment surely cannot then be viewed as already well-trained and having the
‘know how’ to deal with the risk and comply with the Act and the Rules, but
rather in the process of being trained.
Those compliance managers who are happy with the current training program and
do not complain about the costs of AML programs may be those who do not wish
to add to their training burden. If AML training was to become more
comprehensive and systematic, they may fear that this would probably add to their
costs and impose more responsibilities on them.
We recently have been under compliance assessment from AUSTRAC with
external assessment, so what … they have sent a list of questions and required
documents that we have sent through.608

Other respondents expressed an opposing viewpoint. For example, one
compliance manager609 indicated that not all reporting entities were able to
provide effective staff training, because the online training (including
AUSTRAC’s e-learning facility) was focused on the banking sector rather than
covering the different reporting entities’ sectors. The respondent noted that
AUSTRAC uses it as a ‘one size fits all’ approach; however, this may not suit a
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reporting entity group’s particular circumstances. This ‘banking focused’ model,
for example, does not assist managed investment schemes businesses. These lack
the bank sector’s ‘face-to-face’ customer relationship.
A lot of the training that is available out there … is very bank focused … a very
nice overview … to become familiar with the terminology …[T]he most frustrating
thing … [is that] it is very hard to have very structured training by virtue of the fact
…that … it is the nature of the financial product and part of the financial services
niche that this business occupies that really makes it [what it is]. Training actually
has to be done, probably as much, if not more, in-house … The only examples I
have got of real world examples [are those] that we deal with [in] the business.610

The same compliance manager indicated that:
[As] a lot of online training is very bank focused … there is lot stuff in respect [to]
cash. Well, if you do not see cash, then those scenarios really do not assist [your]
knowledge … [T]his includes the AUSTRAC website ... [O]n a day by day basis
we’re hearing how much money is being thrown … into the superannuation
system. And yet there is very little [material]…
[T]hey have all said to a lot of people who are self managed super fund owners and
… invest in managed schemes. …[T]he focus starts to come around, but no one
actually really thought of how you convey that in training materials. 611

This respondent also sees training program costs as high, especially when time
lost from work is taken into account. This compliance manager (among others) 612
also noted that most online training programs provide less materials for the large
number of reporting entities who do not deal in cash and lack a face-to-face
customer relationship; and the cost in time and money of inadequate and largely
irrelevant training obtained elsewhere can be significant.
We … cannot [achieve] … cost efficiencies: because they [AUSTRAC] just do not
have enough relevant material, to justify the expense. …[T]hen there is [also the]
work I could be doing for the business that I am not doing, because I actually have
to train. So is there a cost to the business …. There is lost time, from my other
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tasks in respect of that particular task, because, as I said, you cannot really and
reasonably purchase, [at] a reasonable price, training assistance. 613

The same compliance manager indicated also that alternative providers were
equally unsatisfactory:
We have an online learning provider … who provides other compliance programs
(for example… [OH&S], privacy, bullying, harassment … , compliance programs),
… [W]hen it came to … money laundering ., they were quite happy to adapt it for
us, but at a significant cost…the other programs are quite reasonable … but when it
comes to this, I have actually had to say, “We have to go through that particular
scenario, because that is the way the system is geared, but it is not relevant people.”
[I]n order for them to successfully complete the unit, they have to listen, but there
is no real value in the knowledge gained, because it is not directly applicable to
their day to day tasks in this business.

However, it is not just AUSTRAC’s responsibility to clarify the issues of dealing
with the AML Act and to increase understanding of the RBA. Reporting entities
should put more effort into securing the right training programs, ones that could
build their employees understanding of their AML role, especially for those
entities more reliant on online training, which are clearly inadequate. More
directed, comprehensive and relevant training in person to the employees and
those at management level is so important.
According to Professor John Broome:
Through my long experience in the field of AML (for about 30 years), I found
reporting entities do not apply the right and systematic training for their staff [with
the] … aim to build their understanding of their role in this field. Most of their
training programs are only addressing general issues in terms of combatting money
laundering crimes, and on very … [few] occasions they would go deeply into this
domain. 614

3

In regard to Rule number 4, which calls on authorities to create an environment in
which financial institutions need not fear regulatory sanctions where they have
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‘acted responsibly and implemented adequate internal systems and controls’, the
fact remains that a number of respondents argued for the role of sanctions and
penalties to achieve the required common purpose among AML parties and
encourage strict compliance.
One response (from a representative real estate agent) argued that the enforcement
provisions can make reporting entities concentrate on sanctions rather than
focusing on participating in a national undertaking to guard the financial system’s
integrity.
AUSTRAC needs to give a hand to the reporting entities to comply with the AML
system through enough feedback, and this it will not achieve through concentrating
on the enforcement and penalties, because that will drive businesses to comply
with the major rules in [the] AML system and then the risk based approach will not
be working effectively.615

Others maintained that enforcement is fundamental in order to secure the
amendment of non-compliant behaviour, and most effective enforcement powers
are necessary for a breach of regulatory rules. For example, an accountant argued
that while AUSTRAC’s educative processes have a central role as:

615

Interview with Real Estate Agent C, a real estate agency (Sydney, 21 June 2010).

284

People have to understand what the legislation says and requires of them. It’s very
important for the community to understand what they should do …, and then they
can comply.616

Nevertheless, he urged the use of regulatory sanctions.
I believe that AUSTRAC should be tough and active, by showing its teeth and [its]
ability to take action [in the event of] … non-compliance.617

A banking sector respondent noted:
[I]t is not easy to say whether the enforcement actions taken to date have been
effective in deterrence. We are certainly aware of the powers of AUSTRAC when
it comes to enforcement … We, as an industry, are aware that the enforcement
powers can be very effective and costly, and therefore work to ensure we are
compliant with the requirements. 618

In a jurisdiction like Australia which has built its AML system on RBA, the level
of compliance is the outcome of understanding and applying the RBA. The most
effective enforcement mechanism and powers used by AUSTRAC are an element
that will enhance compliance, especially at this stage when Australia still does not
have an effective RBA. Thus, the need for the goal of ‘avoiding sanctions’ as a
motivating factor to undergird compliance by reporting entities is important until
the AML parties get together on one goal for the AML system which is the ‘threat
reduction’ goal.
Overall, the evaluation of the outcomes that are generated by an understanding
and application of the RBA is the benchmark that reflects the effectiveness of the
Australian AML system in regard to the RBA.
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Accordingly, AUSTRAC’s outcomes are not reflected in a noticeable increase in
compliance levels. The continued difficulties for both reporting entities and
AUSTRAC with RBA are an indicator for that. It also indicates the limited
benefits — in terms of increasing the compliance level — that the AML system
could gain from the greater utilisation of the AUSTRAC enforcement mechanism.
AUSTRAC has not established an environment in which reporting entities believe
that they need to comply because of the need for overall threat reduction; neither
has it established an environment where reporting entities need not fear regulatory
sanctions where they have acted responsibly and implemented adequate internal
systems and controls. It also seems that the use of the enforcement powers so far
are not sufficiently mature to enforce compliance in general nor in those matters
related to reporting obligations specifically.
6.2.2 AUSTRAC Enforcement Powers Still to Fully Mature
It has been clear that there are a very limited number of cases where the enforcement
powers have been exercised by AUSTRAC, as is evidenced through the typology
reports for the years 2007 to 2010 and those powers were not mature enough to enforce
compliance.
6.2.2.1 Enforcement Powers of AUSTRAC for 2006–2011
AUSTRAC has utilised its enforcement powers a number of times since it started to
operate under the AML Act on 12 December 2006 until the time of writing this thesis in
2011. These powers range from warning letters, enforceable undertakings, and remedial
directions, to removal of non-compliant entities from register of providers of the
designated remittance services. See Figure 12 (below).
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1
2
3
4

• Warning Notices
• Enforceable Undertakings
• Remedial Directions
• Removal from Register of Providers of
Designated Remittance Services.
Figure 12: AUSTRAC’s Powers of Enforcement until 2011619

According to the AUSTRAC website (as at 9 June 2011), AUSTRAC has issued:
1

Warning Notices: In 2010, AUSTRAC issued 6 warning notices for a number of
breaches at 6 branches of George Thomas Hotels Pty Ltd, and 1 warning letter to
Argos Investments Pty Ltd.620

2

Enforceable

Undertakings:

In 2009,

AUSTRAC

issued

4

enforceable

undertakings, namely: Barclays Bank, Eastern & Allied Pty Ltd trading as Hai Ha
Money Transfer, Mega International Commercial Bank Co and PayPal Australia
Pty Ltd. In 2010, it issued 6 enforceable undertakings, one to each of 6 branches
of George Thomas Hotels Pty Ltd, and 1 to Argos Investments Pty Ltd. 621

619

AUSTRAC, Enforcement Action<http://www.austrac.gov.au/enforcement_action.html> at 9 June
2011.
620
AML Act 2006 (Cth) s 162(2). See also AUSTRAC, Warning Notices<http://www.austrac.gov.au/
written_notices.html> at 27 March 2011.
621
AML Act 2006pt 15, div 7, above n 75. See also AUSTRAC, Enforceable
Undertaking<http://www.austrac.gov.au/enforceable_undertakings.html> at 27 March 2011.
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3

Remedial Directions: In 2009, AUSTRAC issued remedial direction for Little
Persia. In 2011, AUSTRAC issued a remedial direction for Allsafe International
Pty Ltd.622

4

Removal from Register of Providers of Designated Remittance Services: In 2010,
AUSTRAC issued a decision to remove Thi Kim Hong Tran Company from the
AUSTRAC Register of Providers of Designated Remittance Services. In 2011,
AUSTRAC issued a decision against Cyril Ihemeje.623

6.2.2.2 Case Study: AUSTRAC’s Enforceable Undertakings
Even with the limited enforcement powers that have been exercised by AUSTRAC
against non-compliant reporting entities, the powers that have been used were sufficient.
Warning notices sent by AUSTRAC to the George Thomas Hotels, and Argos
Investments Pty Ltd did not have the desired effect and they faced enforceable
undertakings. Neither warning notices nor AUSTRAC’s educative efforts achieved their
goal, namely compliance. One wonders whether these entities did not believe in
AUSTRAC willingness to utilise its powers of enforcement or whether it was a matter
of complex situations that could not be addressed by warning letters. AUSTRAC needs
to consider these matters, as the efficient enforcement mechanism need an effective
regulator that ensures close supervision of reporting entities with different levels of risk.
Looking at the enforcement mechanism most frequently used by AUSTRAC, that is, the
enforceable undertakings (imposed in 2009 on Barclays Bank, Eastern & Allied Pty Ltd
trading as Hai Ha Money Transfer, Mega International Commercial Bank Co, PayPal
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Australia Pty Ltd) it is possible to observe the immaturity of AUSTRAC enforcement
mechanism.
It has been clear that AUSTRAC has relied on this type of enforcement power and used
it in accordance with its enforcement policy to accomplish a number of aims:
1

To serve as an alternative sanction on non-compliant reporting entities (rather
than allowing them simply to pay fines for breaching the AML Act).

2

To impact on other reporting entities in the same sector, by creating fear of
reputational damage to non-compliant entities.

3

To push reporting entities in different sectors to comply with the AML Act and the
Rules when they see that AUSTRAC active in this domain.

These enforceable undertakings are, of course, generally applied in an ascending order
of severity if the offending behaviour does not cease. It is therefore logical that
AUSTRAC has issued warning notices and applied enforceable undertakings more
frequently than other types of sanctions available to it.
The question remains to what extent and in what circumstances can the ‘enforceable
undertaking’ be categorised as a most effective sanction for non-compliance?
An enforceable undertaking, as one of AUSTRAC’s enforcement powers, faces limits to
its level of effectiveness. This can be found by examining its use by AUSTRAC.
1

AUSTRAC has gone too far by using the enforceable undertaking as a benchmark
sanction, rather than applying (for example) civil penalties on non-compliant
reporting entities that are also available to it; and, civil penalties are as important
for the regulatory enforcement mechanism as the enforceable undertakings.
289

2

AUSTRAC procedures for the application of enforceable undertakings are to
notify the non-compliant reporting entity of its non-compliance in breaching the
Act or the Rules, which might involve public acknowledgement of these breaches.
AUSTRAC then needs to decide whether it is ready to accept the enforceable
undertaking in the form offered by the non-compliant reporting entity.
However, AUSTRAC’s experience with enforceable undertakings reveals some
facts that reduce its effectiveness as a sanction to enforce compliance. AUSTRAC
needs to establish the non-compliant status of the reporting entities on the actual
breach committed. Nevertheless, in some of the enforceable undertakings
AUSTRAC failed to provide sufficient information about that matter to noncompliant reporting entities. For example, the Barclays Bank enforceable
undertaking reflected deficiencies in the information about the type of the breach
and in the level of communication between Barclays Bank and AUSTRAC during
the period when AUSTRAC discovered the breach in relation to Barclay Bank’s
failure to submit the required reports for significant cash transactions and ITFIs.
The same occured in regard to the enforcement undertaking between AUSTRAC
and Mega International Commercial Bank Co; but, unlike the first two instances
when the entities’ interaction with AUSTRAC about their non compliance
behaviour was unclear, this was not the case in relation to the third enforceable
undertaking between AUSTRAC and PayPal (nor in other subsequent enforceable
undertakings). AUSTRAC clarified the matter in its communications with PayPal
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in February, April and May 2008. This provision of clearer information illustrates
the benefits of AUSTRAC’s growing experience. 624
3

The RBA is creating great difficulty for AUSTRAC when it uses enforceable
undertakings to enforce the reporting entity compliance with reporting
obligations. For instance, a reporting entity could see itself as a low or medium
risk but AUSTRAC sees it as a high risk, one that deserves the imposition of an
enforceable undertaking when non-compliance has occurred. Questions remain
regarding AUSTRAC’s confidence in its RBA assessment and that of that
reporting entity on the level of the risk in the particular instance. Regulating the
reporting entities ‘from a distance’ and doubts about AUSTRAC’s own use of
RBA risks reducing system-wide confidence. One of the compliance managers
interviewed again first unfavourably compared the RBA-based AUSTRAC with
its fellow Australian regulator ASIC. The compliance manager also indicated that
the AML Act with its RBA makes the debate between AUSTRAC and the
reporting entities about the level of the risk harder, and AUSTRAC does not help:
ASIC has the Corporations Act that says “You will or you must not” it is quite
categorist. Whereas the AML/CTF Act is a little bit more — if not principled based
— risk [based]. You know the business that you are in. You have done a risk
assessment. Our risk assessment says, “We are going to do nothing” — we have
done nothing and our risk assessment to show that. …AUSTRAC then turns
around and goes, “Well we are not satisfied with that.” So retrospectively they are
coming around and saying, “Hang on a tick, that is not how you should be reading
the Act.” So my question is to AUSTRAC: “If we should not be reading it that
way, give us more definitive material to tell us how you would like us to read it.”
… [Yet] [h]ow many sound bites have you got off AUSTRAC: “You know your
business best”; “You are in the best position to know your risks”. Yet they are quite
happy to come in and say, “Well, that is not sufficient,” I do not think they know it
[RBA] themselves.625
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4

The difference in services that reporting entities provide, especially those with
online services, adds to AUSTRAC’s burden when it has to apply the enforcement
undertakings on these entities when they are non-compliant. ‘PayPal’ 626 was one
such business that gave an enforceable undertaking to AUSTRAC because it had
shortcomings in three important aspects: its OCDD system, procedures for
meeting reporting requirements, and the RBA system. 627

AUSTRAC imposed an enforceable undertaking on this entity because PayPal did not
have a system able to evaluate these accounts, especially new ones. It had six months to
complete its remediation requirement, including changing its own system (valid in US)
to suit the Australian requirements. It also had to appoint independent experts to
examine its remediation achievements within two months.
The situation regarding enforceable undertakings is even more difficult when it involves
institutions that operate in different jurisdictions and under differing AML legislation.
PayPal is a case in point, especially given that its higher level of the privacy for on-line
transactions resulted in its being ‘highly commended’ in the ‘large business’ category of
the 2009 Australian Privacy Award of the Australian Privacy Commissioner. 628
Admittedly, this award is related more to securing customers’ ability to make
transactions more safely (without exchanging personal and financial information with
the seller and thus helping guard their accounts against identity theft and other
626

See PayPal, About Us<https://www.paypal.com/au/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=p/gen/about-outside> at 10
June 2011. Founded in 1998, PayPal is a large financial institution located in San Jose, California. It was
acquired by eBay in 2002. It provides money remittance services, and one important method was ‘eBay’
where it was frequently used to sell and buy online. PayPal has received more than 20 awards for
excellence from the Internet industry and the business community — most recently the 2006 Webby
Award for Best Financial Services Site and the 2006 Webby People's Voice Award for Best Financial
Services Site.
627
AUSTRAC, Enforceable Undertaking [Paypal] (2009) <http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/eu_
paypal.pdf> at 10 June 2011, 2009, 2.
628
PayPal, PayPal Commended in Australian Privacy Award, 13 November 2009
<https://www.thepaypalblog.com/2009/11/paypal-commended-in-australian-privacy-awards/> at 10 June
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fraudulent activities) than matters relating to AML and reporting transactions. However,
PayPal is an attractive case in that it emphasises the difficulties that a great number of
international financial institutions face in terms of the function of local AML legislation
and its industry-wide internal strategy in non-domestic jurisdictions, and vice versa. It is
an issue that needs an appropriate analysis because:
-

Existence of regulatory differences: Each business operating in a number of
jurisdictions has to identify differences between the ML systems of the
jurisdictions and ensure that the parent institution in the first jurisdiction [has] no
conflict with the Legislation and the Rules of the second jurisdiction.

-

The enforcement powers of the FIU (AUSTRAC) and its privileges to control the
AML system. Not all FIUs have the same privileges as AUSTRAC, that is,
simultaneously being the FIU and the regulator and having been delegated under
the relevant legislation to make rules. Unluckily, while there is overlap in AML
legislation internationally, there is no ‘one size fits all’ approach, and this
sometimes makes the decision to take the enforceable undertakings route to
enforce compliance not the best power AUSTRAC could use to achieve its aims.

In conclusion, a compliance manager interviewed indicated that the effectiveness of
AUSTRAC enforcement mechanism relies on how far AUSTRAC can go with its
enforcement mechanism, for example, the power to revoke a licence for non-compliant
reporting entities is sometimes as important as enforceable undertakings are in others.
The most effective enforcement mechanism is that which could be the most adequate
and proper in the circumstances; however, the main discussion remains on the overall
power of AUSTRAC, the extent of its powers and its willingness to use them; and the
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impacts of such use. The following respondent explored the topic, denigrating court
action and applauding enforceable undertakings and the threat of licence revocation.
[E]nforceable undertakings for non-compliance are good … [and] usually …
adequate …[for] enforcing activity … [T]aking people to court is just [a] waste of
money ... Certainly ASIC does take people to court, … they are not afraid to take
[non-compliant] entities …to court. [But] they are far more effective coming in and
saying, “This is not right,” because they can take away your licence … can prevent
you from being a reporting entity and doing that activity... [That would be] highly
unlikely but there is always a threat and everyone [talks] … about loss of licence.
AUSTRAC does not have that power, but if they had the power to take out your
licence then it would be powerful.629

6.2.3 AUSTRAC: Underachievement of its Guiding Principles which Leads it to
Appear to be Subject to Influence During the GFC
According to the analysis in this chapter and the previous one, the question here is: ‘To
what extent has AUSTRAC been successful in achieving its overall objectives as
expressed in its Supervisory Framework, including the Guiding Principles 630 of
“Integrity”, “Transparency”, “Efficiency” and “Equity”, and to what extent has this
required the establishment and maintenance of a successful and equitable regulatory
environment with an efficient use of resources? The answers are somewhat
disappointing.
6.2.3.1 Assessing AUSTRAC’s Guiding Principles
In its Supervisory Framework, AUSTRAC identified the following as the four main
Guidance Principles:
A

Integrity: AUSTRAC mentions a number of the key elements that determine its
strength under this principle: 631
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631
Ibid 4.
630

294

i.

The variety of enforcement powers available (significantly expanded under
the AML Act).

ii.

AUSTRAC being equipped with and willing to use all options available to
guarantee compliance; yet it maintains that ‘the most successful AML/CTF
environment will be achieved by the willing and continuous participation of
all stakeholders’.

iii.

Stakeholder confidence and trust in the regulator, in terms of its expertise
and integrity. AUSTRAC notes that its integrity will be evaluated by others
according to how well it sustains its commitment to (a) act ‘professionally,
fairly, reasonably and without bias’, and to (b) maintain privacy,
confidentiality, and other related values.

iv.

Those with obligations under the AML Act ‘must have confidence and trust
that the decisions made, and the processes used to reach those decisions, are
fair even if they do not agree with the outcomes’. 632

It was clear through the analysis conducted by this thesis that the integrity of
AUSTRAC’s work has a number of weaknesses:
i.

While there is a variety of AUSTRAC enforcement powers available, the
full range of these powers are rarely used and the ones that have been used
have been queried regarding their effectiveness in increasing the level of
compliance. The transparency and adequacy of these powers has also been
questioned.

632

Ibid.
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ii.

Most stakeholders have problems with the AML system and with trusting
AUSTRAC’s ability to regulate the sector. Partner agencies see themselves
as distanced from AML obligations, and their role limited. Reporting
entities lack confidence in AUSTRAC’s skills and remain unsure as to why
and how they are to comply with the AML system, whether for threat
reduction or to avoid regulatory sanctions. This will affect the level of their
compliance, especially in a risk-based system.

B

Efficiency: AUSTRAC cites a number of the key elements that determine its
strength under this principle, such as: 633
i.

AUSTRAC must consider at a practical level the risk that a single entity will
not meet its legal responsibilities, not only the likelihood of non-compliance
but also the materiality of non-compliance (that is, the severity of the
consequences of the non-compliance).634

ii.

Effective regulatory practice for AUSTRAC dictates that those entities
evaluated as being of higher risk should be supervised more closely than
those of lower risk. In creating a ‘high quality, practical risk rating system
[AUSTRAC] … will continue to further develop its system with the aim of
building a model which is comprehensive, consistent and readily
verifiable’. 635

iii.

AUSTRAC’s escalation and enforcement powers will be utilised with great
respect for efficiency, ‘seeking to gain optimal levels of compliance with
the most appropriate enforcement tools’ in order to achieve the desired

633

Ibid 3.
Ibid.
635
Ibid.
634

296

outcome, particularly when moving down the path of prosecution. Decisions
will be made based on the facts and circumstances of each case, taking into
account issues such as the likelihood of successful prosecution, the deterrent
value in relation to others’ non-compliant behaviour, and, the risk-profile
particular business activity represented.
iv.

The AML Act requires AUSTRAC to help and advise reporting entities in
relation to their obligations under the Act, the Regulations and the Rules,
and similarly help and advise reporting entity representatives in relation to
their compliance, hence the importance that AUSTRAC places on educating
those required to comply with the AML Act. Initial estimates indicate that
tens of thousands of entities, varying in size from single person operations
to vast multinationals, and dispersed across Australia could potentially fall
under the AML Act.636 AUSTRAC aims to adopt the most efficient means to
reach these reporting entities when developing its education policy and
strategy.

v.

Clear and decisive enforcement action, where required, is also considered to
be part of the education process where the deterrent impact results in
increased voluntary compliance.

In terms of this Principle, it was obvious from the analysis of the responses in this
thesis that the efficiency of AUSTRAC work has a number of weaknesses:
i.

AUSTRAC’s experience in evaluating the AML risks of businesses has
showed weaknesses in regard to achieving the ultimate goal in this domain
that is, efficiently regulating reporting entities. Thus, the effective practice

636
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that AUSTRAC aims to embody in accordance with this Guidance Principle
has not yet been achieved.
ii.

While AUSTRAC pointed to its education activities and the escalation of
enforcement powers that it needed to achieve efficiency, a number of
interviewed reporting entities indicated that its educative process fell short.
Not only was AUSTRAC unable to adequately clarify what was required of
reporting entity employees to their satisfaction due to the low level of
feedback, which was remarked on by a number of respondents, the elearning site was also found to be unsuited to the task for those other than
banking industry reporting entities. Since November 2009 no enforcement
power has been used, except enforceable undertakings in relation to the
George Thomas Hotel group (2010) and Argos Investments (2010). Those
enforceable undertakings were not entirely clear, so it seems that
AUSTRAC is not being efficient according to its standards, especially as it
is not imposing any civil penalties. According to one AUSTRAC director,
the reasons are essentially threefold: positive responses to notices, cost and
uncertainty involved in prosecution:
AUSTRAC … issued around 300 notices during in 2010 … [It] did not use any
other enforcement action like civil penalties because in many cases, particularly
with larger entities, they end up doing what we want them to do, and from
supervisors point of view and from financial intelligence point of view, it is better
to have compliant entities instead of spend[ing] lots of money in court
prosecut[ing] them. In addition, the AML Act it might be seen in effect since long
time from 2006 until now but in terms of development and prosecution it is not, it
still early days. 637
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C

Equity: AUSTRAC mentions that in this context, equity means ‘neutrality of
treatment’ whereby no entity is unfairly discriminated against. Key elements that
determine its strength under this principle include: 638
i.

Deliberate or unwitting non-compliant reporting entities may enjoy a
competitive advantage which AUSTRAC will not ignore. AUSTRAC
inspection, enforcement, exemption and education policies will be designed
to ensure that all those with obligations under the AML Act take up those
obligations. All actions will be characterised by equal and unbiased
treatment, including ‘the timing and notification of inspection visits,
decisions to escalate action for non-compliance, and the offer of more
intensive education services’. 639

ii.

Equity does not mean that all reporting entities will be treated in a ‘one size
fits all’ approach to regulation. The principle rests on similar treatment
being accorded to reporting entities in similar circumstances. In case there
are differences in circumstances, the AUSTRAC approach will be
customised to the circumstances of each case.

In terms of this Principle, it was clear from the analysis of the outcomes in this thesis
that the principle of equity as defined in its Supervisory Framework is not fully
consistent in practice. AUSTRAC applies a ‘one size fits all’ approach in educating the
reporting entities through the e-learning available on its website, which better suits
entities with a ‘face to face’ relationship with customers than those that lack this

638
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relationship. Respondents commented on the site’s shortcomings and its lack of
suitability for a number of enterprises, due to its being based on a banking model.
D

Transparency: AUSTRAC cites a number of the key elements that determine its
strength under this principle, such as:
i.

Actions taken by AUSTRAC must not only be fair and reasonable, they
must also be seen to be fair and reasonable.

ii.

AUSTRAC policies and processes will be made clear in order to ensure
accountability, and protect its commitment to privacy principles and
practical law enforcement needs.

iii.

As far as is possible, AUSTRAC will publish on the website the AML
Rules, guidelines and policies to achieve transparency in operations.

In terms of this Principle it was clear through the analysis of the outcomes in this thesis
that the transparency of AUSTRAC operations has a number of weaknesses, for
example:
i.

A number of reporting entities interviewed see the work of AUSTRAC as
lacking transparency, especially when focusing its supervision on one
reporting entity cohort and leaving other cohorts with a lower level of
supervision. As one compliance manager indicated:
That lack of transparency … coming from the FIU … is very damaging. [We need]
to improve the approach for everybody, because if other organisations see the bar
being raised, everyone then gets a message that it needs to be raised …
I think they force people to do things, but I think again it is not in a very
transparent way ... [there’s a] certain amount of “we have to do this because
AUSTRAC said to it”.… I am not saying they should have a fight with the
regulator — that is not constructive — but you have got to be pushy … because
you are protecting the business — to make sure you are doing it correctly ...
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[B]ecause of the lack of transparency, it does not flow to everybody else out there,
so the standard does not increase. So from [a] compliance perspective then, it is not
effective. … [AUSTRAC] are not being transparent … It’s literally who are they
… targeting? Some organisations are forced to do one way more than others. 640

ii.

Another compliance manager indicated that the low level of feedback that
reporting entities are receiving is affecting the transparency of AUSTRAC’s
dealing with these entities:
I really don’t find any reporting that they [AUSTRAC] come back to us with — in
respect to the information that’s submitted — is helpful, relevant, articulate or
transparent. I mean the topology reports … that they give. 641

Overall, the indicators show that AUSTRAC is facing a deficiency in adhering to its
Guiding Principles, and as a result AUSTRAC was subject to influence during the GFC
(see below), which affected AUSTRAC’s work in general and its enforcement actions
in particular. Although currently there is a gap noted between the regulator and the
regulated, there is also a danger posed by regulatory capture if it gets too close to those
it seeks to regulate, and its Guidelines reflect the needs and concerns of the regulated
rather than satisfy the aims of the regulator.
6.2.3.2 The Global Financial Crisis and AUSTRAC Operations
In terms of the Australian experience of the GFC, despite the impacts being
substantially less than elsewhere (largely due to China’s demand for energy and
minerals from Australia642 and generally lower exposure to US subprime hedging
instruments), there were rising interest rates, falling superannuation returns (indeed
negative growth), substantial household debt (still high), financial pain affecting
640

Interview with a Compliance Manager A, above n 504.
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Library, Parliament of Australia, 12 October 2010 <http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/Briefing
Book43p/australia-china-gfc.htm>. The author attributed Australia’s stronger performance to the various
stimulus measures, a ‘sound and liquid banking system and … China’s robust demand for energy and
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businesses, and unemployment rose from 3.9 to 5.7 per cent nationally in the 12 months
to June 2009 unevenly distributed but affecting many in the Australian community 643—
hence the ‘stimulus package’ and other government measures, including those by its
regulatory agencies, to protect Australians from the worst of the GFC.
The imposition of new obligations on the Australian financial system was and is a major
concern at the national level. Vulnerabilities exposed by the GFC must be addressed.
Regulators in general, and those concerned with the AML (including AUSTRAC)
should be aware of the issues and deal with them wisely. This includes dealing with
entities in accordance with its Guiding Principles while taking into consideration their
individual circumstance.
Although Australia was one of the countries least affected by GFC, the Australian
Government offered support to the financial institutions in the face of any potential risk.
In October 2008, the Government announced that it would guarantee bank deposits, and
other specific areas were targeted for support:
With the economy facing a recession, an economic stimulus package worth $10.4
billion was announced. This included payments to seniors, careers and families.
The payments were made in December 2008, just in time for Christmas spending,
and retailers predominantly reported strong sales. The first home buyer’s grant was
doubled to $14,000 for existing homes, and tripled to $21,000 for new homes. The
automotive industry was also given a helping hand, as several major lenders had
withdrawn from the market completely, leaving banks to fill the gaps in lending. 644
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For details re unemployment effects, see ABS information cited by Brigid van Wanrooy et al,
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In a line with this approach, regulators’ response is to avoid any potential political
pressure, such as from lobbyists (often former politicians) 645who may enjoy privileged
access to government decision-makers and be perceived as able to exert excessive or
unacceptable pressure on government decision-making (even, on occasion being
awarded massive ‘success fees’ when the government makes a decision for the benefit
of their client, be it an individual business or a business or industry sector). 646This fact
will affect regulators’ enforcement decisions so that it appears lenient on some noncompliant entities. In such circumstances it would not be an easy task for a regulatory
agency, but nor is ‘walking the tightrope’ between (a) saving the improved reputation,
public confidence and communication with reporting entities, and understanding these
entities needs and tailoring approaches appropriately, and (b) becoming increasingly
subject to the risk of regulatory capture, as staff increasing identify with the aims of the
reporting entity, rather than (as desired) the staff of the reporting entity identifying with
the aims of the regulator and adopting its approach.
Unfortunately, the government apparently leant on regulators to ‘go soft’ on
implementing the new arrangements because it did not want to distract management in
the banks and other institutions while they were focusing on the GFC. Regulators
meekly did as they were told.
For example, it was clear that even the decision-making of the ACCC (with its better
enforcement mechanism and better record of decisions when compared with
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AUSTRAC enforcement mechanism and decisions), could be challenged and other
regulators were not immune (including AUSTRAC) during the GFC. It is worth
recalling that bank stocks dropped almost 60 per cent between October 2007 and
January 2009 and the Australian banking sector was not isolated from GFC effects (the
NAB more exposed than the other three majors). General default risk rose steeply
(though unevenly distributed), particularly in relation to the position of other
industries. 647Against this backdrop, the merger of the St George Bank (and Bankwest)
with Westpac proceeded in late 2008 (during the GFC); although under the Competition
Act, the ACCC has the capacity to block any merger in financial institutions that has
potential to reduce competition in the market. The argument was made that the ‘four
pillar policy’ remained, guaranteeing competition. Competition, however, was reduced
overall as the GFC had resulted by late 2009 in the withdrawal of a number of foreign
banks and non-bank lenders. Government fears of the consequences of GFC and the
resulting Government pressure has produced a less competitive banking sector. Even
the then ACCC chair later questioned the wisdom of its decision. 648
In the area of AUSTRAC’s attitude during the GFC, it has been clear that instead of
being a wise regulatory agency that considered its Guiding Principles, AUSTRAC was
‘too soft’ before the reporting entities community. Although former AUSTRAC CEO,
Neil Jenson, and the current CEO, John Schmidt, announced in several publications that
in light of the threats posed by the GFC reporting entities were asked to remain vigilant
and cooperate with AUSTRAC, there was no indication in these publications or
anywhere else regarding whether AUSTRAC was going to deal swiftly and severely
647
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with AML non-compliance. Thus the activities of criminals trying to take advantage of
the difficulties that the Australian financial system was going through during the GFC
was facilitated by a failure to signal enhanced regulatory oversight. Neil Jenson
indicated that:
AUSTRAC is cognisant of the evolving nature of crime — we know that criminals
continually look for new techniques to obscure the origins of illicit funds so their
activities appear legitimate. It is critical, especially in this time of global financial
crisis that the financial and gambling sectors, AUSTRAC and our partner agencies
continue to vigilantly work together and share valuable information to maintain the
integrity of the Australian financial system. 649

The current AUSTRAC’s CEO, John Schmidt in a review for the annual report of
2008–2009 stated:
[The GFC] added to the complexity of AUSTRAC's regulatory role. Throughout
the year, AUSTRAC’s message to the business community was to maintain sound
AML/CTF practices. We impressed upon industry the need to remain extra vigilant
against money launderers and other criminals attempting to exploit weaknesses in
global financial markets.650

In 2008–09, AUSTRAC demonstrated advanced analytical methods to its partner
agencies in several states to identify the changing risks that could occur due to the GFC.
Among them were:
New risk identification techniques and new statistical analysis techniques for
SUSTRs/SMRs. AUSTRAC staff also undertook a macro-analysis of the impact of
the global financial crisis on money laundering and a joint project with Centrelink
to establish fraud risk profiles. 651

A number of partner agencies indicated the elevated ML activities risk for during the
GFC, and the role of AUSTRAC in relation to this risk. For example, the ATO
indicated that:

649

AUSTRAC, Eagerly-awaited Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Typologies Report
Released Globally, 16 December 2008 <http://www.austrac.gov.au/16dec08.html> at 17 June 2011.
650
AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Annual Report 2008–09, above n 19, 6.
651
AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Annual Report 2009–10, above n 189, 63.

305

Times of economic volatility tend to give rise to opportunistic scams and dodgy
schemes, with unscrupulous individuals trying to make money out of other people's
difficulties. We've also witnessed the collapse of long-standing dubious schemes
because the financial crisis means they can no longer continue to operate [for
example] the [US] Ponzi Scheme … was estimated to have lost investors more than
$50 billion … . … So the GFC has focused the operations of AUSTRAC to
identify these sorts of schemes more readily and work with our partners to put a
stop to them. 652

However, many such schemes operated before the GFC. The GFC merely brought them
to light, as when a number of Australian operations collapsed, some legitimate, some
not (including an Australian ‘Ponzi’ equivalent, Chartwell). 653 So the question is why
were they not noticed earlier? The answer is because of a lack of regulatory supervision,
investor gullibility and some may say a degree of regulator ineptitude. 654 In Australia,
AUSTRAC and partner agencies lack of efficiency in this regard and the disconnection
between of them could be said to have contributed to the outcomes. The ATO, for
example, has been accused of not fulfilling its regulatory responsibility by informing
ASIC in a timely manner regarding Chartwell’s failure to pay tax; 655and regulatory
action is underway against auditors in several instances of corporate failure. 656
Despite all of AUSTRAC’s warnings to the reporting entities about the added ML risk
due to the GFC and its advice that reporting entities should put extra resources towards
their AML systems, the result was disappointing. Half of the reporting entities in the
Compliance Officers Survey did not increase their resources to deal with the emerging
new risks. (see Table 10 below).
652
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Table 10: Reporting Entities Percentages of Changing the Level of Resourcing
Devoted to AML Issues since September 2008 657

Table 11: Reporting Entities Percentages of Changing the Level of Resourcing
Devoted to AML Issues since September 2008 – By Sector658
The lack of increased time and resources spent by a number of relevant reporting
entities in the face of warnings of increased risk is worrying. Also worrying is the
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apparent lack of reasonable action by AUSTRAC. None could be found in this regard.
The increased number of compliance assessments (up 42 per cent to 502 in 2019–10) 659
is one attempt to do so. (There are over 17,000 regulated entities). 660 And there still
appears to be a reluctance to use ‘the big stick’.
AUSTRAC indicated that additional detection had been generated globally as the GFC
… has prompted a more cautious international financial market, there are always
opportunities for criminals to exploit the financial sector. Authorities have also
noted that the financial crisis has led to increased detection of money laundering
and other financial crime, as companies and investors around the globe scrutinise
their accounts more closely.661

For criminals looking for the ‘latest and greatest’ payment mechanisms to facilitate their
ML schemes, the GFC provided an opportunity in a volatile market to do so, as
financial institutions issued numerous new products to attract clients and retain
investors. Such products create new opportunities, not just for reporting entities and
their clients, but for criminals to exploit, and for regulators to attempt to deal with.
This thesis has shown that reporting entities still have difficulty implementing their
compliance programs, while AUSTRAC faces a difficult time covering all new products
being issued by reporting entities and potentially used for ML purposes.
While new regulation may restrict some of the reporting entities’ new products, their
continual innovations will make it more difficult for AUSTRAC to control, especially
given its existing weaknesses (discussed earlier).
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One interesting example that reflects weaknesses in AUSTRAC supervision regards a
product developed during the GFC, Stored Value Cards (SVCs). 662 According to
FinCEN:
Prepaid products, also variously known as stored value, stored value cards, or
prepaid cards, have emerged in recent years into the mainstream of the US
financial system …This migration to electronic delivery has escalated greatly in
recent years, most especially over the last 3–5 years.663

Effectively implemented in US during the GFC, SVC systems expanded thereafter.
Australia has to deal with this new type of payment with all of the high level of risk that
this type of card poses.664
Despite the inherent ML opportunities offered by SVCs, particularly those with
anonymity features, AUSTRAC does not appear to have made efforts to regulate their
use. For example, requiring proof of identity when a person wishes to buy or reload
such cards, or requiring the registration or licensing of all SVC issuers.
Either AUSTRAC is easy to be captured by the regulated entities (as AUSTRAC’s GFC
experience has shown), or it is unable to keep pace with the changes wrought by the
regulated entities in terms of product development. For example, the financial arm of a
major national department store issued SVCs with anonymous holders 665 and a
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reloadable value as high as AUD99,999.666 Yet to date there is no strict supervision or
regulation from AUSTRAC for such cards. Thus regulatory delays added to
AUSTRAC’s weakness during the GFC which stemmed from its generally weak
Guiding Principles and, more specifically, its enforcement decisions and powers. These
Principles must be achieved if AUSTRAC wants to ensure compliance and to remain
‘rock solid’ in the face of any emerging economic crisis.
6. 3 Conclusion
Chapter 5 considered AUSTRAC’s publications in order to focus on what AUSTRAC
says in policies and what it does in real life. The outcome was an accumulation of
evidence regarding a lack of quality in the reports that AUSTRAC receives and on the
minimum feedback that AUSTRAC provides to the reporting entities about the quality
of those reports, as well as a number of other related issues. This Chapter has provided
an analysis of the factors that have contributed to and reasons for these outcomes and
for the deficiency in the relationship between AUSTRAC and the reporting entities. It
has highlighted the weaknesses of AUSTRAC in the area of AML activities.
A Grounded Theory based analysis of the responses of the reporting entities interviewed
found a number of factors that help account for this situation as well as for
AUSTRAC’s poor enforcement mechanism, namely:
1

AUSTRAC has failed to apply RBA effectively to regulated entities; and the
AML training it provides is inadequate due to:
-

AUSTRAC’s inexperience and lack of capacity
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-

The Australian AML system not being ready for the adoption of RBA

-

A disengagement in the relationship between AML parties (AUSTRAC and
reporting entities)

-

Inadequacies in the response to the 2007 FATF Guidance on the Risk-Based
Approach to Combating ML and TF.

2

The enforcement powers used by AUSTRAC are not sufficiently mature and have
shortcomings affecting their influence on enforcing compliance. This is due to:
-

Using enforceable undertakings as a benchmark sanction, rather than
applying the harsher sanctions available, including civil penalties, on noncompliant reporting entities.

3

-

Concentrating on some businesses’ categories and ignoring others.

-

Targeting small businesses only in most cases.

Insufficient information being provided by AUSTRAC to non-compliant reporting
entities about the actual breach committed (This establishes the non-compliant
status of these reporting entities).

4

AUSTRAC is facing a shortfall in achieving its Guiding Principles, which leads it
to be subject to influence by GFC. This is due to:
-

A lack in AUSTRAC’s Guiding Principles.

-

AUSTRAC being vulnerable to governmental pressure ‘to go soft’ during
the GFC.
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Overall, AUSTRAC’s in experience plays a significant role in its poor use of RBA in
regards to its application within reporting entities and in the way in which AUSTRAC
deals with them and their risks.
Reporting entities require a far more systematic provision of training programs as the
low quality problem of data begins with the inadequate analysis within these entities.
These entities also need to understand their role and to collaborate in the AML scheme
with other AML parties in a model where risk (threat) reduction and avoiding sanctions
both is the background and supplies the motivation.
Systematic staff training within AUSTRAC is also required if it is to provide an
effective and mature enforcement mechanism for use on non-compliant reporting
entities. This mechanism and its power need to be clear to all and correctly sued,
targeting all non-compliant entities, whether they are small or large. The need to
achieve the Guiding Principles of AUSTRAC (including Transparency, Efficiency,
Equity and Integrity) is crucial; but will not occur effectively if there is a shortfall in the
above-mentioned areas. Instead AUSTRAC will be seen as a weak regulator and FIU, if
not vulnerable to pressure from lobbyists for various interests (including the reporting
entities community and their representatives). The danger here is that while its
operations may not fall prey to such efforts, AUSTRAC (like other regulatory bodies)
has to be seen as totally impartial, impenetrably ethical, not subject to political or
reporting entity pressure, and acting always for the sake of the broader community. It
must be able to achieve its goals and so contribute to the framework of a stable society,
where privacy concerns and necessary financial transparency are suitably balanced.
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Regulators must be on the lookout for the emergence of new products so that they
effectively regulate them in the interests of the community and minimise the possibility
of ML activity.
Effective regulatory activity is crucial to avoid repeating past economic disasters and to
deal with future circumstances.
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7 CONCLUSION
7. 1 Introduction
The original purpose667 of AML systems was to reduce the illegal behaviour (predicate
offences) which gave rise to the need to engage in related ML activities by making it
more difficult for launderers to enjoy their illicit gains. From an economic perspective
this makes sense, at least in theory. Even when taking into consideration the differences
in the regulatory cultures of various countries, generally policies that decrease the
compliance costs which tend to apply to regulated entities (thus encouraging reporting
entities to comply) and reduce the benefit of a criminal activity are likely to reduce that
behaviour. What is needed is an effective AML system at as low a cost as possible. This
is one of the factors that AUSTRAC and many regulators do not seem to understand
because they do not have a commercial perspective. Higher compliance costs weaken
compliance and probably make it easier for the criminal to engage in ML. On the other
hand the regulated entities want to incur no compliance costs and this is also unrealistic.
This debate has been clear through the analyses of a number of interviewed reporting
entities and a number of AUSTRAC’s publications in this thesis.
In 2009–10 alone, AUSTRAC received over 21.5 million transaction reports (of which
the vast majority was IFTIs). These involved over 43,000 SUSTRs and SMRs and
generated almost 1400 financial intelligence assessments for relevant partner agencies
that make further evaluations.668 This large and increasing number of reports motivated
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the Government to spend more money for AML purposes. The ACC has by its own
calculations and from international research conservatively estimated that ‘serious and
organised crime (including ML crimes) cost Australia between 10 and 15 billion dollars
every year’.669 This has necessitated increasing expenditure by the Australian
Government (and by industry). The total federal budget allocation to AUSTRAC rose
slowly from approximately AUD8.3 million in 1996–97 to AUD11.2 million in 2002–
03 before rising steeply in 2003–04 to AUD20.1 million. More recently, the Australian
Government provided AUSTRAC with AUD24 million over four years as specific
funding on top of its ongoing budget.
…to develop its intelligence systems as part of the government’s wider efforts to
tackle organised crime. This money will fund new analytical technologies to
enhance our ability to track illicit money trails and detect serious and organised
crime, tax evasion and financial fraud. 670

The fundamental question that must be asked is whether the multimillion dollar
regulatory burden is achieving ‘value for the money’ — in other words, can the high
costs involved be justified by a correspondingly significant decrease in the criminal
activities targeted?
Unfortunately, there seems to be little reason to believe that resources are being
intelligently allocated. Studies cannot be located that demonstrate that the Australian
AML system has decreased ML crime rates or underlying predicate offences, the very
reason for the AML legislation. It is no wonder that (as this thesis has shown) people
from the private sector have indicated that the AML systems generate expense but have
achieved minimal tangible benefits. These costs might be acceptable if they resulted in
less crime.
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According to the latest estimates (published in 2007), the amount of money laundered in
and through Australian financial system is approximately AUD4.5 billion per year. 671
Though difficult to estimate, it is understood to be a ‘significant, widespread and
ongoing activity’ that is ‘fuelled by, and reflective of, the amount of profit generated by
crime’ with both within and beyond its shores. Real risks continue to envelop the
Australian financial system and reporting entity non-compliance facilitates its
movement in and through the Australian jurisdiction.
However, AUSTRAC has been found to be lenient on non-compliance, even when the
Australian regulatory culture and its pre-existing legal institutional framework provides
dynamic tools for regulatory agencies to apply most effective sanctions including severe
ones. This has been found despite the experience of other regulatory agencies (such as
ASIC, the ACCC, and APRA) demonstrating that the application of harsher sanctions is
more likely to have the desired outcome than ‘softer’ option. ASIC and ACCC, for
example, have both applied civil penalty sanctions on non-compliant entities besides
other ‘softer’ sanctions, such as warning letters. The outcome for these entities has been
made possible by the nature of these agencies. ASIC, APRA and ACCC are separate
agencies and have had an active enforcement mechanism since their inception, and a
better relationship and more consultation with the government. However, AUSTRAC
has been found to lack the required level of enforcement, and the necessary budget and
experience required since it established under the FTR Act in 1988 and even after
passing the AML Act in 2006 and up until the present.
The thesis also showed that — due to the differences in the regulatory culture and the
pre-existing legal institutional framework and ML practices in particular countries—
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what works for the FIU in one jurisdiction does not necessarily work in another; and
very different approaches may be required in different jurisdictions. For example, a
regulatory approach adopted by an FIU such that it relies on the application of harsher
sanctions, as is frequently the case the US experience, may not necessarily work for the
FIU in another jurisdiction. Replacing the ‘softer’ approach typified by the Netherlands
experience, where ‘softer’ sanctions are regularly and predictably imposed on noncompliant entities may not generate the results anticipated; indeed, the particular
approach adopted there may be more successful in that jurisdiction. AUSTRAC — with
all the tools it has at its disposal to enforce compliance in a regulatory culture that
(unlike the Netherlands) permits the FIU to apply what many would consider the most
effective and appropriate sanctions given the seriousness of the criminal activities that
the FIU is attempting to detect — has chosen to utilise only the ‘softer’ options
available to it on non-compliant reporting entities and does not make full and most
effective use of the enforcement mechanism. This result was clear when the thesis
applied the Braithwaite theory on the current AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism’s
scenario.
Reporting entities under the Australian AML system are generating massive quantities
of data for AUSTRAC, creating a veritable ‘haystack’ of material of very different
levels of quality and usefulness with which AUSTRAC has to attempt to deal and select
appropriate material for forwarding to appropriate agencies. There is no doubt that the
personnel of partner agencies, including law enforcement bodies, experience some
difficulty participating in the AML scheme and finding the ‘needle’ of criminal action.
This is exacerbated where a relatively inexperienced regulator is operating and which
attempts to enforce reporting entity compliance while using only a very limited
repertoire from the sanctions and enforcement powers at its disposal. It provides a
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minimal feedback about the quality of that data to those supplying it and so fails to
maximise the quality of information received. This attitude to some extent is alienating
those whose task it is to supply that data. Their attitude will be further fuelled by a
move towards ‘user pays’ by the regulator.672
Thus, there is a pathetically low rate of return for a system that represents an investment
of many millions of dollars, and requires millions of reports on the financial
transactions of the Australian people. Policy makers and regulatory agencies, including
AUSTRAC, should seriously consider modifying the AML system and in corporate
more effective ways to fight crime.
This thesis showed that low quality STRs have been a problem since the inception of
the current Australian AML system in 1988. The shortcomings, as this thesis has
showed, stem from the limited experience of AUSTRAC and the difficulties both
regulator and regulated alike are having applying RBA, as well as the lack of systematic
AML training programs for AUSTRAC and the regulated entities’ personnel.
AUSTRAC’s weaknesses in regulating the system and combating ML crimes call into
question its Guiding Principles, including its use of the enforcement mechanism (and its
structure) for reporting entity non-compliance with their reporting obligations, and for
its other roles and obligations that it must fulfil to regulate the system. It has been clear
that its Guiding Principles of ‘transparency, equity, integrity and efficiency’ have not
yet been realised. This weakens the ability of AUSTRAC to be an effective agency in
the face of the ever-increasing sophistication of money launderers, the challenges posed
672

AUSTRAC is anticipating moving to a user pays model from FY2011-12. Reporting entities (law
firms in the future) will have to pay to use AUSTRAC services. In the recent Budget 2010-2011 papers
AUSTRAC anticipates raising approximately $30m in FY2011-12 with corresponding amounts in the
following 2 years. See Patrick Oliver, Tranche 2 Implantation Timescale, Lexcel Law Practice
Consultants (14 May 2010) <http://www.lexcel.com.au/2010/05/14/tranche-2-implementationtimescale/> at 5 June 2011.
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by the severe economic problems (such as the GFC) that face countries world-wide and
pressures that may be exerted by interest groups or their lobbyists. The thesis has shown
that there are question marks over AUSTRAC’s ability to handle such circumstances.
By considering all the above, this thesis found that the Australian AML system does not
properly meet the four requirements and attributes that this thesis has suggested would
ensure AUSTRAC’s ability to utilise an effective enforcement mechanism for noncompliant reporting entities. Necessary changes would involve:
1

Different and actively used sanctions in place to be applied in response to noncompliance.

2

Concords and agreements between the main regulator of the field and its partner
regulatory agencies, and also between the regulators and the regulated entities to
increase compliance.

3

Unambivalent legislation and regulation essential for a successful enforcement
mechanism.

4

Avoidance of regulatory capture in the face of pressure (economic or other), and
maintenance of independence.

This chapter will show why these attributes do not work effectively with the Australian
AML system and AUSTRAC’s operations, including its enforcement mechanism at the
current time, and what changes are needed in terms of that.
7. 2 Obtaining compliance: What works and what does not?
The main question that the thesis asked was: ‘What are the strengths and weaknesses of
AUSTRAC’s approach to non-compliance?’
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After building a theoretical basis, and a detailed analysis of AUSTRAC publications
including: policies, 673 annual reports,674 the AUSTRAC survey series (2010), 675
typologies and case study reports;676 and analysis of interviewee responses from
reporting entities (mainly, compliance officers and managers) across Australia, the
following strengths and weaknesses are evident and reflect what works to what does not
in the area of enhancing compliance?
A

The Strengths of the Australian AML system and AUSTRAC’s Approach to NonCompliance

There were a number of positive outcomes for the Australian AML system overall and
AUSTRAC enforcement mechanism in particular. These include:
1

The FATF mutual evaluation in 2005 (its third and most recent) found that at that
time AUSTRAC was an ‘effective FIU … [with its] 154 AUSTRAC personnel ...
adequate for it to effectively perform its FIU functions’. 677 However, ‘while the
legal measures are comprehensive they are not fully effective’ due to a failure to
investigate and refer ML as a separate charge. The number of ML prosecutions
was also low.678 It identified a number of areas that needed to be improved, some
of which have only been recently addressed or are still in the process of being
addressed. (For example, the extensions of reporting obligations to a greater
number of types of businesses, such as bureaux de change, bullion sellers,
solicitors).679
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AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Policies’ <http://www.austrac.gov.au/policies.html> at 6 June 2011.
AUSTRAC, ‘Annual Reports’, above n 470.
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AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Survey Series’, above n 471.
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AUSTRAC, ‘AUSTRAC Typologies and Case Study Reports’, above n 472.
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FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report, above n 15, 7. Also see AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Regulatory
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The Report noted that, although a number of areas were rated as Non-compliant or
only Partially Compliant,680 Australia’s level of compliance with FATF
Recommendations overall placed its AML system in the range between Partially
Compliant and Largely Compliant. However, Australia has since succeeded
(particularly after passing the AML Act 2006) in covering many important aspects
of the FATF Recommendations regarding reporting obligations, including
identified classes of reporting entities being required to identify and verify
customers and report suspicious or other designated types of transactions as well
as fulfil their record keeping obligations.
2

The Australian AML Act 2006 (Cth). The first tranche of the law, particularly Part
3,681 requires the reporting entities who are providing ‘financial services’ to fulfil
their reporting obligations by submitting to AUSTRAC the following types of
reports:
-

Suspicious matter report (SMR)682

-

Threshold transactions report (TTR) of transactions equal to or more than
AUD10,000683

680

Ibid. For example, Recommendations 5–8 (at 76), Recommendation 9 (at 79), Recommendations15
and 22(at 94), Recommendation12 (at 111), and Recommendation 16 (at 114).
681
According to Part 3 Reporting Obligations, Division 1 Introduction, s 40 Simplified outline of the
AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth):
A reporting entity must give the AUSTRCCEO reports about suspicious matters.
If a reporting entity provides a designated service that involves a threshold transaction, the reporting
entity must give the AUSTRAC CEO a report about the transaction.
If a person sends or receive an international funds transfer instruction, the person must give the
AUSTRAC CEO a report about the instruction.
A reporting entity may be required to give AML/CTF compliance reports to the AUSTRAC CEO.
682
AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) ss 41–42. See also re Suspicious Matter Report, AUSTRAC, Reporting
Requirements, An Introduction to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter terrorism Financing Act 2006
(AML/CMF Act) Reporting Requirements (n d) doc no 140/1008/CC, above n 264, 3.
683
AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) ss 43–44 See also re Threshold Transaction Report (TTR) AUSTRAC,
Reporting Requirements, An Introduction to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter terrorism
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-

International funds transfer instruction report (IFTI).684

These types of reports were found to be very important to the AML system,
because they help AUSTRAC and law enforcement bodies take further steps in
detecting, investigating and prosecuting groups and individuals who are involved
in any ML or TF activities.
Part 4 covers another two important types of reports, those relating to:685

3

-

Physical currency

-

Bearer negotiable instruments

The Australian AML system (including the Act and Rules) is much improved, and
covers a number of important aspects with regards to the verification and
identification of customers (including CDD and OCDD, and reporting
suspicions).

4

AUSTRAC has been found to be an active agency (especially during the last three
years) in terms of providing reporting entity education and initiating (and in some
instances completing) a number of enforcement actions. 686

Financing Act 2006 (AML/CMF Act) Reporting Requirements (n d) doc no 140/1008/CC, above n 264,
3–4.
684
AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth) ss 45–46 See also re the two types of IFTI reports, AUSTRAC, Reporting
Requirements, An Introduction to the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter terrorism Financing Act 2006
(AML/CMF Act) Reporting Requirements (n d) doc no 140/1008/CC, above n 264, 4.
685
According to the AML/CTF Act 2006 (Cth), Part 4 Reports about cross-border movements of physical
currency and bearer negotiable instruments, Division 1 Introduction, s 54 Simplified outline:
 Cross-border movements of physical currency must be reported to the AUSTRAC CEO, a customs
officer or a police officer if the total value moved is above a threshold.
 If a bearer negotiable instrument is produced to a police officer or a customer officer by a person
leaving or arriving in Australia, the officer may require the person to give a report about the
instrument to the AUSTRAC CEO, a customs officer or a police officer.
686
See, eg, Table 3: ‘AUSTRAC Activities Summary 2009–10’, Appendix A of AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC
Supervision Strategy 2010-11, 10 <http://www.austrac.gov.au/files/supervision.pdf> at 11 April 2011.
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5

AUSTRAC’s publications reveal that it has put in place quality policies to combat
ML crimes in general and compliance enforcement in particular. It can meet its
analytical and regulatory requirements if it effectively applies these polices.

However, considerable weaknesses have been identified that question the effectiveness
of AUSTRAC in the field of enforcing compliance, and its ability to apply its policies in
real life ‘not only as ink on paper’.
B

AUSTRAC’s Compliance Weaknesses

The performance of the Australian AML system has been affected negatively by three
main causes:
1

The shortcomings in the FATF Recommendations that are the benchmark AML
systems:
The thesis showed that the FATF Recommendations are not inclusive in every
respect. A number of inadequacies were revealed in the difficulties that countries
face in complying with them (implementation) and in some other areas the clarity
of the Recommendation (the actual recommendation) itself caused a problem.
Areas included in relation to the beneficial ownership issue (illustrating the
problems with the verification process in the CDD obligation for reporting
entities), the meaning of ‘risk’ in the RBA obligation, reporting suspicions (not
just suspicious transactions), and others.

2

Shortcomings in the legislative framework:
The shortcomings in the FATF Recommendations flow through to the legislation
based on them and affect the way in which the Australian AML system deals with
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issues such as: CDD, the application of the RBA, matters regarding the
identification of the beneficial owner, SMRs. The thesis has shown that the
Australian AML system has covered a number of important aspects in the Act and
the Rules; however, the continued difficulty experienced by reporting entities in
their application of RBA to their reporting obligations under this system are
evidence of enduring problems.
3

The effectiveness of AUSTRAC functions and its enforcement mechanism
regarding non-compliance with reporting obligations has been a major theme in
this thesis:
AUSTRAC operations are hampered by a lack of resources and expertise to
address the severity of the situations it faces. It has a number of powers available
to it (that could be further extended), but its use of those it has is unduly restricted.
AUSTRAC’s personnel and those of reporting entities require better focused
training programs in order to fully understand and play their role in the AML
system. A number of facts have emerged. These include
-

Complexity of the AML prosecution process and an apparent reluctance to
prosecute: There have been very few ML prosecutions at the
Commonwealth level. The 2005 FATF Mutual Evaluation Report indicated
ten matters had been dealt with summarily, with three on indictment since
2003, and five convictions. Though a few additional cases may be
anticipated, this low level of prosecutions and conviction rate in the face of
the estimated level of ML funds indicates that the regime is not being
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effectively implemented.687The most recent evaluation, the 2010 US
Department of State (DoS) report, recommended an increased prosecutorial
effort as well as greater focus on AML/CTF deterrence.688
-

AUSTRAC’s relatively weak enforcement mechanism compared to those of
its partner agencies (ASIC and the ACCC).

-

Reporting entities’ need for more and better targeted training and feedback
so that they can better comply with the AML system. Low compliance or
poorer quality compliance is likely to occur in its absence. Self regulation in
almost every field has been accompanied by significant failures; the degree
of responsibility laid upon the reporting entities combined with inadequate
education/training/feedback to contribute to the challenges facing the AML
system.

-

Significant failures in the overarching RBA, including (i) inadequate
guidelines, education and training offered within the regulator and to some
reporting entities, which must negatively impact compliance; and (ii)
targeting of specific groups for additional attention at the legislative level
and at the regulator’s inspection and enforcement level, and even at specific
entity level where training inadequacies must impact on performance.

-

Stakeholders’ problems with the AML system and distrust in AUSTRAC’s
ability to regulate the sector. Partner agencies are ‘distant’ from their AML
obligations and see their role as limited. Reporting entities lack confidence

687
688

FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report, above n 15, 6.
US Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy, Volume II (2010), above n 291.
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in AUSTRAC’s skills and still struggle with compliance concepts and
activities.
-

A disconnection between the perceptions of AML parties. For example,
AUSTRAC believes that reporting entities are doing a positive job, and that
training is adequate — in stark contrast to the entities’ perceptions of their
available training programs. Nevertheless, some 72 per cent of compliance
officers reported one or more AML matters to their board, and though 28
per cent of respondents failed to report a single matter, they are in the
minority. 689On the basis of compliance officer working hours spent on AML
issues, the value accorded AML compliance appears low. Only 43 of the
150 compliance officers surveyed for AUSTRAC spent more than 25 per
cent of their working time on AML. 690

-

Generation of massive quantities of low value reports by reporting entities,
from which AUSTRAC must try to produce high quality reports. A large
numbers of reports disseminated in 2009–10 were, however, apparently of
limited benefit to partner agencies, including the ATO, AFP and ACBPS. 691

-

Discrepancies between what AUSTRAC Strategies and Polices outline in
relation to its activities, and what occurs, are reflected in its own annual
reports, typologies, case studies and surveys.

-

AUSTRAC’s difficulty in distinguishing between the minimum level of
enforcement power and the most effective use of enforcement power, one
that could guarantee greater compliance by the non-compliant entity and its

689

AUSTRAC, AML/CTF Compliance Officers in Australia, above n 245, 6.
Ibid.
691
AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Annual Report 2009–10, above n 189, 51.
690
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reporting sector. AUSTRAC fails to activate its powers as needed and is
reluctant to escalate enforcement action to the level where harsher sanctions
are imposed.
-

AUSTRAC’s inadequate enforcement mechanism, which reduces its
usefulness, and obstructs AUSTRAC’s efforts regarding securing savings of
public money and seizing proceeds. Its limited powers are used on the basis
of the insufficient information, and generally employ only soft sanctions. It
would be hard to predict the success of the second tranche of the AML Act
as long as AUSTRAC’s current problems remain unresolved.

Thus, while AUSTRAC has strengthened its performance, it still faces a number of
factors that would limit the effectiveness of its strategies unless it takes urgent action to
address these shortcomings. AUSTRAC is facing difficulties in achieving its Guiding
Principles of: ‘integrity’, ‘transparency’, ‘efficiency’ and ‘equity’.
The current Australian AML system does not properly fit with the four requirements
and attributes suggested in Chapter 4 that are needed to ensure AUSTRAC’s ability to
impose the most effective use of its enforcement mechanism on non-compliant
reporting entities.
7. 3 AUSTRAC and the Four Attributes Outlined in the Thesis
When applying an analysis of the interview data and other information collected using
the four attributes, the results show that the current AML scenario in Australia does not
fit inclusively with the four key attributes of the thesis and there is a need for the
Government, AUSTRAC, its partner agencies, policy makers and reporting entities to
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consider this issue, so as to follow AUSTRAC’s Guiding Principles of AUSTRAC and
maximise the effectiveness of the Australian AML regime.
7.3.1 AUSTRAC does not Actively Use the Most Effective Sanctions in Response
to Non-Compliance
AUSTRAC has issued a number of documents to explain and justify its use of its
enforcement mechanism. These include AUSTRAC’s Enforcement Policy, and the
guiding principles within its Supervisory Framework Policy, and the Enforcement
Manual. AUSTRAC uses its enforcement powers where non-compliance has been
identified. According to the AUSTRAC Enforcement Policy:
[W]here cooperation and negotiation have demonstrably failed, AUSTRAC will
not hesitate to take measured but firm enforcement action for the purpose of
securing compliance and rectification. 692

However, the 2005 FATF Mutual Evaluation Report on Australia found serious
deficiencies in Australia’s compliance with FATF Recommendations, namely 17
(‘Effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal, civil or administrative sanctions’), 693
35 (‘Conventions and UN Special Resolutions’), 694 and 40 (‘Provision of wide range of
international cooperation to foreign counterparts’).695 AUSTRAC was found to be only
partly compliant in its application of sanctions where non-compliance was detected, and
its record shows that it does not routinely apply formal sanctions.
Indeed, AUSTRAC has made a very limited use of its enforcement powers since it
started to operate under the AML Act on 12 December 2006 until the time of the
researcher’s writing this thesis in 2011. When AUSTRAC has chosen to utilise the more
692

AUSTRAC, AUSTRAC Enforcement Policy, above n 14.
FATF, Third Mutual Evaluation Report, above n 15, 99–100 [432]–[439], 106, 111 [491], 148, 158–9.
694
Ibid 129 [580], 130 [584], 155, 160 referring to problem with beneficial ownership and
implementation of Recommendation 5.
695
Ibid 139ff, 144.
693
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regulatory intrusive sanctions available to it, it has done so only in regard to a number
of small remittance services businesses by removing their registration (after failure to
achieve compliance with warning letters, enforceable undertakings, and remedial
directions). There is no evidence of any similar serious action against any other entities,
which (according to AUSTRAC) represent the biggest risk, more so than the remittance
services.
Illustrative of its approach is AUSTRAC’s enforcement record for 2009–10: it issued
about 300 warning notices, 696 10 enforceable undertakings (4 enforceable undertakings
in 2009 and 6 enforceable undertakings in 2010), 2 remedial directions (1 in 2009 and
the other in 2010), and 2 removals from register of providers of designated remittance
services (1 in 2010 and the other in 2011).697
If one applies the first attribute (a willingness to actively use the full range of sanctions
available (including stronger ones where these are the most effective response), he will
find that AUSTRAC fails to actively use the full range of tools and sanctions available
to it to achieve the most proper enforcement mechanism that suited to the task. Those
sanctions that have been used by AUSTRAC have not always been used in a way that
guarantees compliance by non-compliant entities. The application of sanctions more
appropriate to the breach would promote compliance in the broader range of reporting
entity communities.
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AUSTRAC Director X, ACAMS: Anti-Money Laundering & Proceeds of Crime: Laws & Counter
Measures, above n 581.
697
AUSTRAC, Enforcement Actions <http://www.austrac.gov.au/enforcement_action.html> at 18 June
2011.

329

7.3.2 AUSTRAC is Facing a Lack of Agreement with its Partner Regulatory
Agencies, and also Regulated Entities
The Australian AML system faces two predicaments that reflect its inability to establish
and reflect the second of the four attributes, namely genuine concord and agreement
with partner agencies and with regulated entities.
a)

Disengagement in the relationship between AUSTRAC and partner agencies in
terms of their active involvement in the AML scheme;

b)

Disengagement in the relationship between AUSTRAC and reporting entities.

Disengagement exists between AUSTRAC and other partner agencies despite the
existence of MoUs. The AML system parties’ differing interests were clear: reporting
entities want to avoid sanctions, protect their reputation and make profits; AUSTRAC
(and other regulatory partner agencies such as ASIC, APRA and ACCC) want to ensure
greater reporting entity compliance behaviour; other law enforcement partner agencies
(for example, the AFP) want to reduce the threat of illegal activities, and successfully
detect and prosecute offenders; while the ATO and Department of Social Security
would like to recover monies owed.
AUSTRAC is in no better position in terms of its relationship with its reporting entities.
AUSTRAC still fails to understand the reporting entities communities and the
commercial environment in which they operate. The reporting entities are looking to
comply with the AML system not to avoid AUSTRAC sanctions but for threat reduction
purposes. Severe sanctions could be more proportionate and potentially more effective if
the regulator would use them. With these generally utilised by AUSTRAC,
unsurprisingly many still have ‘threat reduction’ uppermost in their mind.
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Great effort is needed if the current reporting entity culture regarding AML compliance
is to change. Threat reduction and avoidance of harsher sanctions could be tools to do
just that. The disconnection between AUSTRAC and the reporting entity communities
must also be decreased to the optimum minimum level, by genuine communication.
Outcomes will improve if AUSTRAC better understands the regulated community and
the regulated community better understands its AML obligations such as avoiding low
quality reports and ‘crying wolf’.
7.3.3 Australia having Controversial Legislation and Regulations which have
been affected by the Controversial Recommendations of FATF
The ‘one size fits all’ approach that was initially created by the FATF recommendations
in 2003 has caused problems in a number of areas. To its credit, the regulator has
gradually adapted its approach, but more needs to be done (as can be seen from the
interview data). Australian AML legislation and regulations need to clarify aspects of
issues relating to the reporting (and other) obligations with which the reporting entities
are to comply. These include: beneficial ownership, the best practices in verifying
customers under the CDD obligation, the uncertainty of suspicion in SUSTRs, and the
meaning of ‘risk’ under the RBA obligations.
These shortcomings pose difficulties for both reporting entities and AUSTRAC. The
use of an RBA has proved to be one of the major burdens for the reporting entities and
AUSTRAC itself. Reporting entities are still struggling with applying the RBA in the
way that AUSTRAC understands it, and AUSTRAC is struggling also on how to best
apply it to the various regulated entities.
This controversial system adds further difficulties to AUSTRAC when it decides to
enforce compliance. However, if it eventuates that AUSTRAC does not enforce some of
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the FATF rules because it believes that these rules are ineffective or have a significant
shortcomings, then AUSTRAC has a reason not to insist on the enforcement of such
rules (and move towards their amendment). It is not just a question of whether the
reporting entities are following the rules; AUSTRAC should be ensuring that the system
itself is effective. This might mean ignoring impractical rules. For example, how
effective is the reporting of SUSTRs? If it is not effective, then why is that? What do
the reporting entities think they must do, and are there problems with this requirement?
Or can intensive and relevant education, designed by and conducted in conjunction with
the regulated entities and partner agencies, or a close examination and redesign where
necessary of their roles and relationships, make their application more successful? The
answer is complex.
AUSTRAC needs to consider these questions and when it finds answers to them there
will be important consequences that will change the reporting obligation scenario and
the whole Australian AML regime positively. An improved AML system will then be in
place.
Unquestioned and broadly accepted legislation and regulation will help to achieve
superior outcomes with a greater flexibility of process and enhance the regulated entities
ability to apply self regulation as well as encourage the ‘culture of compliance’.
7.3.4 AUSTRAC Appearing to be Unable to Avoid Regulatory Capture, and
Drawing Away from its Responsibilities Due to Economic Problems
AUSTRAC’s principles of ‘transparency, efficiency, integrity and equity’ must be
rigorously upheld. Those of ‘transparency’, ‘integrity’ and ‘equity’ are particularly
relevant in relation to the areas of potential regulatory capture and the potential for
undue influence on the legislature and the regulator by the larger financial institutions or
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the financial sector. This sector was ‘the third largest industry sector’ of the Australian
economy in 2004, 698 but is now the largest industry sector (on the basis of market
capitalisation).699 Lobbyists (including former politicians) may be engaged by these
entities or their representative organisations either as external consultants or directly as
employees. AUSTRAC must be seen to be ‘holding its course’, despite the size of the
sector and the sector’s potential to negotiate from a position of strength, and also despite
changes in economic circumstances that might otherwise put pressure on AUSTRAC’s
ability to fulfill its obligations. There is no evidence of any incidence of actual undue
influence. This thesis maintains, however, that it is important for AUSTRAC not only
actually to be free from influence or political pressure and unmoved by economic
problems in terms of its processes and decision-making, but also to be seen to be free
from such pressures. This should especially be the case after its Guiding Principles are
strengthened.
AUSTRAC actions during the GFC exposed a weakness. It publicly foreshadowed that
it would be lenient with instances of non-compliant behaviour in an environment where
there was a harsh economic climate for reporting entities. Even generally high
performance regulators like the ACCC (known for its greater independence and strong
enforcement profile (compared to AUSTRAC) was influenced by the global economic
outlook and approved some bank mergers. The treasurer approved the merger as it
appears did Treasury and the ACCC at the time, despite consumer groups concerns
regarding a lessening of market competition.
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Thus, the Australian government and AUSTRAC should consider all the above
shortcomings and address the current AML system’s shortfalls.
7. 4 Recommendations
In terms of the recommendations, these can be directed to the AML system’s parties
positioned in their three categories and their respective relationships: AUSTRAC,
partner agencies and reporting entities.
7.4.1 Recommendations to AUSTRAC and Partner Agencies
As this thesis has addressed a number of shortcomings regarding (a) the enforcement
mechanism of AUSTRAC in terms of its response to non-compliance with reporting
obligations, and (b) other AUSTRAC functions, AUSTRAC should consider these
shortcomings as important issues that need quick positive action to solve them. Below
are recommendations for AUSTRAC’s operations and partner agencies participation.
1

AUSTRAC needs to consider the implementation of far greater effectiveness in
the reporting entities’ industries. This can be achieved by the sharing of
information in terms of what is the best practice, what AUSTRAC sees would
work by setting high standards, through a regulatory guidance system which is
developed in conjunction with and through a dialogue with the reporting entities’
industries. This will help AUSTRAC to set appropriate benchmarks for everybody
and make AUSTRAC’s job easier, and the reporting entities’ job clearer. This will
build a dialogue and create greater engagement between AUSTRAC and its
reporting entities. When non-compliance occurs, then it will be a reasonable
approach for AUSTRAC to enforce compliance and activate its most effective
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powers and use the variety set of sanctions it has according to the level of the
breach.
2

The balance between being a successful regulator and the effective FIU is
important to the success of AUSTRAC work in general and its enforcement
mechanism specifically. As a regulator AUSTRAC needs to abandon the policy of
‘well this is our view and you should do it even if it is not clear enough’. It risks
alienating the reporting entities on whose information is crucial in the fight
against ML. A regulator cannot risk fostering an attitude where industry supplies
low quality materials (out of fear or even disinterest), the sheer volume of which
may displace indicators of serious threats. It would be extremely unhelpful to
foster an industry attitude of ‘yeah will do whatever’ due to ‘pressure’ when that
fails to produce the best outcome for both regulator or regulated.
AUSTRAC needs to engage with reporting entities at a regulator level and benefit
from other regulators’ experiences in this domain. This will add important value
to AUSTRAC’s work, and make the operation of the AML system much easier
than it is at the current time for many businesses.

3

As Australia has relatively new legislation, it needs to revisit the Act and its
operation by considering a discussion about the applicability of certain parts of the
Act to institutions. This also should not happen separately from considering the
experiences of comparable international agencies. AUSTRAC needs to examine
what other countries are doing in enforcing compliance — for example, not just
the raw data of cases prosecuted but the number of cases taken to court (and those
successful) expressed as a proportion of reports received, and their enforcement
measures and their use. It should develop some sort of benchmarking of the
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performance of the new legislation compared to those other western countries
with developed economies.
4

AUSTRAC needs to be clearer in its communication with reporting entities in
order to ensure the adoption and maintenance of the correct OCDD and in order to
complete the KYC verification.

5

AUSTRAC must seriously consider the quality of its existing feedback and the
need for additional feedback and further guidance and explanations in areas of
uncertainty or ambiguity. AUSTRAC’s feedback should consider the quality of
reporting entity reports so as to enhance the existing controls, as the current
feedback that AUSTRAC provides through its publications has proven to be
inadequate for reporting entities to understand and deal with the AML system in
the way it expects/desires.

6

AUSTRAC should consider establishing an annual award (or perhaps a major
award and awards per key sub-sectors) and publishing the name of the financial
institution that is the best performer in terms of compliance for the year in the
annual report. Such awards can provide additional motivation for reporting
entities not only as a form of positive recognition by the regulator of their efforts
but also as an opportunity to publicise its level of compliance to the public. The
adoption of such a system might also help foster a more positive relationship with
regulatory agencies and result in helping the reporting entities to start to deal with
the AML system not from only a perspective of avoiding regulatory sanctions
(which should be enhanced) but also from a perspective that takes its threat
reduction aspect into consideration more effectively.
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7

The experience of partner agencies in enforcing compliance is richer and stronger
than AUSTRAC’s experience in this domain, as this thesis has shown. Thus,
AUSTRAC should consider this outcome and try to learn from other partner
agencies’ enforcement mechanisms, and how these agencies were be able to
activate their range of enforcement powers to enforce compliance. Such agencies
include ASIC, ACCC and APRA.

8

AUSTRAC and partner agencies such as regulators should examine the current
disengagement in their relationship and their role in combating ML activities
(according to their MoUs) and what they can achieve in terms of combating ML
crimes. This would include regulators being more involved and spending more
time in looking at AUSTRAC requests in relation to certain cases. For example,
AUSTRAC does not have the ability to revoke the licence of non-compliant
businesses but ASIC (the regulator that has the authority to give and revoke
licences of non-compliant entities) can. However, there is no evidence of an
action by ASIC or any other regulators to revoke licences of any non-compliant
entity. Here AUSTRAC should consider other partner agencies’ abilities to
activate the enforcement mechanism of the AML system, and those partner
agencies should be involved and take the AML system and its obligations as a
serious matter and one of their priorities.

9

AUSTRAC should be provided through its executive and management teams
(including: Executive General Managers, Chief Information Officer, and
Directors) with personnel with the right talents and a high enforcement profile that
would enhance the enforcement decisions in its work so that it achieves the
adequate and most effective use of its enforcement mechanism and is able to
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handle any external pressure that it might receive that could affect its enforcement
decisions. For example, AUSTRAC could benefit from the expertise of other
regulators and enforcement agencies’ staff such as ASIC, ACCC and APRA, for
its enforcement executive and management teams.
10

It is essential to remember that the reason for the need for stronger and effective
regulation is the different nature of the reporting entities. AUSTRAC needs to
consider this fact when enforcing compliance and to insure it receives high quality
information from these entities if it wants to achieve greater outcomes in the area
of AML enforcement and regulation. As a result, this will enhance the overall
outcome of the AML system by improving the quality of information that the
partner agencies such as the ATO, ASIC, ACCC, APRA, and AFP receive from
AUSTRAC.

7.4.2 Recommendations to Reporting Entities
1

Reporting entities should consider the shortcomings in the quality of their reports
and ensure that they keep up to date with and follow any amendments to the AML
system (Act and Rules) and AUSTRAC instructions so as to maximise regulatory
compliance within their institutions.

2

This thesis also urges reporting entities to determine where AUSTRAC found
shortfalls in reporting entity operations and work together to decide how to avoid
similar problems in future.

3

The reporting entities need to understand why they are reporting to AUSTRAC
and what they need to report, in order to enhance the level of compliance.
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4

The reporting entities also need to understand the use of the enforcement powers
(many of which can easily found on AUSTRAC’s website) and be able to
determine how these actions are arrived at. They are fact-based, but most likely do
not reflect all the factors that convinced AUSTRAC to take the enforcement
action. However, this understanding can be achieved with better communications
and systematic education between AUSTRAC and reporting entities.

5

In addition, reporting entities should consider the shortcomings they experience in
AUSTRAC’s and their own in-house AML training programs and put greater
efforts into communicating with AUSTRAC so that the most appropriate and
effective systematic programs that will improve the quality of the reports can be
put in place.

7. 5 Conclusion
The dilemma in the Australian AML system is clear: It is supervised by the Australian
FIU and regulator (AUSTRAC), which is suffering from a deficiency in experience in
regulating the system in the way it should be, which is affecting its enforcement
mechanism negatively. AUSTRAC has been found to have major weaknesses that make
it deviate from the four key attributes identified in this thesis. The thesis has shown that
AUSTRAC does not actively use the most effective sanctions in response to noncompliance with reporting obligations or other obligations under the AML Act and
Rules; AUSTRAC is facing a lack of agreement with its partner regulatory agencies,
and also regulated entities; and Australia has controversial legislation and regulations
which have been affected by the recommendations of the FATF that remain themselves
controversial. AUSTRAC also needs to guard against appearing to be unable to avoid
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regulatory capture, or appearing to draw away from its responsibilities due to political
pressure or economic problems.
The deficiencies do not stop at AUSTRAC operations; rather it extends to other parties
in the AML system. On one hand, regulated entities (reporting entities) in general suffer
from a lack of understanding the RBA and deficiencies in AML training programs. This
affects their level of compliance with their reporting obligations as well as other
obligations under the AML Act and Rules. On the other hand, partner agencies seem to
work separately, and at a distance, from the AML system, and their contribution in this
domain is very limited. Operational enhancements alone under AUSTRAC will not be
sufficient to deal with its current weaknesses. For example, concentrating its efforts on
enforcing small business compliance with the AML system (such as by remittance
service businesses) may just further blur the thin dividing line between achieving
AUSTRAC’s Guiding Principles — including integrity, equity, efficiency and
transparency in its operations — and adding more weaknesses to its current situation.
Such a concentration on small entities may lead to a perception that it is subject to
improper influence (whether pressure from lobbyists from larger entities or industry
sectors, or from the performance of the economy itself) and so chosen to avoid
investigating and imposing harsher sanctions on larger non-compliant reporting entities.
Maintaining sustainable improvements in the relationship between AUSTRAC and its
partner agencies could significantly assist AUSTRAC to achieve its common objectives
of addressing its enforcement mechanism and utilising it effectively. Given the features
of its regulatory culture that permits the regulator (and its partner agencies) to enforce
compliance using various enforcement powers (soft and harsh) largely at its discretion,
in the long term this necessitates that AUSTRAC develop a clear, more appropriate and
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practical solutions for the Australian AML system. AUSTRAC’s achievement of this
will result in more cost-effective surveillance by and better responses from reporting
entities in regard to compliance by their consideration of both threat reduction and
avoiding regulatory sanctions. Enhanced surveillance, detection and notification could
also discourage the proliferation of criminal intent among those with access to the
Australian financial system.
Towards this end, this thesis has made several recommendations which will improve
AUSTRAC’s operations and organisational structure, and will positively affect its work
in general and its enforcement mechanism in particular. It has also made a number of
recommendations to enhance the role of partner agencies in regard to the AML system
and the advantages that their collaboration can provide to AUSTRAC in this domain. In
addition, a number of practical solutions are suggested for reporting entities in terms of
the provision of successful AML training programs and enhancing the level of reporting
entities’ compliance in AML crimes area. Moreover, it has been clear that the thesis has
urged the federal government to find the right balance between targeting, monitoring,
and criminal justice and civil justice responses (‘steering’ rather than ‘rowing’) in
consultation with AUSTRAC and the various other key players.
While there are difficulties with the implementation of RBA in AML in Australia, and
particularly in relation to poor quality reports, and AUSTRAC’s use of its enforcement
mechanism, as well as difficulties AUSTRAC has in its relationships with both
reporting entities and partner agencies, these are not insurmountable. The benefit of
enhanced relationships achieved through better communication between regulator and
regulated entities, and the more appropriate use of the enforcement mechanism, would
provide substantial benefits for the Australian and the broader international community.
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It is well worth the effort that needs to be made to improve the Australian AML system.
It is hoped that this thesis has made a contribution to just such a process.
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APPENDIX B: PARTICIPATION INFORMATION SHEET

RESEARCH TITLE
An Evaluation of AUSTRAC’s Enforcement Mechanism Regarding Noncompliance with
Reporting Obligations

The investigators of this study:
Supervisor: Prof. John Broome, Faculty of Law/ Centre for Transnational Crime
Prevention, (phone number). (E-mail address)
Student: Mohammad AlRashdan, PhD Candidate, Faculty of Law/ Centre for
Transnational Crime Prevention, (phone number). (E-mail address)
What is the Research aim?
This research project will examine the strengths and weaknesses of the enforcement
mechanism of the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) in
dealing with non-compliance of reporting entities in regards to the reporting obligations.
It aims to identify, and critically evaluate, the factors that impact upon AUSTRAC’s
enforcement decisions. It also aims to understand how reporting entities perceptions of
AUSTRAC’s enforcement mechanism affect their responses to the reporting
obligations.
Why have I been invited to participate?
You have been invited to participate in this study because you are a representative and
one of the Compliance Department staff for an Australian Reporting Entity who has had
the duty to comply with the Australian Anti- Money Laundering Act and its reporting
obligations.
What will I be asked to do?


You will be asked to participate in a one on one interview with the researcher
that will go for approximately one hour.



You will be asked a series of questions on the Australian anti-money laundering
system including AUSTRAC, and the effectiveness of AUSTRAC in enforcing
compliance with national reporting requirements (see questions attached).



The answers you give will be recorded using a tape recorder.



A transcript will be sent to you to check. If you have any changes you will be
asked to mark them on the transcript, and return them to the researcher within
two weeks by E-mail.

Will my answers be kept confidential?
All information that is collected during the interview will remain confidential. The
information will be stored securely at Centre for Transnational Crime Prevention,
University of Wollongong. The information gained from you during the interview will
be analysed along with that of the other participants in this study and used in the
preparation of a thesis and other academic publications. No personal or identifying data
will be included.

372

How do I consent to participate?
A consent form is attached. By completing this form and bringing it on the day of the
interview with the researcher and complying with the interview process, consent will be
officially given.
What if I change my mind about participation?
At any time during the study you have the right to withdraw your consent by E-mail to
the researcher.
How will I benefit from participating in this study?
This study will not benefit you personally. However, through participating in this
research, you may be providing benefit to your institution and other reporting entities as
well as the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC). The
findings that will come from this study will be referred back to AUSTRAC.
Will participating in this study be harmful to me in anyway?
As you will be asked to answer questions that may reveal information that indicates a
lack of compliance in your institution, you will have all rights to decide which questions
to answer and which not.
The information provided will be fully de-identified before publication and it is not
anticipated that this study will cause you harm in anyway.
Who can I ask any questions I have about this study?
If you have any further questions about this study, please contact Prof. John Broome on
(phone number).You will also have the opportunity to ask questions before and during
the interview.
This study has been reviewed by the Human Research Ethics Committee (Social
Science, Humanities and Behavioural Science) of the University of Wollongong. If you
have any concerns or complaints regarding the way this research has been conducted,
you can contact the UoW Ethics Officer on (phone number).
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APPENDIX C: CONSENT FORM FOR MANAGEMENT/ ADMINISTRATIVE
STAFF

RESEARCH TITLE
An Evaluation of AUSTRAC’s Enforcement Mechanism Regarding Noncompliance with
Reporting Obligations
RESEARCHER'S NAME
Mohammad AlRashdan

I have been given information about ‘An Evaluation of the AUSTRAC Enforcement
Mechanism Regarding Noncompliance with Reporting Obligations’ and discussed the
research project with Mohammad AlRashdan who is conducting this research as part of
a PhD degree supervised by Prof. John Broome in the Faculty of Law/ Centre for
Transnational Crime Prevention at the University of Wollongong.
I understand that the only burden associated with participation in this research is the
time involved in the interview. I understand that some questions will be related to my
work place (Name of the institution) and may reveal some challenges which are
currently facing this institution. I have been informed that all information that I provide
will be treated confidentially and that I will not be identifiable in the publications
resulting from this study.
I have read the information sheet and have had an opportunity to ask Mohammad
AlRashdan any questions I may have about the research and my participation. I
understand that my participation in this research is voluntary, I am free to refuse to
participate and I am free to withdraw from the research at any time. My refusal to
participate or withdrawal of consent will not affect my treatment in any way /my
relationship with the Faculty of Law and the Centre for Transnational Crime
Prevention or my relationship with the University of Wollongong.
If I have any enquiries about the research, I can contact Mohammad AlRashdan (phone
number) or John Broome (phone number)or if I have any concerns or complaints
regarding the way the research is or has been conducted, I can contact the Ethics
Officer, Human Research Ethics Committee, Office of Research, University of
Wollongong on (phone number).
By signing below I am indicating I have consented to


Participating in the research through an interview.



Answering all questions related to this research, where I have not agreed the
question has not been answered.



The data collected from my participation will be used for Mohammad
AlRashdan’s PhD Thesis, and related publications.



Check the transcript of the interview and notify the researcher of any changes I
would like to do within two weeks.

Signed

Date

.......................................................................

......./....../......

Name (please print)
.......................................................................
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